Une Laïcité 'légitime': La France et ses religions d'État ['Legimate'Laicité: France and its State Religions.]
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This book has a catchy title and nice cover art, adding to the reader’s anticipation that it will be an absorbing—and entertaining—read. The price is reasonable, making it potentially attractive as a text. And the book is, in fact, generally quite well written. America’s romance with technology is complicated, contradictory, and confusing, and it certainly deserves more scholarly attention. However, much has already been written on this subject, not enough of which finds its way into the pages of this book. The introduction suggests that its author, fiction writer and English professor Glen Scott Allen, imagines an audience largely unfamiliar with social and cultural studies of science and technology, and tends to leave the impression that he is unfamiliar with much of this work himself.

Allen concentrates on what he sees as Americans’ suspicion of the purely scientific, as opposed to the technological, a suspicion that he correctly surmises may have roots in social class distinctions. He reports that in researching this book, he “began to wonder to what extent . . . American culture [has] shaped American scientific practice” (p. 5), as though this were an entirely original question. In Chapter One, he marvels that in 1848 the American Association for the Advancement of Science adopted promotion of the “purer” sciences as its goal (p. 17), and in general implies surprise at his discovery of the social, political, and class-based character of science (although it is not exactly clear how the AAAS vision is an argument that Americans distrust science, instead of an argument that at least some of us approve of it). He discusses the “selling” of American science in Chapter Three without any apparent reference either to the work of sociologist Dorothy Nelkin or to that of media historian Marcel Lafollette, two scholars especially well-known for their careful documentation of how media representations of science and technology have historically served this purpose. Then, in Chapter Four, Allen presents American Pragmatism without reference to John Dewey, who makes only a cameo appearance a few pages later. Surely Dewey’s contribution to Pragmatism would have been an excellent pillar on which to build any argument about American perspectives on practical knowledge.

Finally, as a postscript about two pages from the end of the entire work, Allen confesses that two issues “not specifically addressed in this book are race and gender” (p. 260). Struggling to express my reaction to this latter statement in particularly appropriate scholarly language, the phrase that seems to sum it up best is: “Well, duh!”

While some of Allen’s insights into American culture are intriguing—for example, our preference for the practical and our obsession with efficiency certainly ring true—they are not ideally persuasive as presented because of the book’s tendency to ignore too many important issues and scholars. Allen may have read more broadly in the sociology and history of science— as well as in media studies and philosophy— than this presentation of his subject matter implies; if so, he ought to have reflected this reading in what he has written here.

A dose of empiricism may be helpful in this context. While it seems to be true (on the basis of most relevant opinion polls) that today’s Americans prefer science that has economic or social benefits (for example, science that creates jobs, health, and wealth), it is also true that Americans continue to like and trust science as well as technology (even while some segments are doubtful about specific points, such as evolution and climate change). If, as Allen apparently takes as his premise, suspicion of all things purely scientific is a peculiarly American cultural...
characteristic, then what is wrong with all these polls? And are there really no heroic images of scientists to be found in American popular culture that effectively compete with the “wicked” ones? Not Einstein, not Schweitzer? If not, and if popular culture is such a reliable window on popular sentiment, then why is it so clearly at odds with public opinion? More likely, our relationship with science is simply a complicated one, with cautionary morality tales consistently reminding us that some science, some of the time, can run amok, coexisting alongside less critical perspectives.

That public perceptions of technical expertise (“master mechanics”) should be different from those of more purely scientific genius (“wicked wizards”) is plausible, if arguably overdrawn in this volume. Even if accurate, this tendency likely began earlier than Allen’s focus on a couple of recent centuries in colonial and post-colonial North America is capable of detecting. Longer-standing class divisions between (working class) tradespeople possessed of “technical” knowledge and early (upper class, usually white and male) scientists may be one root he overlooks by focusing so closely on the recent history of North America, which hardly created this distinction. Allen’s effort would have been more valuable had it been set in the context of more of the work—and history—that preceded it.


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Motivated to explain why many male participants in his assorted qualitative studies reject expressing orthodox styles of masculinity, Eric Anderson inductively develops “inclusive masculinity” theory. This model challenges Raewyn Connell’s prevailing theory of hegemonic masculinity. Anderson selectively draws on several theoretical traditions, including social constructionism, and pooled data from multiple ethnographies and interview studies that include largely white, middle-class, university-attending men in the United States and Britain. A total of 276 interviews with gay male athletes, fraternity brothers, rugby and soccer players, male cheerleaders, and others, inform Anderson’s thinking—214 interviews “formally feed the results” (p. 15).

Anderson links his notion of inclusive masculinity to the degree to which homohysteria—a combination of the “culture of homophobia, femphobia, and compulsory heterosexuality” (p. 7)—gains traction in a particular cultural context. For Anderson, three cultural phases contribute to how gender relations occur: high homohysteria, diminishing homohysteria, and diminished homohysteria. Whereas a hegemonic or dominating pattern of masculinity typically characterizes the first phase, a less hierarchical model is expected to surface once homohysteria diminishes.

Anderson’s qualitative research and personal observations as a sociology professor, gay man, and former coach lead him to believe that, on average, recent cohorts of young men (and women) in North American and many European cultures perceive and experience gender relations, masculinity in particular, differently than their older counterparts. Accordingly, he argues, as gender norms become more fluid and alternative expressions of masculinity gain wider acceptance, men are less apt to embrace an orthodox, hegemonic version of masculinity. Instead, alternative expressions of masculinities are thought to co-exist on an increasing level playing field and compete for boys’ and men’s recognition.

In his introductory remarks, Anderson promises to render his ideas in a manner “accessible for public consumption” because he is committed to “emancipatory research” (p. 14). On this front, Anderson achieves mixed success. Some sections are lively, flow well, and are likely to engage academic and nonacademic readers alike; others are cumbersome, redundant, and resemble textbook prose with extensive foreshadowing and summary. Many lay readers, and some academics, will lose interest when they encounter the latter. Although the book would have benefited from an additional
round or two of serious editing and proofreading, plenty of creative thinking and provocative analysis can be found.

The book is divided into three parts: orthodox masculinity, inclusive masculinity theory, and inclusive masculinities. In Chapter Six Anderson summarizes the central tenets of his theoretical framework, even though he is too imprecise when talking about “culture” here and elsewhere in the book, sometimes confounding it with subcultural activity. That said, this chapter should be required reading for students of men and masculinities.

Anderson apparently has access to a wealth of intriguing qualitative data, but one is sometimes left feeling that he had not dug deeply enough into his field notes and interviews to explore the processes that foster and curtail displays of inclusive masculinity. More could have been heard directly from the men about how they navigated the unusual terrain many have traversed, and the conditions that serve as “tipping points” for getting men to adopt inclusive masculinities.

Overall, there is much to like about this book. First, Anderson presents a persuasive case that gendered team sports continue to slow down the march toward gender justice. At the same time, he demonstrates how inclusive forms of masculinity have recently and increasingly emerged in selective sports venues, sometimes in surprising ways, such as male soccer players kissing teammates on the lips without any apparent loss of masculine capital. Second, Anderson accentuates inspiring stories of individual men effecting how masculinity is constructed in different groups and organizations—primarily those comprised of all males. Third, his creative integration of multiple observational studies is to be scrutinized, duplicated in some ways, and commended.

Anderson’s unique style of immersing himself in a number of field settings as a gay man/professor most likely enhanced his ability to get a rare first-hand glimpse of unconventional gendered practices among men. His methodological descriptions and commentaries about his exceedingly casual style of interacting with participants, collecting data, and relating to his own students raise provocative methodological questions. Has Anderson unveiled fascinating patterns that exist largely intact outside his influence, or has his participatory approach led him to co-construct interpersonal exchanges and narratives that are inextricably tied to his engaging and “out” presentation of self? This question may not matter to some, but if the latter is true, then it is a bigger leap to speculate that inclusive masculinities are regularly springing up among men from other demographics or in other contexts. Perhaps much of what Anderson and his assistants have observed and reported transcends a self-serving “front.”

To his credit, Anderson on several occasions acknowledges that his conclusions are not meant to extend beyond his limited samples. While provocative, his conclusion that inclusive masculinities are much more common among younger cohorts of men must be tempered because very little can be said about intersectionality issues based on these data. Ideally, his clever research will inspire other scholars to examine how relevant a model of inclusive masculinity is to men who are situated differently in terms of race/ethnicity, social class, and age. For those interested in gender studies, and issues involving men and masculinities more specifically, read Anderson’s Inclusive Masculinity: The Changing Nature of Masculinities closely, and evaluate this fresh perspective themselves.
scientists and theologians. Contemporary sociologists have also accepted what historians have been saying for years, which is that the “warfare” thesis should be rejected – science and religion have not been at war for hundreds of years. Rather, members of particular religions have clashed with particular types of science in particular places over a very limited number of issues.

The edited volume *The Religion and Science Debate* is a compilation of short talks given at a panel at Yale that revisits this long time debate. There are chapters written by two scientists (Kenneth R. Miller, Lawrence M. Krauss), a philosopher (Alvin Plantinga), a historian (Ronald Numbers) and a sociologist (Robert Wuthnow). They were asked to focus on debates over evolution, and the talks seem to have been written for an audience of nonspecialists.

The first aspect of this book that will disappoint sociologists is that the scientists seemed to be engaged in a different writing task from the others. The scientists are activists who have written extended arguments against the intelligent design theory and then conclude with a call for a negotiated settlement between religion and science along the lines of Stephen J. Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria, where science makes claims about the physical world and religion makes claims on the meaning of it all. The other essays are more analytic. A second aspect that will disappoint sociologists is that by focusing on evolution the organizers of the panel were essentially selecting the dependent variable. Evolution is the only scientific claim in the modern world where religious people are “opposed” to science. So, the volume should have been called “the Religion and Science Debate Over Evolution.” Finally, most of the essays are focused on elite discourse, without acknowledging a distinction between the elites they are describing and ordinary religious people.

The book does not hang together as a unit, but readers may be interested in individual chapters. Biologist Kenneth Miller’s chapter is an account of how the forces of Intelligent Design (ID) have been defeated in recent debates. With subsection headings such as “smashing the icons of ID” the reader is given a tour of, for example, the court trial in 2005 where the ID advocates decisively lost. In the last few pages the author, using Augustine, argues for a version of Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria. Physicist Lawrence Krauss’ essay is even less analytic, and has the tone of rallying the troops for battle. The central question is why the public does not accept the scientific truth of things, and a finger is pointed at failures of science education. (This implicitly references the knowledge-deficit model that few sociologists would accept.) He also complains that journalists give equal time to critics of evolution, whereas journalists would never give equal time to a holocaust denier. ID advocates are compared to the Taliban, and he repeats Miller by describing why ID is wrong. Along the way he reveals what sociologists already know about ID advocates— that they are primarily motivated by concern over what they see as the morality taught by materialist science.

Unrelated to these essays, but useful for sociologists, is historian Ronald Numbers’ essay, which provides a nice example of how “science” and “religion” have not always been at war. Religion and science were best friends at various points of world and American history, with any conflict being based on specific issues in specific times. Conflict on an elite level did begin in the nineteenth century when secularizing scientists used science as a weapon against theologians and religion more generally. Darwin was the main issue. Numbers’ essay does not cover new ground for those familiar with this literature, but it will be informative as an overview to undergraduates and others.

Philosopher of religion Alvin Plantinga makes the sort of subtle distinctions from which sociologists could benefit in their work. He separates secularism with respect to the scientific method from secularism tout court, where all of life can proceed without reference to the supernatural. People on both sides of the debate abuse this distinction, he claims, with some scientists and religious people presuming science must mean secularism tout court. Plantinga uses as an example the assertion by Richard Dawkins that evolution must be unguided, while Plantinga points out that it is not inconsistent with science that God is directing the mutations.
As we might imagine, the one sociologist in this volume, Robert Wuthnow, produces the essay that will be of most interest to sociologists. His is the only essay that does not presume that Dawkins represents “science” and that Jerry Falwell represents “religion.” Instead of assuming conflict, he asks why ordinary Americans do not see a conflict between science and religion. He points out that these “debates” are irrelevant to the lives of most Americans, who think of science as just delivering useful goods like medicine. He also develops, consistent with contemporary cultural sociology, a way of describing how people can be “inconsistent” when believing in both religion and science.

Scholars looking for data on the reactions from elite scientists to ID should examine the chapters from Miller and Krauss. Those looking for a nice summary of the history of religion and science in the United States should consult Numbers’ essay. Plantinga’s essay can be used to see how the scientific method is often equated with scientism in these elite debates. Wuthnow’s essay should be consulted by sociologists interested in science and religion, because of the useful discussion of how ordinary people can have a different conclusion than the elites.


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Two decades of neo-liberalism and global trade agreements have marked a new era in global policy and contentious politics. Far-reaching and drastically restructuring regional trade policies were passed at the exclusion of a multitude of voices. The process, context and results of trade agreements have resulted in an ongoing and conflicting struggle in the global public sphere. Questions of state sovereignty, inequality and democracy have arisen under the conditions brought fourth by free market imperatives. Such dissent was punctuated by large-scale public protests and demonstrations at places such as the WTO meetings in Seattle a decade ago. While this phenomenon is obviously global, North America presents a distinct case of transnational governance and conflict over neo-liberalism. Since the passage of NAFTA, scholars, activists and policy makers have grappled with the implications of continental integration. Intersecting the phenomena of continental trade liberalization has been a state-initiated expansion of the national security and surveillance apparatus. In tandem with this expansion of state power has been a movement toward cooperation among sovereign actors in the establishment of a global security state.

While much research has examined the economic and political aspects of NAFTA and unfettered trade, relatively few studies have examined the contentious struggles that have emerged in response to regional integration. These struggles open multiple avenues of inquiry for sociological analysis. While transnational trade agreements are generally divisive and exclusive, they generate more opportunities for collaboration among dissenting movement actors within nations and across borders. For these reasons, Contentious Politics in North America is a welcome and timely contribution to our understanding of collaborative protest movements in the neoliberal era. This volume presents a generous and varying compilation of scholarship related to issues of protest and contention in response to economic integration.

Focusing on the experience of North America, this book compiles the contributions of several scholars into eleven chapters on the contentious politics underscoring liberalization and the resulting alliances and rifts that ensued between various non-state actors. Overall, the book is well-structured, giving a harmonious yet counterbalancing look at mobilizations against free trade and the expansion of state power. The volume begins with the editors’ exposition that contextualizes the various political dilemmas in an economically integrated continent. Jeffery Ayres and Laura Macdonald organize the content of the book into three key areas of discussion: social movements, transnational politics and global convergence. They seamlessly
combine a diverse collection of works examining questions of cross-boarder contention along with ideas of where we are going in the future. Most of the contributions draw heavily from established social movement literatures, examining the unique characteristics of the fight over regional trade agreements, especially NAFTA. The book situates a variety of perspectives on the two-decade long struggle over trade liberalization and economic integration on the North American continent. The first section of the book places the struggle over trade within the larger political economic context of neoliberalism. Underpinning this problem are issues of state sovereignty and control in the wake of new security threats such as September 11th. The second section features five distinct cases of national and transnational instances of organizing and mobilization of contentious politics. The third section includes an examination of how specific social movement organizations (SMOs) such as the labor and environmental movements have contested the policies of regional governance.

Unique to this book are several chapters that discuss national movements within the context of continental integration. For example, one chapter details specific actions distinct to Quebec while another chapter examines several cases of social movements and contentions in Mexico. A refreshing and perceptive work by Armando Bartra and Gerardo Otero examines how peasant movements in Mexico are influenced by liberalization. This piece demonstrates how movement actors interact with each other and aim to negotiate and exert pressure on the state. Other chapters explore broad and trans-boarder coalitions that formed in Mexico, Canada and the United States in the wake of the economic integration of North America. Specific social movements and SMOs have been transformed also in the interactive discords over trade. For example, one chapter gives an astute analysis of how alliances and conflicts within and among SMOs such as the labor and environmental movements have been altered by the fight over NAFTA and neoliberalism. The book concludes with a provocative piece by Stephanie Golob that argues the map of the regional system is not yet fixed and could be altered by counter-hegemonic and democratic forces.

While concise and well-organized, the book does have a few areas that could be critiqued. The first chapter gives a succinct appraisal of the structural logic of continental integration and conflict, yet the scope of the book could be better oriented with a deeper look at continental integration within the larger context of global capitalism. For instance, situating the struggle over trade agreements in North America within a world-systems perspective could yield a more comprehensive understanding of the problem of regional trade agreements (i.e., how core countries dominate peripheral ones). More attention could have been given to the question of state power and sovereignty in a post-9/11 environment, as was problematized in the second chapter. That said, these are relatively minor shortcomings and are vastly outweighed by the overall strength of the book as a whole.

In all, the book is a much-needed contribution and it should appeal to a wide audience of academics. Ideally, this volume will provoke more debate and critically needed scholarship related to the questions of contentious politics in the era of free trade and integration.

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In this meticulously researched, theoretically sophisticated, and thought-provoking book, Stanley Bailey offers new findings and insights regarding the topic of race in Brazil. Scholars of race in Brazil have long been interested in racial group boundaries, the myth of racial democracy, and anti-racist mobilization. Currently, researchers are attempting to assess the impact of recent, momentous changes in Brazil, such as the implementation of racial quotas. Covering these critical topics, Bailey uses data from

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three major Brazilian surveys on racial attitudes, spanning 1995 to 2002, to create a unique study. *Legacies of Race* is extraordinary both in terms of its successful advancement of the field of race in a manner which will interest general scholars of race, and its significance as a seminal text in the evolution of race scholarship in the Americas.

This book is replete with new findings and theoretical advances. A highlight is Bailey’s discussion of the concept of “antiracialism,” which he argues is well-suited to contexts where there are weak racial subjectivities and racial ambiguity. Another contribution is Bailey’s creative attempt to both define and measure the concept of racial groupness, a concept that unfortunately is rarely the subject of empirical investigation despite its central importance to the study of race. Through careful analysis, Bailey demonstrates the weakness and ambiguity of Brazilian racial group boundaries thus creating the foundation for a major argument of his book—that dominant theories on racial attitudes (mostly derived from the U.S. case) are ineffective in the Brazilian context because they assume high levels of groupness. Presenting counterintuitive findings, Bailey demonstrates how race does not determine racial attitudes in Brazil.

On another front, Bailey engages questions of social movements and public policy. He speaks to the conundrum of the historical lack of success of black movements in Brazil, a country stratified by color. Challenging the dominant response to this enigma, which blames Afro-Brazilians for their putative failure to recognize racism or to identify as black, Bailey critiques the strategies of the movements themselves, arguing that their racialist, bi-polar racial dynamics are incompatible with popular understandings of race. Contributing to the cutting-edge feel of the book, Bailey also assesses the impact of recent affirmative action policies in Brazil which employ a dichotomous racial format, finding that this approach often excludes multiracials from racial quotas.

Bailey’s most impactful (and also most controversial) contribution is his forceful challenge of the dominant stance in the literature—that Brazil’s national ideology of racial democracy has created a situation in which everyday Brazilians do not recognize racism. He finds strong support for the idea that Brazilians of all colors not only recognize racism but also support anti-racist organizing and race-targeted policies such as affirmative action. Based on these findings, Bailey argues that the myth of racial democracy is best understood as a creed of racial egalitarianism. More importantly, he suggests that this ideology could be harnessed to combat racial discrimination.

The strengths of this text are multi-fold. Bailey adeptly manages to produce an in-depth analysis of core topics surrounding the study of race in Brazil while simultaneously building conceptual and theoretical bridges with scholars of race in the United States. Bailey’s novel data and innovative approach move us significantly closer to understanding the Brazilian puzzle of race. Methodologically, the analysis is consistently rigorous. Bailey is refreshingly honest regarding the limitations of his research and continually engages various interpretations of his data. Readers will find this book very accessible and clearly written.

Despite its many strengths, this book has a few limitations. Bailey’s discussion of boundaries in the Brazilian case is a bit circular. From the onset, Bailey establishes the weakness of Brazilian racial-group boundaries but then proceeds to test theories which assume high levels of groupness. He then, not surprisingly, demonstrates their ineffectiveness. This theme is repeated over various chapters. At some point one wonders how productive it is to repeatedly engage with U.S.-based theories whose assumptions violate the Brazilian situation. Nevertheless, Bailey succeeds in making his point regarding their ineffectiveness.

Another limitation of this book is Bailey’s reluctance to stake out a clear position on some of the most controversial issues related to race in Brazil (e.g. affirmative action, the adoption of a dichotomous racial system). Bailey stays very close to his data, maintaining a safe distance from the most heated debates in the field. At some point the reader yearns for him to detach himself from discussion of the empirical findings, leave his cautious approach behind, and hear his voice on the matter, especially given the revolutionary nature of his findings.
A final limitation surrounding Bailey’s research is the question of whether or not his findings merely reflect a new era of racial attitudes in Brazil. If they indeed capture an attitudinal shift, then Bailey is well positioned to address this new moment; he is on less stable ground when attempting to speak to earlier attitudes as well as the overall essence and effect of the myth of racial democracy. Bailey is aware of this perceived limitation and draws on earlier data to suggest that racial attitudes similar to the ones he found were held decades earlier. However, these data are much less conclusive and, ultimately, the question of whether or not Bailey’s data are representative of earlier time periods remains unanswered. However, given Bailey’s desire to speak to the myth of racial democracy more broadly, it may have been worthwhile to move beyond the Brazilian context. In other Latin American countries, where national ideologies are similar to that of Brazil’s racial democracy, there is evidence that suggests these ideologies have resulted in a popular denial of racism and have inhibited anti-racist efforts. In any case, the verdict is still out regarding the effects of such national ideologies. Needless to say, this book is likely to spark tremendous debate. As Bailey himself acknowledges, this book will not settle many of the debates in the field. In fact, the real debates have just begun.


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Slavery. You may think it is a relic of the past or a contemporary feature of the global South, but if so, sociologist Kevin Bales and his co-author, historian Ron Soodalter want you to know that you are wrong. Slavery, involving the violent or coercive control of another person in order to profit from their labor, and human trafficking, the process by which a person is brought into enslavement, are alive and well and occurring in our own backyard. Bales, President of the nonprofit Free the Slaves in Washington, DC, trustee of Anti-Slavery International, and consultant to the United Nations Global Program on Trafficking of Human Beings, adds this book to his list of numerous publications aimed at raising awareness about contemporary slavery and motivating readers to take steps to eliminate it. The Slave Next Door: Human Trafficking and Slavery in America Today is an answer to those who would say that Bales has focused too little on countries of the global North.

In the first part of the book Bales and Soodalter embark upon what amounts to an extended public education campaign on contemporary American slavery that reads much like the “Free the Slaves” website. It contains an introduction to and overview of slavery coupled with disturbing vignettes and language geared to motivate the reader to act. Case after case is presented, from the abused 12-year old domestic worker in Texas, whose story opens the book, to the well-publicized and successfully prosecuted case of Chinese and Vietnamese garment workers at the Daewoosa factory in American Samoa. “House slaves,” agricultural slaves, and sex slaves warrant a chapter each, because domestic workers, farmworkers, and women and girls in prostitution are thought to make up the largest proportion of those trapped in modern-day slavery in the United States. Each case exemplifies slavery as a relationship in which slavers threaten or employ violence because they find the control “intoxicating and addictive” and slaves do not run away because they are physically or psychologically coerced.

In the second part, the authors devote attention to the identification of slavery in local communities, and they analyze state and federal responses to it. Here the authors draw on copious interviews, news reports and research studies to describe some of the most pressing policy problems. Though many American states now have anti-trafficking laws, they too often lack adequate provisions for victim protection and assistance, they have widely varying content, and they remain troubled by an ongoing debate about whether or not all prostitution
can be defined as slavery. States do not always provide resources for implementation, either, so some legislation remains symbolic. This may be in part because the federal government funds victim services through the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), so that state officials claim it is not their responsibility or because they simply believe that trafficking is not very common. The authors concede that empirical data on trafficking and slavery are lacking, but suggest a conservative estimate of 50,000 slaves in the United States. What is certain is that few victims of trafficking and slavery and even fewer traffickers are being found: only 111 cases were prosecuted by the Department of Justice in 2006.

Federal agencies receive mixed assessments in the book. The Department of State, for example, garners high marks for funding and monitoring anti-trafficking projects abroad, and for the annual Trafficking in Persons report. Politically motivated applications of sanctions based on the reports, lack of an independent mechanism by which the U.S. government can assess its own trafficking responses, and an overall lack of strategy and coordination in the Department’s Office to Combat and Monitor Trafficking in Persons are identified as problems. Much more criticism is aimed at HHS for its per capita funding of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which has left some of them underfunded and faced with the prospect of finding their own clients. HHS is also faulted for failing to quickly certify victims so that they can receive needed services, for focusing on U.S. children in prostitution as victims of trafficking rather than on foreign-born victims and victims of other types of slavery, and for contracting one-third of its trafficking budget to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, which oversees funding to over 90 subcontractors providing victim services. Not only has HHS required a controversial anti-prostitution pledge from NGOs receiving funding, but HHS money filtered through the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops cannot be used to provide funding for contraception or abortions for trafficking victims.

NGOs are optimistically positioned in the book as the mechanisms through which slavery can be ended once and for all. If individuals in their own communities would help to identify victims and support NGOs providing victim assistance and press governmental officials for better anti-slavery policies and consistent implementation, then slavery would be eradicated. The authors also support partnerships with businesses to eliminate slavery in the supply chain, because they believe that boycotts penalize the majority of ethical businesses that do not use slave labor, harm poor workers, and move slavery to other geographic areas. Rugmark and the International Cocoa Initiative are offered as two good examples of efforts to stop slavery at its source, but the authors do not mention persistent critiques that such initiatives are more symbolic than effective, because they lack accountability and do little to change existing business and labor practices.

All of the authors’ suggestions fit squarely within a human rights approach to trafficking and slavery, which simplifies the issue, as well as its solution, and ties it up with a neat bow. This may be reassuring for the general reader, but for sociologists, it raises more questions than answers. For example, what is the actual frequency and scope of the problem in the United States and how can we best determine that? Do different types of slavery have the same causes, employ the same methods, draw upon or reinforce gender, ethnic, and class inequalities in the same ways? Policy debates about funding and service provision surely require answers to these questions as do any attempts to develop strategies to combat slavery. How common are unfair and exploitive labor conditions and when and why do they lend themselves to slavery? Though the authors do touch on governmental reforms to guestworker and visa programs, slavery is left curiously detached from broader issues of decent work and routine business and labor practices within and across countries. Lastly, what are the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs in eradicating slavery? This question is especially pressing, given the exponential increase of NGOs in recent years and their heightened role in global governance. Academics and activists who work on trafficking, slavery and human rights will find interesting details in the book, but there is much sociological
research, analysis, and theorizing of contemporary trafficking and slavery yet to be done.


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When Things Fell Apart is a highly readable and insightful account into the post-independence problems of sub-Saharan Africa. The central question of the book is why sub-Saharan Africa has been the one major world region that has not shown consistent economic development since independence. Robert Bates argues that the weakness of post-colonial states created a dynamic in which political elites benefited personally by instituting policies that channeled resources to a small urban elite—in some cases very small—to the general detriment of the broader rural agrarian population.

At their time of independence, several African states were well positioned for economic success and political stability. Uganda was one of the wealthiest British colonies in Africa, while several other African states including Nigeria, Angola, and the Gold Coast boasted a wealth of natural resources that should have given these states a head start on economic development. Yet a half-century later, sub-Saharan Africa is a sad exception to the economic progress and political democratization that has marked most other regions of the world. Robert H. Bates provides a compelling answer to the puzzle: what happened to Africa?

First, Bates points out that independence left political power concentrated in the hands of a tiny handful of elites. These elites tended to reinforce their political power by outlawing opposition parties and in many cases instituting military rule. Bates notes that approximately one-third of African state leaders might be viewed as “specialists in violence,” due to their origins in the armed forces.

Second, these elites instituted economic control regimes, in which the government—chiefly the president or a very small minority—created policies that controlled international trade, banking and currency, and protected domestic industries which were often owned by elites. In effect, these policies amounted to a tax on agriculture which discouraged economic growth. Although economic development was hampered when the economy was controlled in this way, rather than being left to market forces, these policies tended to be maintained because of the private benefits that accrued to the president and his cronies.

Third, global economic shocks further weakened these economies. This distortion of economic forces worked adequately during times of economic prosperity, such as the oil booms of the 1970s, or for countries with plentiful natural resources. Yet in times of global economic crisis, the policies further disadvantaged the disenfranchised majority of the population. As public revenues decreased, public servants and the military turned to corruption and looting to supplement their incomes. Government services declined in quality.

Fourth, these practices led to both internal and external pressures for change. As domestic conditions worsened, many countries experienced an explosion of popular grievances and protest, ranging in severity from disturbances and rioting to civil war. Likewise, external organizations such as the World Bank or donors from industrialized countries began to press for economic and political reforms. In particular, increased pressure for democratic reforms was envisioned as increasing broad political rights and participation. These reforms threatened the power of the political elites.

In the end, these processes weakened the governments of sub-Saharan Africa. Few states in Africa experienced consistent economic development, despite the initial bounty of natural resources enjoyed by some. Nearly half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa experienced large-scale civil war since independence. Ten percent of the states in Africa were considered failed states at some point.

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Bates outlines a general dynamic in which economic mismanagement leads to political rebellion. Yet in some states, political disorder preceded economic downturns—in some cases, marked the onset of independence. In the Congo/Zaire for instance, government officials had barely unpacked their moving boxes when civil war erupted within the first six weeks of independence. Professor Bates does not consider the colonial policies which may have already predisposed the states of sub-Saharan Africa to particular weaknesses. In other cases, state weakness might have been precipitated by struggles among elites to establish structures that work in their favor in the early days of independence. From this perspective, the mismanagement of economic policy might be seen as the result of efforts to weaken political opposition, rather than the cause.

Bates also does not seek to explain the few rare African states which experienced economic growth and escaped the costs of intractable civil war: a few states in sub-Saharan Africa seem to have escaped the downward spiral of state weakness, economic corruption, and civil war. An examination of the relative successes of Equatorial Guinea, Botswana, or the Maldives in avoiding some of these ills might have further illuminated the more common story of economic deterioration and war. Nevertheless, When Things Fell Apart provides an excellent account of the dynamics of decline which beset the majority of states in sub-Saharan Africa.

Bates tackles a challenging puzzle and does an impressive job explaining the failures in sub-Saharan Africa. Bates skillfully provides evidence for his argument suited to multi-disciplinary audiences. He illustrates his argument with game theory examples, yet supplements with a wealth of historical examples from Zambia, Rwanda, and several other countries to persuade those unfamiliar or skeptical of game theory arguments. He also provides statistical models that utilize conditional logit for pooled time series data for those convinced by quantitative analyses. Yet the bulk of evidence comes from case histories of sub-Saharan African countries, which make the book accessible to undergraduate audiences as well as seasoned Africa hands.


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Little Kiddies are big money for big capitalism. Whether they go to market or stay home, eat roast beef or have none, they can’t outrun the ever more voracious corporate wolves who hunt them wherever they may be. Sharon Beder argues that the major problems facing children in affluent countries today “are a direct result of the efforts of corporations to make profits from children and to shape and socialize them to suit business interests” (p. 5), and that such “corporate interference in children’s lives and psyches” has produced “a rapid decline in children’s well-being” (p. 3). That is a strong claim, and Beder (with contributions from her coauthors in two chapters) culls a wide array of studies and statistics to support it, drawing especially from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.

The most obvious arena for this interference is consumption. Marketing to children has radically increased over the past generation, up an amazing 170 times from $100 million in 1983 in the United States to almost $17 billion by 2007. As Daniel Cook, Juliet Schor and others have shown, marketers have specifically targeted children for deliberate socialization into consumerism, from inculcating brand identification, to identifying with products as “cool,” to encouraging children to nag parents. In the mid-nineties marketers began to bypass parents and penetrate young psyches directly, targeting children through one of the most basic channels of socialization and identity formation: play. Through television and computer advertising, typically linked with cartoon play characters, children learn to play through commercialized media, and to desire its seductive commodities: toys, dolls, etc. Play has become increasingly identified with commodities, and Beder tracks the money trails in early chapters.
One in three children born in the United States in 2000 are predicted to develop diabetes, 17 percent today are obese, and one third are overweight: facts that testify to the radical reshaping and capture of children’s bodies by the food industries. Beder shows how corporate responses to studies, such as one on childhood obesity in 2002 by the World Health Organization, are typically to deny or lobby against them, or to sponsor ones favorable to industry. Coca-Cola, for example, sponsored an Australian government study which shifted major blame for obesity rates from diet to declining physical activity.

The majority of the book traces ways in which corporate powers have influenced education, not only intruding commercial materials into the refuge of the classroom, but promoting a shift toward education as simply a business. The reduction of funding for schools in many English-speaking countries, which began in the 1980s as part of neoliberal policies, not only helped to reduce corporate tax burdens, but also left schools more vulnerable to corporate intrusions. Corporate “beneficence” could make up the difference with self-serving sponsored educational materials, as Beder documents.

Corporate power, through foundations and the presence of CEOs on many educational advocacy groups, has pushed to transform schools into a business model of education. Yet, as Beder states, “Learning should be about discovery, exploration, and curiosity, not just performance and achievement, which is all the business model is concerned with” (p. 70). Teaching for testing, such as tended to result from the “No Child Left Behind” policy, tends to displace teaching for learning.

Beder also strongly criticizes advocacy of “back to basics” models as supporting conformism instead of critical thinking, citing core curricula as one example. But in seeing core curricula as merely presenting “cleansed” views of history and promoting a status quo of compliant student consumers, she avoids the ways the progressive agenda also morphed into postmodern ideology in which relativism rules and anything goes. She ignores how there might be some good things in basics, such as great works or memorization, especially in a world where kids have outsourced their memories and identities to commercialized screens all too eager to condition their awareness. Or what about an anti-corporate revival of basic daily physical education in gym, free play in recess, healthy school lunches, a back to basics program I’ll call “no child left with a fat behind.”

A new Kaiser Foundation study has found that children’s media use has expanded far faster in the past five years than in the five years before that, despite the belief of its authors five years ago that media use had reached a ceiling and could not expand any more. Children 8 to 18 report spending more than 7 ½ hours per day interacting with media devices, though when multitasking is considered, the time goes up to over 11 hours of content. Much of this content is commercial, and so it appears that these little kiddies are going to market virtually all of their spare time. The dynamics of how kiddies get captured speak not only of corporate consumerist capitalism maximizing itself, which This Little Kiddy Went to Market amply documents, but also of unbounded technological innovation as another agent of the transformation of social lives and identities.
of families and individuals. Typically forced to rely on secondary data gathered for other purposes, researchers have often found themselves in the awkward position of drawing conclusions on the basis of an empirically truncated assessment of the core thesis.

Some 30 years after Distinction’s publication, Tony Bennett, Mike Savage, Elizabeth Silva, Alan Warde, Modesto Gayo-Cal, and David Wright have finally remedied this situation. Using what one assumes were considerable grant funds, the authors have collected superb data from respondents throughout the United Kingdom on an exceptionally broad range of cultural preferences and activities. Especially impressive is the fact that they have embraced a multi-method strategy. The data they analyze is composed of a set of focus group discussions, a representative (when weighted) survey, a set of open-ended interviews with a small subset of survey respondents, and a handful of interviews with “elites” occupying high positions in business, academia, government, and the labor movement. The data collection instruments and sampling strategies appear to have been well thought out and executed, with the authors keeping one eye focused firmly on Bourdieu and the other on more recent debates and issues (such as the spread of digital media). As a result, the data alone are enough to guarantee that this work will remain at the center of discussions of taste in the foreseeable future.

That said, Bennett et al. have also put the data to good use. Perhaps their most interesting choice was to analyze the survey not (primarily) with the standard tools of linear modeling, but with Multiple Correspondence Analysis (a form of principal component analysis). While MCA was Bourdieu’s preferred statistical tool, the authors clearly were not motivated by blind loyalty, as they are more than willing—indeed, enthusiastic—to depart from him in other respects. Instead, they have made the calculated decision that this is simply the best means to answer many of the questions which motivate the project. The book stands as an artful reminder that regression analysis is not the last word in quantitative analysis; and the combination of MCA and qualitative analysis presents an intriguing version of multi-method research.

The empirical analysis opens with a global model, derived from the survey data, of the patterning of cultural orientations. This is followed by a series of chapters that examine individual “fields” of cultural activity (music, visual culture, etc.) in greater depth, drawing heavily on qualitative material. Finally, a series of chapters assesses the relation between cultural consumption and different dimensions of stratification in detail.

The global model establishes that a number of tastes and practices are distributed more or less uniformly across the “cultural space,” rather than clustering with other tastes and practices. However, a very substantial number do cluster, and together constitute a map of cultural differences in contemporary Britain. The map is defined by four axes of variation. The first (statistically most powerful) axis distinguishes those with high levels of cultural participation and an array of cultural enthusiasms from those exhibiting very low levels of engagement and a preponderance of dislikes. The analysis establishes that this axis corresponds quite closely to both occupational class and educational attainment. To be sure, there is considerable overlap in the tastes and practices of adjacent educational and occupational groups. Nevertheless, culture undeniably marks class in the United Kingdom.

The chapters dealing with particular cultural fields amplify—but also complicate—the findings from the global model in myriad ways. At a general level, the researchers report that “highbrow” cultural tastes—fine art, classical music and opera, modern literature, and so on—remain the near-exclusive province of the economically and educationally privileged segments of the population. But whereas lack of knowledge concerning classical music no longer appears to trigger discomfort or defensiveness, lack of knowledge concerning the visual arts does. In the musical arena, “omnivorism”—understood to entail a taste for a large variety of genres which also spans the highbrow/lowbrow divide—is a fairly rare phenomenon. Choice of newspaper and quantity of television watching are strongly class-linked; the proclivity to eat out and cuisine preferences...
are similarly tied to economic and cultural capital, but domestic eating habits do not appear to be.

The most provocative finding in the book lies in the authors’ claim that, absent a few residual traces, one can no longer identify anything approximating a distinctive working-class culture in the United Kingdom. Working-class respondents are disproportionately unlikely to engage in most of the cultural activities that figure in the global map, and on a large range of taste measures, it is their expressions of dislike which register. The qualitative data suggest that, for members of this class, “taste is a means of identifying social groups, and is clearly associated with a sense of social hierarchy.” Bennett et al. are careful to clarify that the dissolution of a distinctive aesthetic does not imply Putnam-esque social isolation, much less some kind of general anomie: members of the working-class remain engaged with various elements of “popular” culture—but these are in no way distinguishing. One likely reason for this partial convergence of taste profiles, the authors speculate, is the emergence of an omnivorous orientation among the upper classes, with its in-built tendency to “usurp” elements that, in the past, had been located more or less exclusively in working-class cultural repertoires.

Also highly interesting is the chapter on gender stratification. The third axis of the map of cultural differences distinguishes what the authors refer to as “inwardly” and “outwardly” directed orientations. This distinction underlies preferences for different genres of film (romance versus comedy), painting (renaissance versus landscape), and television shows (soaps versus nature documentaries). As such, it corresponds very starkly to gender differences. Interestingly, the authors demonstrate that this division remains largely constant across social class locations. This places them in direct opposition to Bourdieu, who argued that the gendering of cultural tastes was highly dependent on class position.

In general, Culture, Class, Distinction exhibits a somewhat anxious relation to Bourdieu. While the project is obviously motivated through and through by an attempt to evaluate the generalizability of the Distinction argument, the authors go to great lengths to differentiate their work from Bourdieu’s, both conceptually and in the interpretation of the findings. To take a single example, they deem the concept of habitus irredeemably flawed, and eschew it throughout. One consequence of this, however, is that in a book devoted to the relation between social structure and culture, it becomes unclear exactly what causal story the authors wish to tell—or whether they even aspire to tell one. More subtly, the authors also appear disinclined to admit the idea that cultural tastes may function as symbolic capital. This premise was central to Bourdieu’s argument that taste is implicated in the perpetuation of privilege: for him, the lifestyles of the dominant constitute a “legitimizing theatricalization” of their superior position. Bennett et al., by contrast, are unable to discern any overt snobbishness (or conversely, deference) among their research subjects, and from this seem to conclude that taste is not connected to legitimization in any significant way. But this renders ambiguous the issue of exactly how certain tastes might generate “profits” and what role they may have in processes of social reproduction and transformation.

Regardless of these issues, however, the accomplishments of the book are numerous and important, and it will no doubt take a central place in discussions of the relation between social structure and taste for years to come.


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In the last three decades, European politics have been recast by the appearance of rightwing populist parties, most famously France’s National Front. In this fascinating book, Mabel Berezin explains why these parties became an established part of the political spectrum. Her analysis centers on...
those “shocking events” which mark the 30 years between the emergence of the National Front (NF) and its rise from the margins to the center of French politics.

The narrative covers the rise of Jean-Marie LePen in the 1980s through the 2005 defeat of the French referendum on the proposed European Union (EU). Berezin defines the emergence of right-wing populism as a distressing historical surprise, a deviation from the main currents of European political development since 1945. She focuses on the NF because it was the first party of its kind to be represented on the local, national and European levels. The main argument is that “neoliberal” globalization and the creation of supranational legal institutions and economic governance threatens to displace the nation-state as the place of collective identification and security. Europeanization has undercut the link between democracy and security, replacing the collective with the individual as the bearer of rights and responsibilities.

Berezin defines the nation-state as a “consolidation regime” that seeks to consolidate territory and culture. “Hegemonic” nation-states, such as France, are those that combine parliamentary democracy with a strong sense of political community that subsumes ethnic and regional cultures. In this institutional context, citizens rely on the nation to provide them with both cultural identity and social security. When citizens perceive the nation as endangered they react emotionally to both cultural and material threats. The book thus offers a macro-micro connection by maintaining that Europeanization disrupts national consolidation regimes, which, in turn, is experienced as personal threat to identity and security and, when politically mobilized, gives rise to collective emotions that inspire right-wing populist voting. The rise of the NF is a reaction to threats to core political values, certainty about the future, and a (generally chauvinist) set of claims about the cultural identity of the French. Sociologically, citizens whose cultural and social capital is most clearly defined by the hegemonic national-state are the most prone to nationalist appeals.

The methods of the book are comparative and historical study based on secondary data sources and press archives. Berezin follows the call to develop an “eventful” sociology focused on narratives of particular transformative events. The focus on events is justified by their cross-sectional character—that they allow observations on culture, institutions and actors; by the many voices that participate and comment on them; and because they are concrete and apparent. Contemporaries perceive events as moments of possibility replete with emotional resonance, yielding public discourses about what matters to a political culture. Yet, while Berezin contends that the events she analyzes are transparent as such to those that live through them, it is not obvious that an event to be studied would be as evident to one historical researcher as another. While William Sewell Jr. may persuade us that the storming of the Bastille was recognized by contemporaries as opening up a template of (revolutionary) possibilities, some of the rather less monumental events that Berezin includes in her analysis do not seem to rise to that level of transparent significance.

Although right-wing populism is depicted as a historical puzzle, perspectives drawn from the study of comparative politics would not necessarily concur. While Berezin discusses rival theories, her engagement with them is hardly sustained. One can also question the rather one-sided depiction of the EU as indicative of a neo-liberal “opportunity space” that is displacing the social security and solidarity that were putatively typical of post-war Europe. This understates the great variation in the level of welfare state effort and norms of solidarity among Western European societies (which has been amply demonstrated in the comparative welfare-state research program) and fails to do justice to the EU as a force for social inclusion and policies (such as on climate change) that do not meet narrow neoliberal criteria. These characterizations seem to reflect the author’s unapologetic nostalgia for the golden age of European welfare states and loyalty to social democratic values.

Though meant to be general, the theory does not very well account for some cases. For instance, Berezin posits that globalization has threatened all hegemonic consolidation regimes but that monarchies such as
England and Sweden have a firmer sense of nationhood that deflects “extreme nationalistic energies.” This argument is undermined by the success of right-wing populist parties in monarchies like Denmark and Norway where they are among the leading vote-getters. Finally, the general claim that nation-state has retreated very much from the provision of social goods is a dubious one. Still, perceptions can depart from tangible realities and Berezin has done a masterful job of interpreting the perceptions of threat and the resulting fears that help to generate support for the National Front and similar parties. Analytically, it may not be justifiable to bundle globalization, migration, and the EU into the same package but that may be what many European voters on the right and the left have done, particularly in the French and Dutch anti-EU referenda of 2005. Certainly, anyone looking for a culturally sensitive and richly-detailed analysis of European right-wing populism will be more than satisfied with this book. Those looking for a cultural argument for why collective security promotes civil politics and social inclusion will find Berezin’s book especially compelling.


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What makes stripping empowering or exploitative of women? This is a question that Mindy S. Bradley-Engen seeks to explore. Most studies of the sex industry focus on the feminists’ debates resulting from the 1980 sex wars, which question if the nature of sex work is good or bad for women. However, Bradley-Engen in her ethnographic study moves the discourse beyond this debate, and argues that the level of exploitation, or empowerment, women experience working in the exotic dance industry depends in which types of clubs they work. She observed almost forty clubs within the United States in both rural and urban environments. The dancers in Bradley-Engen’s study ranged from 18-40 years of age, and have worked in the industry anywhere from one-time to seventeen years; most were white with 11 percent being black dancers, and one Asian dancer.

Bradley-Engen examined the internal structures of the clubs using grounded theory methodology, where she combined quantitative and qualitative data with telephone interviews, recorded interviews, and email interviews with dancers, customers and managers to assert that within the strip club industry the following typologies exist: the Hustle Club, the Show Club, and the Social Club.

The author provides full descriptions for each of the club typologies and the responses by dancers and managers to her presence at the clubs while doing research. She highlights the social world of a particular club within each typology, and interviews in depth one dancer to illustrate the social worlds of each club type.

In the Hustle Club the structural environment is a hostile one, with dancers competing among one another for stage time to perform for customers and receive lap dances, since this is how most women make money—lap dances are $25 with management taking out $15. Dancers at the Hustle Club pay a $25-$50 stage fee, (a rent the dancers must pay to dance per shift), plus tips for the deejay, bouncer, and doorman.

Women at this club feel disposable by management, and as a result, take their frustrations out on one another, often by trying to sabotage a dancer’s performance, creating lies about a particular dancer to a customer, or stealing from each other. Bradley-Engen reports that dancers use drugs to cope with the disrespect they feel from customers fondling them inappropriately, in spite of a no-touching policy. Dancers use various techniques to have customers spend as much money as possible on them, such as suggesting that they will become sexually satisfied if they spend more money. Many women who work there feel trapped because they have few career options, and often need to support their families. However, there is more money to be made at the Hustle Club than if they were working in another service occupation.
The second social world Bradley-Engen describes is that of the Show Club where dancers are regularly weighed and measured by management to ensure that they are maintaining their standards of appearance for the club. At the Show Club most dancers are only concerned with striving to make themselves the best they can be for the customers, which involves buying high quality costumes, investing in expensive make-up, jewelry, and sometimes plastic surgery. Dancers make good money and pay a $25 stage fee. The goal is for dancers to be original, and to have sex appeal, stage presence, and physical ability. In the individualistic world of the Show Club dancers do not form social networks among each other, (except for the occasional advice on what foods cause bloating, and skin products to hide blemishes), thus, dancers do not have hostile relationships with one another.

While dancers sense they can be replaced by management, if they do not keep up their appearances, unlike in the social world of the Hustle Club, dancers at the Show Club are invested in themselves as goddesses, and thus have negotiating power with customers because they are told on a daily basis that they are beautiful.

Bradley-Engen’s last social environment is that of the Social Club, where women are friendly, and supporting of each other. Dancers make about $100 to $150 a night. The club is defined as working class, with a small staff and dancer population, so dancers often cover each other’s shifts in the event a dancer is sick. Dancers also have greater negotiating power with club owners because owners know their employees, and dancers are less expendable.

Bradley-Engen describes the relationship between the dancers as one of moral commitment based on friendship, which keeps dancers invested in working at the Social Club. Thus, dancers in the Social Club view social networks as influential to maintaining dancers at the club, and sometimes recruiting new dancers. Dancers who are off shift often feel obligated to work because they feel “needed” by the club to fulfill the desired number of dancers on shift.

Readers of this book will find Bradley-Engen’s observations and analysis useful when considering what is at stake for women working in the exotic dance industry. However, her racial analysis of the exotic dance world could have been clearer. For example, in her methodology section she states about 11 percent of the women she interviewed were identified as African American, the rest were white, with one Asian participant. Yet, her observations (beyond mentioning that the Hustle Club does not hire many black women) do not reflect this racial make-up of interviewees. In her conclusion she states that she found racial disparities in the clubs, but doesn’t illustrate these disparities enough in her research, or display the ways that race affects the social worlds of exotic dance. However, Bradley-Engen’s study adds to the field of the sociology of women, labor stratification, and future directions of sex industry research.


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Over the years, I have given quite a bit of attention to ways in which leaders of white supremacist organizations explain their goals and justify their actions. Contemporary racists often speak of global conspiracies involving elite actors collaborating with and/or manipulating nonwhite people to enrich themselves at the expense of the “white race.” In the 1920s, leaders of the Ku Klux Klan seemed to be particularly alarmed when describing the potential danger posed by alliances between labor radicals and African Americans. For example, a headline in the Klan’s national newspaper proclaimed, “Bolsheviks Fear Power of Klan; Tampering with American Negroes” (The Imperial Night-Hawk, April 18, 1923). The Klan writer expressed grave concern about the rise of a radical black organization called the African Blood Brotherhood which, he proclaimed, “proves that there are black Bolsheviks as well as white and that the call of the Klan for the maintenance of White Supremacy is not an idle
“Similarly, Klansmen of the 1960s, not to mention FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, seemed to be obsessed with alleged ties between Communists and African American civil rights leaders.

Exaggerating and manufacturing threats posed by African Americans to white interests is common practice for racist groups seeking to generate support. Yet Roderick Bush’s provocative book, The End of White World Supremacy, suggests that the prospect of an alliance between African Americans and leftist radicals generates high anxiety and fear among whites (and not just among racist extremists) precisely because such an alliance fundamentally threatens the actual processes that sort the “haves” from the “have-nots.” Writing from a world systems perspective, Bush argues that, historically, racial oppression developed hand-in-hand with class-based oppression in a global economy. Any organization that seeks to fight simultaneously race-based, class-based, and gender-based oppression is particularly threatening to beneficiaries of the status quo. In order to transform the social order significantly, it is first necessary to develop an understanding of the how race, class, and gender intersect in processes of exploitation and domination. With such an understanding, however, comes not only the possibility of change but also fierce resistance from those who are charged with protecting the interests of privileged actors and from those who sense that they will pay a price if societal rewards are distributed more justly.

The title of the book is a nod to Malcolm X who, in a 1963 speech, declared that we had arrived at the end of white world supremacy. Like W.E.B. Du Bois, and several other black leaders before him, Malcolm saw the oppression of African Americans in global, rather than solely national terms. He also recognized a strategic advantage in aligning African Americans, a minority in their own country, with an oppressed majority in a global system. Bush offers an intellectual history of black radicalism, as he explores the roots of global consciousness in African Americans’ struggle for equality. Bush focuses on key historical tensions and debates among African American leaders, such as questions about whether integration or black empowerment would be the most effective means of achieving desired ends. Those who embraced various strains of Marxist thought disagreed on whether class or race should be prioritized in the struggle. Bush argues that both must be addressed, and warns that the welfare state and reformist strategies in the United States and in western European nations have, to a great extent, aligned capital and a privileged segment of labor in opposition to poor nonwhite people who reside in nations located in the periphery of a global capitalist economy or who are victims of interior colonization within core nations.

The last two chapters focus on the black power movement in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and on the more radical elements of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Bush notes how, toward the end of his life, Martin Luther King Jr. became increasingly conscious of how the fate of African Americans was linked to the fate of nonwhite people across the globe. Although Bush is analyzing social movements, he does little to engage contemporary social movement theory. Yet his work does shine new light on the civil rights struggle by focusing attention on those who sought more than assimilation and who pressed for radical transformation of American society. Bush’s attention to the ways in which social movements are influenced by a long history of idea development (as opposed to short-term framing processes) is also refreshing.

Bush’s argument may be hard to follow in places, and his own voice can get lost among all of the historical voices. Yet these historical voices had important things to say and are instructive when it comes to understanding how far we have come in a quest for greater freedom and equality, and also how far we still have to go.
Executive Order 8802 prohibiting discrimination in the defense industries and in federal government jobs on the basis of “race, creed, color or national origins.” To enforce this order, FDR created the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). Although this temporary wartime agency lasted only five years and met with limited success, in Chen’s argument it served as “a catalyst” for a wide range of liberal interest groups to collaborate “in the name of civil rights” to create a permanent FEPC (p. 33). Beneath the umbrella organization of Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, groups including the NAACP, religious organizations, and unions worked together targeting not only racial discrimination in the Jim Crow South, but employment discrimination across the United States on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, and national origin. In calling for the prohibition of employment discrimination in their proposals, liberals imagined their agency would operate as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did by ordering “affirmative action” as a form of administrative redress in cases where discrimination was found (p. 51).

Chapters Two through Four focus on the political struggle for FEP legislation from 1941 to 1964. Chapter Two examines the struggle in the House and Senate from 1941 to 1960, detailing the political formation of the liberal coalition, its regulatory ideals, and its failure to wrest control of the House and the Senate from Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans. Chapters Three and Four review the successful campaign passing FEP legislation in New York and its checkered success in other states. These chapters are significant not only in laying out the early development of these liberal and conservative coalitions across the United States and their respective political strategies, but in delineating the rhetorical appeals they marshaled. Interestingly, conservative appeals bear many similarities to contemporary arguments against affirmative action. For instance, conservative politicians often claimed that they believed in racial equality, but countered that tolerance could never be legislated. Similarly, employers argued that “freedom from discrimination” was a laudable goal, but that such a law would “unduly emphasize differences” and “pit race against race” creating prejudices where none existed (p. 106). Others maintained that such laws granted “unfair preferences to minorities” and ignored the “rights of whites” (pp. 66 and 67). And, one politician argued that such a law would not only emphasize differences, but result in “quotas” (p. 110). These chapters are meticulously researched and provide an intriguing look backwards at the arguments and strategies conservatives used to thwart their liberal counterpart’s campaign for “freedom from discrimination.”

Chapter Five moves forward to the congressional debates surrounding the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Civil Rights Act is so often hailed as a great historical achievement that we forget, as Chen reminds us, that it involved many compromises which considerably weakened its potential clout. His main focus is the struggle over Title VII which prohibited discrimination in employment and established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Liberals pushed for “a fair employment agency with administrative enforcement powers,” while conservatives strongly opposed it (p. 178). The final compromise which passed denied the EEOC the power to file lawsuits, effectively nullifying its deterrent effect and ultimately placing the burden of enforcement on aggrieved individuals.

The rest of the chapter traces changes in the meaning of affirmative action as policy begins to shift from “ordering discriminatory employers to compensate victims” to a wide variety of programs created through executive orders under Kennedy and Johnson and finally through Nixon’s implementation of the Philadelphia Plan in 1969. In Chen’s argument, these “new” forms of affirmative action developed in the regulatory vacuum that conservatives created by thwarting plans for a stronger regulatory agency. Federal officials implementing the Philadelphia Plan, for example, took strong action against union discrimination by tying federal contract awards to compliance with “goals and timetables.” While these officials may have found the EEOC ineffectual for their purposes, many others flocked to use it to resolve discrimination claims. Historian
Nancy MacClean (2006), for example, shows that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act served as a significant resource in mobilizing a movement for economic advancement first among African Americans, followed by white women, and later, Mexican Americans. Reading these two historical accounts together suggests that what federal officials regarded as a regulatory weakness, activists seized as an opportunity.

Because many scholars locate the origins of affirmative action in the Kennedy and Johnson era, Chen’s broader historical perspective is a welcome contribution. However, if we look earlier than 1941, others such as Terry Anderson (2004) locate its origins in the 1930s at the height of FDR’s New Deal legislation when Congress passed the 1935 Wagner Act which created the NLRB. Anderson begins here not only to signal the first use of the term, but its connection to federal government action in regulating discrimination. Because New Deal legislation did not apply to agricultural or domestic workers who were disproportionately African American, the Wagner Act served to protect white union workers. Anderson’s earlier starting point illuminates that affirmative action held different meanings long before the 1960s.

In his conclusion, Chen focuses again on the 1940s as the origins of affirmative action to pose a counterfactual. He suggests that if liberals had managed to “win NLRB-style enforcement authority” for FEPs, the meaning of affirmative action might not have taken the racially-conscious meaning that it has today. “‘Color blindness’ would have been the regulatory order of the day. There would have been less room for racially attentive policies—much less policies of the kind that today go under the name of ‘affirmative action’” (p. 233). Chen’s assumption that an FEP authority would have been “color blind” while modern affirmative action policy is “racially attentive” elides the fact that surveillance of race and its classifications are necessary to guard against discrimination. Practicing non-discrimination does not mean that employers should be inattentive to race, but rather that they should not use race as the basis for exclusion. An FEP-like agency would indeed have probed race more closely. In this light, the arguments that 1940s employers and other conservatives made against FEPs should not be surprising. They recognized that a federal agency prohibiting discrimination would “emphasize” race in ways that they did not. Excluding blacks because they were black would no longer be permissible.

Despite these criticisms, Chen’s interdisciplinary study is an important one revealing that the electoral alignment of racial conservatives and racial liberals began, not in the 1960s as many have argued, but in the 1940s. Political sociologists, historians, and political scientists will find his argument about the role of elites in public policy formation compelling and carefully researched.

References


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Late August 2009, more than 40,000 people drove out into the desolate Black Rock desert of Nevada for the week-long event called Burning Man. They built a massive, horseshoe shaped tent city, twelve blocks deep. In the center of the horseshoe, they propped a three-story-tall abstract statue of the Man. Around him, and across the desert floor, the campers constructed sculptures, staged performances, and danced day and night in Day-Glo feather boas, work boots, and kilts. On the Saturday night of Labor Day weekend they circled the man, tens of thousands strong, and hollered while he burned. Two days later, they and their city were gone.

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With its over-the-top theatricality, Burning Man has long been a darling of journalists. Now, finally, Katherine Chen’s richly researched volume provides a much needed sociological analysis. To date, writers have focused primarily on showing that Burning Man represents the latest link in a chain of New Age gatherings spawned by the San Francisco Bay area counterculture. Chen, on the other hand, explores the organization that brings the festival to life, year after year. In the process she offers an original and important analytical account of what happens when bohemian modes of sociability meet bureaucratic forms of organization.

In the 1960s version of this encounter, bureaucracy would attempt to co-opt bohemian sensibilities, while the forces of counterculture would try to undermine the powers of centralization. Chen’s study reveals that at Burning Man however, the two forces have learned to work together. Part of the story of how they have is historical. As Chen explains, Burning Man began in 1986, when landscaper and artist Larry Harvey and his friend Jerry James built a wooden figure on San Francisco’s Baker Beach and set it alight. A small crowd gathered then and joined them each year thereafter, until local law enforcement asked them to leave. Harvey, James and their friends then met annually in the desert, their population doubling each year, and the event itself became increasingly chaotic.

To help solve that problem, Harvey and a team of friends established what Chen calls a “hybrid organization.” At its center, that organization features a bureaucratic form: a for-profit, limited liability corporation, headed by Harvey. Yet, it also depends on the labor of hundreds of unpaid volunteers, many working year-round, to do everything from laying out the city to cleaning up after the event. These volunteers need to be recruited, trained and retained. And this presents a challenge. According to an internal Burning Man document quoted by Chen, volunteers are often “asked to labor in . . . [physically challenging] conditions for 4 weeks to 4 months, for less than equitable compensation.”

Chen draws on extensive interviews and participant observation to show that they do it for a kaleidoscope of reasons. Some hope to learn new skills or to meet new people. Others want to be part of an artistic event. At bottom however, both the festival’s organizers and its participants seem to agree: Burning Man is a site for personal transformation and the organization behind it is designed to facilitate that process. Chen pays particular attention to the ways the organization recruits volunteers, matches them to tasks, and rewards them. As she points out, many workers regard their labor as a gift to a community rather than an effort on behalf of a for-profit firm. Leaders in turn encourage volunteers to take initiative, to develop new skills and contacts, and to do so with a creative flair and a drive toward self-improvement that would seem to have little to do with cubicle America. For Chen, this makes Burning Man an “empowering organization” – that is, one in which individuals and the group can pursue multiple forms of professional, emotional, and communal satisfaction simultaneously.

Like many Burners, Chen argues that Burning Man offers a model for other kinds of organizations that seek to make their workers both happier and more productive. Chen clearly admires the organization: she has even dedicated her book to “the Burning Man community.” At the same time though, she has left some tough questions on the table. For instance, as a number of scholars of the culture industries have shown, many corporations today are seeking to satisfy the individual’s search for self-transformation and community instead of offering financial compensation. As Larry Harvey notes, he receives a high salary, while many who work for him receive no financial compensation at all. Is the trading of self-actualization for money as a form of compensation really a model the rest of us should follow? And what about the politics of diversity? As Chen points out, organizations that build member allegiance around shared cultural values often subtly exclude those who don’t share those values. Burning Man’s organizers describe it as “radically inclusive,” yet as earlier writers have pointed out, its aesthetics and its racial make-up in particular tend to be remarkably homogeneous. I wish Chen had asked why.

That said, Chen’s book grants a unique, on-the-ground view of the integration of bohemia...
and bureaucracy. Scholars of organizations—and of creative disorganization—should be grateful.


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The Golden Triangle is a difficult book. The narrative returns repeatedly to a substantial cast of locales and persons in unfamiliar regions and languages. It requires frequent lookbacks to maps and earlier sections to retain cognitive continuity for Mengba vs. Mengbin vs. Mengpian vs. Menglian and Bao Youxiang vs. Xiao Mingliang vs. Yan Shengbing. The Ko-Lin Chin does strive to keep the drug merchants distinct: “Liu Ming, whose real name is Liu Zhang, was born in Chengdu, Sichuan in 1953 and he was 42 years old when he died,” (p. 92) while “Liu Ming (not related to the above-mentioned Liu Ming who committed suicide) was born in 1959 in Yunnan province and went to Kokang in 1992” (p. 96). In navigating the Burmese, Chinese, and Thai land- and personsapes, the author, a Chinese-speaking criminologist at Rutgers who acquired an NSF grant to support this international project, pursues three distinct purposes that weave through the narrative in fractal patterns.

The first purpose is an “exploratory” investigation of drug production and use by members of the Wa ethnic group, of which 400,000 members live in the remote northern highlands of Burma (or the Union of Myanmar, as the SLORC national military regime has renamed the country). About that same number live across the border in southwestern Yunnan province, China. Most of the Wa in Burma are subsistence farmers whose main food crop is rice and main cash crop is opium. But the Wa have also organized a strong independent army and cadre of military/political leaders—who are portrayed in the book as simultaneously state builders, warlords, and (increasingly reluctant?) drug lords. A healthy enterprise of heroin and methamphetamine production operates under the protection of the Wa Army, to whose regional authority the central Burmese government has acquiesced in order to focus its attention on suppressing lowlands dissidents associated with Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel Peace Prize winner and daughter of the 1947 assassinated founder of the modern Burmese state.

In its economic enterprises the Wa and others of the northern Burmese provinces have been heavily dependent on Chinese émigrés associated first with remnants of the defeated Kuomintang, then with the Communist Party of Burma, and after that party’s collapse following Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in China during the 1980s, by carpetbaggers like the aforementioned Liu Mings. This investigation of “ordinary farmers” is based on 300 structured field interviews and a team ethnography conducted in rural Wa villages during several months in 2001 by a group of student interviewers bilingual in Chinese and Wa, recruited and trained by the author in the border town (with China) of Bangkang, the main urban center in Northern Wa. The bottom line is that most of these farmers cultivate opium to supplement their living and make occasional medicinal and in many cases recreational and addictive use of it, but very few are involved in trading above the level of small packets that are accumulated in stages for bulk sale to heroin manufacturers.

The second purpose is to understand how the trade in opium, heroin, and methamphetamine works in this principal part of the Golden Triangle region, including tracing the evolution over roughly 1990-2005 of drug trafficking within the three-country region as various policy changes were enacted at national and sub-national levels. The primary focus is on activity within the Shan State of Northern Burma, where the Wa and numerous other ethnic groups reside, and the adjacent border areas of Thailand to the south and Yunnan province to the east. Here refined drugs are traded and the drug entrepreneurs in Burma—the majority of whom are ethnic Chinese who have migrated to Burma, particularly in the past 20 years—obtain the precursor chemicals...
and chemical equipment used to refine heroin from opium for export largely to China and beyond, and more recently to manufacture billions of methamphetamine pills for the booming Thai market (and, one strongly suspects, although Chin does not, beyond).

This second line of study is based on about 150 interviews between 2001 and 2006 with urban drug users, traffickers, businesspeople, government officials, and military officers (all heavily overlapping sets) in Burma, Thailand, and, to a lesser degree, in China. It also depends heavily on readings in journalistic sources (the English language Bangkok Post is particularly prominent) and reports by academics and various government agencies concerned with drug suppression. The seamless interdigitation of subnational government and military units, legitimate business operations, and the drug commerce, against a background of national governments engaging in largely ineffective but occasionally successful (and those, well-publicized) anti-drug enforcement efforts, is a principal conclusion of this line of study.

Finally, the author wants to place the economics and politics of the Golden Triangle in its global setting, in which the evolving relationship between China and the United States comprises the force majeure. This is the least developed part of the book, essentially bookends around the central chapters, and it relies largely on a few books that Chin (perhaps rightly) admires.

This is a necessary book for students of global drug commerce and a rare glimpse of contemporary life in the northern Burmese hill country, a region inaccessible even by the reclusive standards of Myanmar.
peer support, can lead to sexual assault or other abuse as a means of control or retaliation (p.30). Though not explicit in their model, the book calls to mind that ineffectual outside intervention also explains why men behave as they do, because they can. All the women interviewed badly needed help and actively sought it, with less than satisfactory results. Improved normative and structural support is not only a remedy; its absence directly contributes to men’s repeated abusive actions.

Analysis of why such support is lacking in rural areas is an interesting feature of the book. Explanations of crime that compare urban social disorganization with the more effective mechanisms of social control that presumably deter crime in rural areas are challenged by domestic violence. When collective efficacy primarily serves patriarchal values, women are placed at greater not lesser risk in intimate relationships, with official statistics underreporting actual occurrence. While people may feel anonymous in urban areas, for women in rural counties being “known” does not mean being protected: the abusive man is let off the hook by a good old boys network, or the woman is fired for being stalked by her ex at work.

Contrary to popular images of rural life, DeKeseredy and Schwartz note that rural residents are not necessarily more likely to help people they know. Women in their study commonly encountered people not willing or able to get involved. In rural counties individuals are more geographically isolated and rugged individualism can translate into community norms of non-interference in private matters. Insofar as rural communities hold to more traditional gender roles, local law enforcement tends to reflect the same biases. Women become vulnerable when the common good is understood to encompass male dominance, does not prioritize women’s safety, and restricts intervening with abusive men on behalf of their female partners.

While not all rural counties are the same and not all rural men abusive, the key role of male peer support was confirmed by the women’s accounts. Their abusers regularly socialized with other men who modeled sexist attitudes and abusive conduct, provided advice, encouragement, and reinforcement, and covered for them. Such social attachments can generate peer pressure to conform to notions of masculinity based on controlling women or risk losing face. Bolstered by an aggressive climate of guns, alcohol and other drugs, pornography, and bravo, individual men’s sexually coercive conduct appeared partly motivated to maintain or regain status among peers. Still needed are in-depth studies of how the meanings of their behaviors are constructed in the context of rural men’s social networks to better understand, and counterbalance, the motives that drive abuse.

All told, readers of this book will learn something about criminology, rural sociology, violence against women, and community development. Listening responsively to the voices of rural women means fewer will experience the kinds of emotional, physical, and sexual assault described here. In this sense the book has potential to make good on its promise to the women who participated of ultimately increasing the safety and well-being of women in rural areas. The authors and the women themselves offer many suggestions, including better education, more shelters, stronger advocacy, and more progressive police response in rural areas (e.g., using female officers). Above all, community norms must be changed to openly acknowledge the problem, hold perpetrators accountable, encourage women to seek help, and secure resources to provide it.


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A question that seems to have been asked by every generation of adults throughout the twentieth century is, “What’s the trouble with our young people today?” In Mean Streets: Chicago Youths and the Everyday Struggle for Empowerment in the Multiracial City,
1908-1969, Andrew J. Diamond offers an explanation of how and why young people found themselves in so much trouble—at least in the city of Chicago—throughout that century.

Diamond is a history professor. Thus, he does not offer an explicitly sociological account of why racialized and ethnic youth in Chicago operated on the cusp of seeming incorrigibility throughout the twentieth century. Instead, he provides an urban historical account of how white ethnic, Hispanic, and African American young people in Chicago (and young males, to be more precise) confronted modernity (in the sense of a rapidly evolving, complicated, and increasingly hierarchical industrial socio-economic sphere), and how their class, race, and ethnic backgrounds situated them to confront it as they did. Much of these confrontations resulted in myriad efforts to promote public identities, claim public spaces, and embrace, reject or modify different aspirations as these young people strove for control and stability in a social world that, due to the rapidity of social change fostered by industrialization, offered little in the way of security. In making his case, Diamond focuses on the social effects of the formalization of public schooling, the structuring of the world of work, and the residential migration patterns of different racial and ethnic groups throughout took place in Chicago during that century.

Not surprisingly, schooling, the primary social institution where young people spend their everyday lives, was a constant site for conflict. Hence, the unintended result of mandating schooling for youth in the early part of the century (particularly their effort to secure spaces in industrial America as it blossomed), Puerto Ricans and Mexican migrants (their struggle for cultural and social space in the mid-twentieth century) and African Americans (particularly their quest for inclusion in the political and civic spheres of Chicago). The effort to hold on to so many groups and their stories results in a book that is under-theorized in terms of a cultural analysis of race and ethnicity. For instance, readers learn little about whether the commitment to hostility and violence by Irish-American males was different from that of African-American males (especially in terms of the nature and quality of its expressive styles). Readers also learn little about the manner by which youth regarded violence that occurred within their own racial and ethnic groups.

Despite these shortcomings, it is impossible to find great fault with Diamond for his not being a sociologist. Instead, the value of this work for sociology rests in its unpacking the phenomenon of young people’s investment in the urban sphere, and the social turbulence associated with it, without surrendering to blanket indictments of youth nor racial and ethnic group culture.
Diamond illustrates how action on the part of these people involved conscientious decision-making as much as, if not more than, sheer emotional impulse. Consequently, this book invites more thinking about how modernity, policy, and the urban sphere connected at various points in time to shape the reactions of groups of young men such that a more formidable historical foundation is provided for grappling with the lingering idea that youth in cities are a troubled, and troubling, constituency.


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Heather Douglas’ book offers an introduction to the basic role of values in scientific research in the context of the late-twentieth-century advisory science policy apparatus in the United States. Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal is not specifically targeted to the social sciences and, to a contemporary social scientist, much of this discussion regarding the basic role of values in the scientific process appears anachronistic and the historical account dated.

From the outset, however, Douglas’ motivation seems to lie in an effort to educate a very different audience of technically-trained scientific advisors in the public policy process whom she argues are without training in the nature of the scientific process and role of values in a context of realistic humanism or scientific realism. In a historical introduction, Douglas notes the book began as a philosophy dissertation and emerged as a text targeted to an audience of methodologically-conservative (read as positivist leaning) researchers (specifically those the author believes to be represented by members of the Society for Risk Analysis) engaged in policy-relevant research. Some members of that community could be forgiven for questioning whether this representation is somewhat of a caricature or straw man. Nonetheless, there is plausibly some truth to the characterization, and this framing of the necessity for the lesson may explain why much of the material would seem to reflect well-rehearsed, even dated, arguments to most social scientists. It has been nearly a half-century since arguments revisiting realism and the philosophy of science became pervasive in response to a constructionist critique of value-reliant science and postmodern variants of the attack on positivism. Building upon sources as venerable as Weber, the emergence of a social science variant of scientific realism, grappling with the role of values in selecting and framing research topics, interpretation of findings and even labeling of latent or unobservable constructs, is an old story that has, by now, worked its way in simplistic form into most introductory social research methods textbooks.

Throughout Douglas’ presentation, especially in introductory chapters, there is also a critique of the process by which a value-laden public policy has been formed and shaped by advisors untrained in scientific realism. The author also offers some speculation on reasons underlying the reluctance of the policy research apparatus to accommodate the value-reliant aspects of the scientific process. Early chapters recapitulate a skeletal history of the struggles to define, defend and contest, the value-free ideal of science. Sadly, this discussion becomes notably thinner as one approaches more contemporary discussions and is already somewhat dated. A brief chapter on the moral role of the scientist is also curiously devoid of reference to debates, particularly those from cultural anthropology, which preceded it, and adds little to the text. However, the real core of the work lies in the last half of the book. In four chapters Douglas addresses the role of values in the scientific process and practice. The reader can wish at times that the discussion was somewhat less pedantic and that the goal of educating scientific advisors to communicate with policy makers was facilitated by a choice of terminology now common in this realm. Nonetheless, this half of the text is a worthy read, even by those already familiar with the arguments. Embedding much of the discussion within the policy realms, institutions and debates of scientific policy in the last
decades of the twentieth century provides a historical context in which to appreciate the author’s concerns for the scientific advisory process. Selections from the last four chapters with retrospective illustrations may prove useful in constructing a course. Unfortunately, this chronology ends well before the much more alarming, and informative, war on science-based policy during the Bush administration. As a result, the history offered is of only one small portion of the larger political story regarding values and science in policy research at a federal level.

It is unfortunate that Douglas’ text is already somewhat dated in both historical and philosophical realms, at least for a social science audience. The utility of the book in the social sciences is also somewhat limited by the fact that it offers a critique targeted to a very different audience and a discussion that is not well-situated in either the common history or terminology of these issues within the social sciences. As a result, it is difficult to see the text as generally useful within a social science or public policy class. However, those teaching interdisciplinary courses that first introduce students from the physical or natural sciences to the public policy process, might, as noted above, glean selections from the last half of the text to provide useful illustrations of the historical and political obstacles in the practice of scientific realism. Some similar selection of examples may also be useful in a policy research course, not as a methodological offering, but as reflections of a particular historical period in the ongoing negotiation of relationships between values, science and policy.


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This is an interesting, idiosyncratic and often frustrating book. James Flynn wants to defend a “liberal” perspective on race, class, and political philosophy against dominant conservative arguments. The problem, in his view, is that the “spokespeople for conservatism are articulate and spirited” while “liberals have been so feeble in criticizing their agenda and suggesting real alternatives” (p. 1). Flynn seeks to rectify this by offering his own “account of the Jeffersonian tradition from the perspective of the Social Democratic left” (p. 1).

Where Have All the Liberals Gone? is really three distinct books in one. The first section, on racial inequality, is the most empirical, much of it based on Flynn’s earlier work. It begins with Chapter Two on the black family, “the central problem of black America” (p. 39). Flynn examines the shortage of males in the black “marriage market” and behavioral differences between black and white females regarding marriage and pregnancy. Many of Flynn’s arguments are similar to William Wilson’s—though neither Wilson nor the voluminous literature on the “Wilson thesis” are cited. Moreover, he says little about the structural economic factors emphasized by Wilson. He adds a twist, however, by discussing the relative dearth of interracial marriages between black females and non-black males.

Chapter Three considers The Bell Curve argument on race and IQ. Flynn accepts that there may be “real intelligence differences between black and white,” but these “can be the result of either genes or environment” (p. 81). He argues persuasively for an environmental explanation, but much of this discussion occurs on conservative ground. For example, “environment” means “a distinctive black subculture that offers a less rich spectrum of cognitive environments at every age” (p. 99). Flynn examines the cultural and behavioral deficits of blacks themselves but does not analyze economic, political, or demographic factors outside of their control (cf. Wilson; Massey and Denton). Though they hover in the background, such structural or institutional factors are mainly ignored. To be sure, Flynn makes a strong case for affirmative action in Chapter Four. But he does so through a “market information” argument: that black skin serves as a proxy for assumptions about character traits and therefore leads to
statistical discrimination. Flynn examines racial profiling in criminal justice, finance, housing, and employment, and concludes that “Blackness really does make a difference,” controlling for other variables, in predicting outcomes (p. 119). He is critical of this situation in supporting affirmative action. But again he relies on a conservative argument, in this case the rational choice perspective of Thomas Sowell. This leads to some rather strange conclusions for a “Social Democrat.” For example: “Most of the black experience in America is dictated by a rational response to objective group differences” rather than “crude racial bias”; even though “there still may be one or two racists left in America” (p. 120).

The second part of the book deals with social class, and domestic and foreign policy. In Chapter Five Flynn critiques Herrnstein and Murray’s version of the meritocracy thesis, arguing that “a robust welfare state is not a gratuitous boon but the very soul of a meritocracy” (p. 134). Chapter Six extends this argument in discussing “the ethics of social democracy.” Flynn lays out principles he ascribes to Jefferson regarding egalitarian moral concern, justice, individual rights, and civic virtue. Since there are fundamental tensions between these principles and market capitalism, “The state must remedy the market’s deficiencies” (p. 159). Chapter Seven continues this “moral idealism” with a long “sermon” on U.S. foreign policy. Here Flynn contrasts the ideal of a “world sovereign” which leads by moral example with that of a coercive “great power.” He criticizes U.S. arrogance and unilateralism in favor of a vision of global leadership by example and consensus.

The final section, on moral philosophy, seeks “a philosophical foundation for Jefferson’s ideals” (p. 211). This is needed to counter the “moral confusion” caused by liberal relativism. Flynn traces the development of this relativism from Darwinism through the anthropology of Boas and Benedict. This is followed by a discussion of William James’ “epistemological relativism” and a critique of Rawls’ theory of justice. After pointing out the deficiencies of this “liberal” tradition, Flynn again turns to conservatives for help, since “In my opinion, the only serious attempt to ‘save’ Americans from cultural relativism has come from the students of Leo Strauss” (p. 218). Flynn just happens to be one, though he is a self-proclaimed “heretic.” He examines the work of fellow student Allan Bloom, followed by an interesting excursion on Plato, Aristotle, and Nietzsche which concludes with a long justification for his own “humane-egalitarian” ethical principles. Flynn asserts the value of “cosmopolitan humanism” without supporting its imposition on others. Somehow he distinguishes this from the wimpy relativism of earlier liberals. He defends the objectivity of science but also “chooses” to accept “free will” as a moral necessity against a deterministic view of human behavior. Ultimately, Flynn’s philosophical foundation falls short of earlier liberal attempts, perhaps because he tries to reinvent the wheel. Except for Rawls, he neglects a long tradition of social theorists like Habermas, Rorty, and countless others who have grappled with these issues for decades in defense of liberalism.

There are many interesting arguments in this book. But given its stated goal, it is unfortunate that Flynn ignores much of the best work supporting liberal arguments. He seems much more familiar, and comfortable, with the conservative icons he purports to criticize. This leads him to give them too much credit. In his Epilogue, Flynn issues “a final plea” for us to “read the best of those who disagree with me. Start with Charles Murray and Thomas Sowell” (p. 297). I would hasten to add: read the best of their critics. Contrary to Flynn’s implication, there are a lot of them around.


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In The Plot to Kill God, Paul Froese uses the case of the Soviet “Secularization Experiment” to address current debates in the sociology of religion. Froese characterizes the
eight-decade-long (1917-1992) campaign to eradicate religion as a great experiment: both by design and by chance, the anti-religious policies of the Soviets tested some fundamental questions about the nature of faith and religious life, and sociologists of religion should be eager to learn the results. Froese carefully synthesizes dozens of historical accounts from the Russian Revolution to today and assembles data from secondary sources to provide snapshots of the religious landscape of the Soviet Union during four decades. The take-home message? The Soviets couldn’t defeat God, but they dealt some seriously debilitating blows.

Froese uses succinct statements from well-known theorists to set up his framework. Is religious vitality shaped primarily by ignorance (Marx), ritual activity (Durkheim), social institutions (Trotsky), social rewards (Weber), salvation incentives (Stark and Finke) or church-state relations (Adam Smith)? Even in this simplified form, the approach works well as a device for organizing the ideas guiding this work and clarifying the intent of the book. The assertions are engaged one-by-one in Chapters One and Six – either would be a very useful tool for making the distinctions among these perspectives accessible to undergraduate students. As Froese makes clear, his book is not an outlet for unveiling a new discovery about Soviet history or providing a comprehensive account of religion during this period. He relies only on English-language sources and gives short shrift to Judaism (a mere two references).

Readers seeking a clear discussion and application of theories of religious supply and religious demand to the case of Russia are going to be excited about this book. Froese’s book has been positively received, including having been honored with the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion’s Book Award for 2009. But readers hoping for an empirically-grounded story about Soviet history or providing a comprehensive account of religion during this period. He relies only on English-language sources and gives short shrift to Judaism (a mere two references).

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violent oppression and leaves his readers with “human nature” as the key explanation for what remains of religious life in the former Soviet republics. While ambitious and thought-provoking, Froese goes well beyond the scope of his data in these conclusions.

Readers might struggle with the problem of proportion in interpretation. If you are rooting for God in God vs. The Communist Party Officials, the existence of any religion after decades of violence and oppression is a clear victory for God. But if you’re rooting for the Soviets, they succeeded in achieving a dramatic transformation of culture (beliefs, priorities, motivations, etc.) within a short period of time. They (whoever “they” are) used sociological insights to realize their agenda: they decimated religious practice and did untold damage to the taken-for-granted idea of God. Froese seems to think God won, but I’m still undecided.


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In Why David Sometimes Wins, Marshall Ganz has crafted a research project that systematically codifies movement scholars’ interest in the strategic elements of collective action. Efforts to understand strategy are not new, of course. With the development of the resource mobilization approach and the embrace of the rational-actor model in the 1970s, social movement research shifted largely from asking why individuals engage in protest to questions of how social movements affect change. These innovations promulgated an avalanche of studies demonstrating that access to resources, or political opportunities lead to viability and quite often, success.

What has been lacking, however, is a model of how movement actors themselves exploit potential advantages. Foundations do not give to all groups willingly, political elites are often cautious when aligning with movement actors, and the media cannot and will not simply transmit all movement claims. Perhaps even more intriguing are historical moments when movements emerge and win some measure of success despite the absence of opportunities.

Ganz’s account of the rise of the United Farm Workers of America succinctly addresses these issues through an historically rich analysis of organizing efforts among agriculture workers in California. He sets up the study as a natural experiment; how was this union, forged with little more than the vision of a few committed activists, able to take on economically and politically powerful growers, while more established, resource-rich, and politically connected labor unions, ultimately failed?

Ganz’s model rests on “strategic capacity,” which refers to the ways social movement actors generate leverage against more powerful opponents. Reflecting the title of the book, movement actors “change the rules of the game” in a way that maximizes their strengths and minimizes the advantages enjoyed by their targets. Ganz fleshes out his model of strategic capacity early in the book, and while it is multi-faceted, the two most important features are (1) a group of decision-makers with wide-ranging experience and a willingness to listen to new ideas, and (2) an organizational structure that facilitates stimulating interactions among not only leaders but between leaders and the rank and file. Importantly, Ganz recognizes that structural conditions and power differentials are a normal part of movement life, but that committed leaders can forge new and dynamic repertoires of action.

Ganz puts his model of strategic capacity to the test with a careful account of the organization that ultimately became the United Farm Workers. As one of the members of the organization’s original leadership, he is uniquely positioned to provide a first-hand account of how the organization successfully mobilized allies and overcame obstacles, and he does so in an evenhanded manner. Unfortunately, he is less able to comment on the internal organizational dynamics of the other unions competing with the UFW, but he does do an excellent job of drawing on secondary evidence on these organizations.
Ganz’s narrative begins with an historical overview of the union and the challenges of organizing farm workers in California. Although New Deal labor legislation was a considerable boon to the labor movement as a whole, agricultural workers were not protected by new labor laws. This omission, along with the *bracero* program that allowed large growers to import cheap labor from Mexico during labor shortages (including labor disputes) did little to attract unions to the cause of farm workers.

In the 1960s the emergence of politically liberal allies and the growing urbanization of America weakened agribusiness interests and eventually led to the death of the *bracero* program. Recognizing this new opportunity, the AFL-CIO and the Teamsters took a renewed interest in the plight of farm workers. Yet despite their considerable resources and experience, these unions made little headway. The reason, Ganz argues, is that they sought to graft the traditional union model of representation onto this new group of workers. Their leadership had no experience with farm workers, were generally white, and from working class backgrounds. Moreover, their strength, access to resources, prevented any sort of rank-and-file input from the very workers they were organizing.

The National Farm Workers Association (precursor to the United Farm Workers), on the other hand, was not only able to overcome difficult odds, but time and again turned weakness into advantage. First, this union lacked the financial resources enjoyed by their competition, and therefore was nearly entirely dependent upon their membership. This had real implications for organizational functioning: Ganz documents numerous instances when tactical innovations sprung from the membership. Moreover, their leaders, access to resources, prevented any sort of rank-and-file input from the very workers they were organizing.

Perfectly manicured lawns, abundant resources, small classes, and ample extra-curricular activities make “Weston” the envy of many and home of a privileged few. Rubén Gaztambide-Fernández’s ethnography of “Weston,” an elite boarding school in New England, provides a rich and novel understanding of the creation and reproduction of elites. Two overarching questions guide the inquiry: What does it mean to be a Westonian? And how does one become a Westonian? In addressing these questions, the author offers a cultural explanation of elite identification which focuses on five E’s: exclusion, engagement, excellence, entitlement, and envisioning. The Westonian journey begins with a highly selective admission process which excludes many more than it admits. Once on campus,
students engage in the myriad of available academic, athletic, and artistic activities, to excel in many or most realms. By demonstrating excellence, they confirm their entitlement to a Westonian education as well as a right to an equally elite future.

The Best of the Best illuminates the complexity of elite identification. Instead of being broadly concerned with social reproduction (and/or social mobility), Gaztambide-Fernández focuses on the micro-level interactions and creation of meaning. This level of analysis reveals the contradictions of elite identification embedded in creating a unique but differentiated identity. Being a Westonian rests on shared meanings and experiences. Westonians know the difference between a four-year and a three-year senior, they know what a “skippy” is, and they know where to sit in the dining room. In addition to shared experiences, Westonians are connected by “having survived” Weston and by the general expectation that Westonians are smart and work hard. While being a Westonian is a shared identity, some students are more Westonian than others. There are clear hierarchies that distinguish students by the duration of their enrollment (four years or less) and location of their beds (day students vs. boarders). These distinctions are justified by Westonians as reflecting differential levels of emersion—non-four-year seniors and day students do not share the full experience of Weston. A similar but more complex distinction is made with respect to PG’s (postgraduate students who have completed high school but are spending an additional year in school before attending college and are often athletes).

There are many other distinctions that produce diverse experiences within the apparently unified community of Weston, such as hierarchies of work (distinguishing academic from athletic and artistic domains) and hierarchies of social esteem. Weston does not escape the manifestations of the youth culture, where clothes, looks, interests, and activities are associated with popularity and development of cliques and social hierarchies. It also does not avoid inequalities by gender, race/ethnicity, and social class. As unique as Weston may be, it reflects many lines of demarcation found in other contexts and society at large.

The chapter “Unequal Distinctions” is the most intriguing and thought-provoking. Does the finding that students from different gender, race/ethnic and social class groups have different experiences mean that they are less Westonian? The author claims yes, but answering this question depends on how one (including students and outside observers) understands the relationship between experience and identity. When asked, the majority of students identify themselves as Westonian, regardless of their backgrounds. Two students who did not were a male two-year senior who received a partial scholarship and a male four-year senior from a socioeconomically advantaged background. They challenged the Westonian identification, not based on their experiences (as indeed they were advantaged in many realms), but based on the perceptions of others (i.e., non-Westonians) of what it means to be a Westonian. Moreover, when discussing the gradations of “Westonian-ism,” students did not invoke class, race, and/or gender as relevant categories, nor did they believe that the benefits of the Westonian experience will (or should) be unequally distributed across groups after graduation. Listening to students’ voices thus leaves open the question of whether women and students from racial/ethnic minority groups or less advantaged family backgrounds are less Westonian.

The discussion of “unequal distinctions” is further complicated by extensive variation within groups. For example, while some girls seem to succumb to the pressure to be popular (particularly with the boys) and thus “play dumb,” others appear quite comfortable with being smart. It is said that some girls are at Weston in order to become “trophy wives” (I do not recall any of the girls interviewed identifying as such, so we do not have a first-hand account of what this identity entails), but others are clearly taking advantage of internships and other opportunities to build their future careers. Why do these differences emerge? Is it something that girls bring with them to Weston or do particular experiences at Weston lead to these distinct paths? It is likely a combination thereof, and other factors, but the book leaves the reader wondering. Similarly, why is it that different groups of students
end up in different (unequal) locations. For example, all students taking Latin and Greek seemed to be white, which meant that they received special recognition at the graduation ceremony. But why was that the case? Did students from racial/ethnic minority groups try to enroll and had a bad experience? Did they get the message from peers and/or instructors that those languages are not “what they ought to be interested in?” The differences in experiences are clearly evident, although how and why those differences emerge is less apparent.

The Best of the Best raises as many questions as it answers. Ample presence of students’ voices invites the reader to embrace the challenge posed by the author at the beginning to make sense of the complex social processes described, which will stimulate energetic discussions in classrooms and other professional settings. This is an engaging and insightful book, which sets the stage for a new wave of scholarship on elite identification.


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Social scientists who are employed by business schools have long appreciated the ambiguity of accounting rules and the critical role played by accountants in the negotiation of commercial reality. Some portion of the joy of this is the continued surprise experienced by others when these houses of cards collapse suddenly. The articulation of how facts believed to be the epitome of both precision and rigor can be a reflection of self-interest and context is the subject matter of Matthew Gill’s slim but powerful new monograph.

Based on interviews conducted with working accountants in London, Accountants’ Truth is a skillful exercise in the sociology of knowledge. Gill produces insights that are the product of a keen awareness of the larger picture of the need for trust in modern capitalism and the smaller detail of why lower-level accounting workers cannot articulate their decision-making choices. The juxtaposition works because there is not an excess of armchair philosophy about the esoteric of our economy and globalization. One also is not subjected to an excess of quotes from interviewers about their lives and work. In fact, Gill gets so much middle-range interpretation from his interviews that, for most of the book, one forgets that interviews were conducted.

In the space of this review, it is impossible to do justice to the many and subtle points of substance made by the author. But a few suggestions provide a flavor for the balance of the deep pot of eye-opening ideas offered to the reader. Accountants construct a truth that is highly context specific, largely rhetorical, and in a complex interdependence with the technical aspects of the knowledge base. Accountants possess a poorly developed professionalism, in part due to their structural relationship to commerce, and that does not function well to protect them or their knowledge.

For readers who do not share a fascination with the social construction of knowledge, Gill’s treatment of ethics and professionalism are major compensations. Even a casual observer of our financial environment would recognize the importance of these questions to the well-being of our wealth as individuals and society. The “bottom line” is not the usual “why are things in such a mess?” but instead Gill’s analysis leads us to appreciate how such a fragile world has held together for so long. We should ask “Why are things not in more of mess?”

Gill does not oversimplify the areas that he problematizes. If anything, by revealing the complexity of factuality, ethics and professionalism one is left adrift in heightened confusion about these subjects. Although Gill is critical about the modern practice of accountancy, his appreciation for the difficulties and dilemmas of this work makes him quite sympathetic to the people who ply this trade. The absence of a simple fix is a hallmark of this book. I fear that the author will never make much as a consultant!

One of the strengths of this book is how Gill blends the work done by accountants for their corporate clientele with their status as employees of large and powerful accounting firms. This duality allows Gill to avoid

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glorifying the work, instead tempering it with the recognition that accountants are alienated from their work and disillusioned with the demands of their emotional labor. The latter perspective also allows us an appreciation for the supervisory dyad and the trajectory of accounting careers.

One of the most successful sections of the book details the difficulty that the interviewees had in arriving at the proper accounting treatment for a particular client. Perhaps because of the heightened specificity of this treatment, or perhaps due to the more generous number of transcripted comments, this material comes to life. The treatment should be particularly valuable to those readers who have little appreciation for the reporting contingencies.

The relative brevity of this book places considerable demands upon readers and the assumptions made by the author are many and daunting. To fully appreciate this text, one has to be well-versed in the broad range of social theory, for there are few tutorials available here. At the same time, one needs to have a good working knowledge of commercial practice with emphasis on the work of auditors. Very little is explained on that front, making the book a mystery to the lightly initiated. This effort could easily have run to 500 pages had the author chosen to make the argument in a less dense fashion.

In sum, I find it difficult to be critical of this work. Having thought about these types of accounting topics for many years, I was surprised by the new dimensionality that Gill’s book opened on them. Although my position might be ideal to appreciate what Gill has done, others should be able to find ample, albeit different, value in Accountants’ Truth.


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Aside from its title, this edited volume does not have much in common with Jacob Riis’ 1890 exposé on the shocking conditions of tenement life. Where the Other Half Lives is not concerned with the conditions of low-income housing so much as with the political forces that are currently dismantling public housing throughout the developed world. The book presents a searing critique of neoliberal politics in the latter half of the twentieth century, using affordable housing as the case through which to engage a political debate. This collection of essays, mostly written by editor Sarah Glynn, dissects neoliberal housing policies and argues that they have resulted in the destruction and marginalization of publicly-funded affordable housing throughout Europe, as well as North America, Australia, and New Zealand. Analyzing the similar histories of public housing in these contexts, Glynn and contributors illustrate the ways in which the neoliberal agenda, while touting the wisdom of the unfettered free market, successfully transfers housing profits from the poor to the wealthy. In the process, low-income populations are left with increasingly small stocks of affordable and well-built housing. Public housing itself is simultaneously transformed from a desirable option to a stigmatized one.

It is a timely book, and Glynn pertinently ties neoliberal attacks on subsidized rental housing into the larger issue of the subprime lending crisis. Throughout the book’s background section, she extols the virtues of affordable rental housing and argues that privatization benefits only wealthy landlords and developers. Particularly in the American context, in which low income housing is synonymous with social ills, and home ownership is understood to be a god-given right, Glynn’s critique of the political construction of private ownership as “natural” is both necessary and salient. The background section illustrates her points by providing a thorough history of public housing in the UK, highlighting the past interplay between citizen demand and political response. It also examines the numerous ways in which the current neoliberal agenda has resulted in backtracking away from state involvement in public housing despite its successes and popularity, moving instead towards different types of privatization.
In the book’s second section—also its most interesting and compelling—case studies analyzed by Glynn and contributors detail the ways in which neoliberal housing policies serve to remove the poor from sight, as well as from prime real estate. The case studies, which include England, Scotland, France, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, the United States, and Canada, further demonstrate the scope of housing problems and the insidious spread of neoliberal policies throughout even previously Keynesian nations. The case studies provide compelling evidence to back up Glynn’s at times heavy-handed critiques. They also paint a somewhat dismal picture of the state of public housing throughout the developed world. The book’s final section attempts to return hope to the story and a sense of agency to the affected populations by detailing past and present social movements and their successes. Glynn thus ends on a positive note with a call to action for both activists and academics to join the fight to save public housing worldwide.

While the book certainly presents a coherent story, it is unclear whether it tells a full story. Many of the contributors, including Glynn herself, appear to blur the line between academic and activist, and the political slant of the book colors most of its analysis. This is a collection of essays that share a consistent goal: to prove the inadequacy of the neoliberal agenda to manage a necessary public good such as housing. Given this goal, the reader might question what has been left out. Since there is very little discussion of methodology in any of its chapters, it is difficult to get a sense of how rigorously it was researched and how heavily the authors’ political agendas might have influenced their research choices. Thus, it remains ambiguous as to whether there is another side to the story, or perhaps a middle ground that might exist between the two extremes of neoliberal and socialist policies. Despite Glynn’s faith in grass-roots activism, the book gives little reason to believe that realistic options exist for adequately housing the poor within the current neoliberal political hegemony.

Where the Other Half Lives might also have been strengthened by greater attention to the people most in need of affordable housing, whose stories and struggles could lend credibility to the political arguments. The book lacks the human face that made Riis’ work so affecting, focusing mostly on macro level concerns like political battles, numbers of housing units, demographic changes of neighborhoods, and rising rental costs. The voices of the disenfranchised low-income tenants themselves are rarely heard, while the deeds of activists and politicians figure prominently throughout the book. Although it is not an unbiased take on the debate over affordable housing, Where the Other Half Lives makes an important contribution to that debate. Its strength lies in its case study chapters and the ability of the authors to show the consistency with which attacks on affordable public housing are occurring across nations. Regardless of the country or its past history of Keynesian versus neoliberal policies, we witness the same push to dismantle, relocate, and privatize affordable housing, while replacing low-income tenants with mixed income populations that are more attractive to municipalities. The authors persuasively argue that if not stopped, these overlapping trends of privatization, destruction, and gentrification may lead us to a future of housing conditions hauntingly similar to those documented over 100 years ago.


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In From the Ground Up, Rick Grannis explores networks of neighboring ties and proposes a fundamentally sociological insight: weak microgeography affects neighboring behavior, which then gives rise to “neighborhoods.” This insight is non-obvious, as he observes “In no case, however, have residents attributed improvement or deterioration in their neighborhood to a hedge or a bike path or a bus stop” (p. xviii). Thus, Grannis proposes that physical barriers...
affect neighboring relations. These barriers can range from freeways to highways, primary streets, or even secondary streets. Inside these barriers of larger streets are his “neighborhoods,” which he terms t-communities: a collection of tertiary street-blocks (tertiary streets are “local neighborhood roads”, generally a single lane in each direction).

Conceptually, Grannis argues that four stages undergird all neighboring relations: (1) propinquity (individuals must be geographically available to one another, (2) casual encounters, (3) intentionally initiating contact, and (4) engaging in activity that indicates mutual trust, or shared norms and values. Stage One of this schema is useful in orienting researchers towards “selection effects”, whereas Stage Two focuses on the notion of “passive contacts.” Focusing on passive contacts emphasizes the importance of small walkable geographic areas, overlapping time schedules and longer residence in the neighborhood. These passive contacts also highlight the importance of children in Grannis’ study, as over 80 percent of passive ties occurred when adults met while walking their children to school or the bus stop, or while their children played together. Indeed, children are crucial in these “neighborhoods” given their geographic constraint to a relatively small area (particularly for young children who are often limited to their own street block). Stage Three highlights the importance of residents tending to initiate ties with others similar to themselves, particularly based on race/ethnicity. Notably, he defines Stage Four ties based on their potential to generate social capital and collective efficacy, and ignores their emotional strength—a conceptual decision that not all scholars would agree with.

Most striking are the rich data marshaled to address these questions. Grannis combines data from a single gang barrio, a college town at two time points, and 68 Los Angeles neighborhoods (with a follow-up survey of 20 of them). The LA surveys used adaptive link-tracing sampling, in which one household is chosen at random in a neighborhood, and from this interview 10 more households were chosen (based on the households named and the furthest distance from the initial household). The follow-up Los Angeles survey interviewed 20 additional households from the seed in this manner. The college town was an exhaustive census of one t-community in town (1,214 residences).

What is the takeaway point in *From the Ground Up*? On the one hand, Grannis argues that he provides a “more theoretically grounded neighborhood equivalent” (p. 4) that maps more closely onto underlying social processes than other conceptualizations of neighborhood. In support, his chapter focusing on a large territorial gang in Southern California shows that the boundaries claimed by the gang coincided with the boundaries of a tertiary street island. The youthfulness of new gang initiates occurs in a time period when they are more geographically constrained, explaining the importance of this micro-geography. Grannis also shows that adjacent block groups within a t-community were more similar in racial/ethnic composition than adjacent block groups on the border of two t-communities. And he shows evidence that his t-communities capture social ties better than do census tracts, as almost none of the ties identified as known personally were to someone living in a different t-community (0.2 percent), whereas 6.3 percent were in a different tract.

On the other hand, another perspective is that the evidence marshaled here provides evidence of potent boundaries for neighboring ties, but less evidence for actual neighborhoods. Notably, the “neighbors” named by respondents tended to live very close to them, as the cognitive maps shown in Chapter Eight often list residents on the same block, or just a few adjacent blocks. Furthermore, Grannis notes that households use the characteristics of the local micro-neighborhood as a heuristic for the “neighborhood” in residential mobility decisions, rather than the characteristics of the larger census geography. All of this suggests that the face block is an important socio-spatial unit. However, is it reasonable to suppose that these micro-ties truly aggregate to the “neighborhoods” of the much larger t-communities with a mean population of 14,351? Indeed, one t-community in south Los Angeles had nearly half a million persons. Are these really cohesive neighborhoods?
Regarding the evidence of ties occurring within t-communities noted in the previous paragraph, it is worth observing that 94 percent of these neighboring ties did not cross tract boundaries. Given that scholars often criticize the use of tracts, are t-communities really enough of an improvement? To what extent this study yields insights about a bounded unit that has sociological significance as a “neighborhood” is an open question for future scholarship.

Some might wonder if Grannis’ provocative strategy focusing exclusively on neighboring ties is too narrow to understand adequately the neighborhoods and their processes. Grannis acknowledges that this is a specific type of social relation, but is intent on seeing how far this will take us. It is not an unreasonable strategy, as it is useful to understand how much we can learn from focusing on this single dimension. The question ultimately is how much do we lose by disregarding other network ties that residents have to co-workers, more distant friends, fellow church members, etc? Also, what do we lose by ignoring the personal biases and cultural frameworks that residents bring to their perceptions of their neighborhood and community?

Nonetheless, From the Ground Up provides strong evidence that residents have very localized neighboring ties and that these ties are strongly inhibited by the rather subtle boundary of secondary or primary streets. This finding has considerable merit. Understanding how physical boundaries can affect social ties—even if only focused on neighboring ties—can provide important insights for many other possible research questions scholars might wish to pose.


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Myra J. Hird’s book apprises its readers of the sociological significance of organisms that are not “big like us” (p. 21), specifically, bacteria. Hird does an artful job of explaining how “meeting with” bacteria and other microbes compels entirely new ways of thinking about topics familiar to sociologists, including communication, communities, social intelligence, the intersection of nature/culture/society, science and epistemic cultures, the self (both economic and biological), exchange, sex and gender, environments, and ecologies. Throughout her book, Hird repeatedly disconcerts the reader with a series of cognitive jolts from which often emerge refreshingly new ways of thinking about the world.

In Chapter One (“After War”), Hird situates her analysis in the context of recent discussions and debates about the nature of science and epistemology and introduces her project as a study of “microntologies,” a strategy for framing sociological attention on the microbial world. She describes her affinity for the work of thinkers like Bruno Latour, who conceive of reality as populated by various “actants” (both organic and inorganic, simple and complex) among which exist complex systems of relations. It is the profound mutual entanglement of everything microbial with everything else that constitutes the primary focus of Hird’s book.

Chapter Two (“Plenty of Room at the Bottom: Thinking Bacteria”) provides a crash course in bacteriology which Hird uses to document convincingly the various ways in which bacteria have dominated life on Earth, including the radical alteration of the atmosphere by causing an “oxygen Holocaust” which resulted in the greatest mass extinction on Earth, killing virtually all species for which oxygen is poisonous. Of direct sociological interest is Hird’s account of how bacteria exhibit perception, complex communication, collective memory, community organization, social intelligence, and complex behavioral patterns such as cooperation, cheating, and hierarchy. Hird concludes Chapter Two with a discussion of how microontology can enhance our understanding of the intersections of the natural, the cultural and the social.

In Chapter Three (“Evolutionary Theory and Its Discontents”), Hird provides an extensive discussion of symbiosis and symbiogenesis theory which will be of particular interest to “neo-Darwinian” thinkers such as evolutionary sociologists, sociobiologists,
and evolutionary psychologists. Symbiogenesis theory poses a direct challenge to various neo-Darwinian orthodoxies, including the idea that replication and mutation are the driving forces of organic evolution, and the related assumption that genes or individuals are the basic units of selection. Hird counsels readers to become open to the idea that symbiogenesis theory may not only triumph over neo-Darwinian orthodoxy, but also could reshape the way future social scientists think about organic evolution and social behavior.

In Chapter Four (“Microontologies of Self”), Hird skilfully deploys her microontological approach to call into question conventional ways of thinking about the distinction between self and non-self. She discusses, for example, the relevance of biological immune responses to self/non-self, the importance of distinguishing between the economic and the biological self, the meaning of the self in relation to gifting and social exchange, and what it means to view the self as a symbiont “all the way down” (p. 84). Thus, if it is better to think of the body as a community of relations among living things rather than as a single, distinct entity, then the self may also be best understood as a complex and extensive web of “actants,” a product of vast symbiogenetic mergers.

In Chapter Five (“Microontologies of Sex”), Hird’s discussions of sex, gender, and sex/gender diversity bring attention to an intriguing body of scientific information regarding sex, gender, and reproduction at the microbial level. How many sociologists would ever suspect, for example, that organisms have reproduced sexually for less than 10 percent of the duration of life on Earth, or that sexual reproduction by animals may have evolved in response to a failure to reproduce sexually, or that countless organisms can share DNA and even produce new organisms without having sex, or that some species feature tens of thousands of genders? After describing carefully the “diversity of sex, gender, reproduction, sexuality and sexual difference” (p. 93) in nature, Hird uses symbiogenesis theory to examine the neo-Darwinian orthodoxy that sex exists to maximize genetic diversity for the adaptive advantages it can confer.

Chapter Six (“Microontologies of Environment”) entails a review of the Gaia hypothesis as a scientific (versus “New Age” or spiritualist) analysis of the Earth’s biosphere. Lacking extensive support in most establishment scientific circles, Hird nevertheless gives the idea serious consideration within the context of symbiogenesis theory. She explains that the “superorganismic,” self-modifying, and mutually-entangling processes by means of which the biosphere regulates itself can best be understood in light of bacteria’s role in symbiogenesis.

Chapter Seven (“Eating Well, Surviving Humanism”) concludes the book by discussing the ethical implications of coming to understand the complex and extensive entanglements that link humans, and all other species, to the microbial world. She discusses “eating” (both literally and metaphorically) as the most profound way in which we engage the natural world. Bacteria are the very “stuff of life” (p. 142), and any system of thought that would orient humans ethically to nature must feature, front-and-center, the microbial world.

This is one of most interesting books written by a sociologist that I have read recently, and I recommend it enthusiastically. Neo-Darwinians (such as myself) will appreciate Hird’s excellent discussions of the self-organizing social complexities of bacterial colonies, the challenge that symbiogenesis theory poses to “vertical” (versus “lateral”) models of DNA transmission, and the tenuousness of insisting that either genes or individuals always must be the units of selection. Other readers with more of a humanities bent will take away other lessons. But there is considerable value in this book to be gained by anyone who would do him- or herself the favor of meeting with Hird and her microbial world.


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Norms are sociology’s version of gravity: an ubiquitous fact of life and indispensable


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Norms are sociology’s version of gravity: an ubiquitous fact of life and indispensable
explanatory tool that is itself incompletely understood. The Rewards of Punishment is Christine Horne’s ambitious attempt to shed light on one crucial aspect of norms. What she proffers is, as the title declares, a “relational theory of norm enforcement,” one that sees a would-be enforcer’s social ties and interests as primary determinants of their propensity to sanction others’ behavior. She posits that beyond personal motivations for sanctioning (i.e. to dissuade future trespass), individuals also have an interest in the interests of potential interaction partners, as well as in the ways that their own sanctioning behavior affects their standing in these partners’ eyes. From this she deduces that sanctioning behavior should be directly related to the would-be sanctioner’s belief that others will value and reward such behavior, and that this is in turn determined by both their mutual interdependence and the prevailing “metanorms”—norms concerning the sanctioning of norms. After sketching her model, she sets out to illustrate and substantiate the argument with examples, field data, and laboratory experiments. She concludes with an exploration of the model’s policy implications.

There is much to like about this book: it is brief, it pays overdue attention to a fundamental but under-researched social phenomenon, it connects its findings to relevant applications, it recognizes the indispensability of the micro-foundations of individual behavior to sociological theory, and it is explicit in its use of social psychological and evolutionary literatures to support those foundations. But what is most exciting is its use of that most woefully underutilized of research techniques in sociology, the laboratory experiment. While they by themselves constitute only a partial substantiation of any sociological theory, when combined with complementary data from the field (as here), experimental methods allow the theorists to make the soundest possible substantive case. For all of these reasons, but especially her advocacy and use of the experimental method, my hat is off to Horne.

Of course, like any work, this one is not without fault. The book’s origin in several separately published articles has resulted in somewhat uneven writing and organization, and some of the cited examples are of questionable relevance. More substantively, her “relational” alternative sometimes borders on a subjectivist version of the consequentialist approach to norms that is her main foil. That is, as implied by the eponymous catchphrase, the rewards of punishment, the argument often follows the well-used RCT strategy of identifying some heretofore unrecognized benefits that “explain,” via the actor’s ostensibly imperative pursuit of self interests, this or that social behavior.

Ironically, this reviewer’s greatest reservations about the work spring from its signal feature—Horne’s use of laboratory experiments. Though lab experiments are necessarily abstracted from reality, external validity demands that the operationalized constructs remain recognizably analogous to their real-world referents, which does not obviously obtain here. One questionable operationalization is that of “norm” itself, in that the sanctionable behavior is only assumed to be normative in subjects’ eyes, and is so only because it is advantageous to the other players that one behaves this way. But a behavior’s desirability, even to multiple others, does not make it normative. That subjects had no interaction apart from the act of sanctioning seems to eliminate the requisite social dimension of normative behavior, and to cast further doubt on this operationalization.

The problems with the “interdependence” variable run deeper. Horne’s theory predicts that sanctioning varies with the degree of relatedness among interactants, and the consistent finding of her research is that interdependence does effectively determine sanctioning. But this large effect for interdependence is arguably an artifact of the interdependence manipulation itself: in the “low-interdependence” condition, when subjects chose to sanction each other by sharing points with them (presumably on the basis of their contributions to a group project), these points were simply transferred. The cumulative difference in what each player could make by never cooperating versus always cooperating with their partners totals just over $1 ($8.23 vs. $9.33). By contrast, in the “high interdependence” condition, shared points were doubled (and later tripled) during transfer. In this condition, a player who participates in mutual

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sanctioning with even one cooperative other could earn as much as $18.65. Thus, not only is “interdependence” here confined to the act of sanctioning itself, not only is sanctioning limited to the rewarding of desired behavior, not only are the stakes in the “low-interdependence” condition trivial, not only does the profitability of sanctioning in the “high-interdependence” condition dwarf the stakes of the sanctionable behavior itself, but mutual sanctioning is mutually profitable – indeed, its unique ability to produce wealth makes sanctioning the only means for subjects to significantly increase their earnings.

Together, these observations suggest that the experimental paradigm represents a singular situation, disanalogous with most imaginable real-world instances of sanctioning. While the gist of Horne’s theory is that individuals sanction when it is in their interest to do so, in these experiments the profitability differential across conditions is so profound that it threatens to overdetermine the results and calls into question the very definition of the situation as an example of norm enforcement. Indeed, the game could just as likely be construed by players in the high-interdependence condition as, say, a “vetted investment game,” as a case of sanctioning. To the extent that this is so, these experiments speak less to norms than to individuals’ proclivity to act in their material interests when, and only when, these are made sufficiently salient.

Now, subjects may actually have construed the experimental situation as an instance of normative sanctioning. But in the absence of the manipulation checks that are both normal and relatively simple to obtain in the experimental method, one cannot rule out alternate construals. Likewise, the text, appendix, and even original articles evinced a dearth of the kinds of descriptive statistics about subject’s behavior that would have illuminated their understanding of the situation. Readers need more than regression coefficients and a table of global means to fully interpret the meaning of an experiment.

To be clear, I find Horne’s propositions eminently plausible. I’m just not sure that the reported results support them. Even granting, as I am happy to, that normative sanctioning is ultimately rooted in its evolutionary fitness-enhancing benefits, there are multiple routes by which it could be manifest in behavior, most of which are consistent with Horne’s data. The job of theory is to provide a valid means of deciding between these, but while Horne writes much about mechanisms, the research reported gives us few or no reasons to prefer one over another. Thus, though Horne’s book represents a positive step towards the better understanding of norms that the discipline demands, especially regarding the methods that will get us there, it unfortunately fails to fully capitalize on the strengths of those methods themselves.


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This edited volume offers a comprehensive, historical, and comparative account of China’s ascendancy in relation to global capitalism. The chapters contributed by a group of renowned scholars address a series of important questions. What are the historical legacies that facilitate or thwart China’s integration in the global economy? How is China’s economic expansion and outreach reconfiguring the global geopolitical and economic orders? How is China’s domestic labor movement interrelated with the global labor market? The book excellently addresses these questions and greatly enhances our understanding of China’s rise in economical and geopolitical terms.

Ho-Fung Hung’s introductory chapter sets the stage. It contextualizes the rise of China against the backdrop of the structural transformations of the global capitalist system since the 1970s. Hung specifically attends to the rise of the new international division of labor, the rise of multiple and rival capitalist centers among core countries, and the decline of antisystemic movements that once constrained the class power of
capital across the world system. His discussion distinguishes China’s rise from that of Japan and the other Asian Tigers. Instead of subjecting itself as a client state of the United States, China is an independent geopolitical and military rival to the United States and other status quo.

Two subsequent chapters contributed by Giovanni Arrighi and Alvin So each deal with historical trends that place China’s rise in broader perspective. Arrighi insightfully contrasts the Western and East Asian geopolitical and economical system head-to-head. Combined with historical specifications, Arrighi explains the changing fortune and might of these two important regions of the world over the course of the past five centuries. In comparison, So’s characterization of China’s ongoing economic reform is controversial. Moving beyond the consensus that China’s latest developmental pattern is closer to the East Asian developmental model than to the neoliberal model, So boldly asserts that China had embraced neoliberalism up to the early 2000s but then shifted to state developmentalism. This argument is likely to raise eyebrows from those who draw distinctions between market economy and neoliberalism. Furthermore, the author writes that “the Maoist state provided social services (such as housing, health care, welfare, education, pension, and so on) based on need and free of charge of all citizens” (p. 52). Such a claim is closer to communist propaganda than actual fact.

Richard Appelbaum’s chapter focuses on an interesting phenomenon emerging in the global retailer-contractor chain. He argues that the rise of giant transnational contractors in the Greater China Region is tilting the power balance between global retailers and these contractors to the latter’s favor. He laments such an important trend is “largely untheorized.” Reading through this informative and fascinating piece, however, one may find that the aim is yet to be achieved. Students of organizations may note that Michael Porter’s theory on the forces shaping competition or Jeffrey Pfeffer’s resource dependence perspective would provide good starting points for that purpose.

József Böröcz’s cast of Asia’s (mainly China and India) rise vis-à-vis the decline of the former Soviet bloc and the West offers an interesting argument and a quantitative exercise. Böröcz argues that the collapse of the former Soviet bloc served as a buffer for the decline of the West in global terms. This conclusion is largely drawn from his analysis of the changes of the nations’ GDP and GDP per capita in relation to the rest of the world between 1989 and 2001. Sandwiching the former Soviet bloc between Asia and the West might make sense in statistical terms. Less obvious though are the substantive mechanisms linking Asia and the former Soviet block directly and also the bilateral interactions accounting for the rise of the former and the decline of the latter. Without such detail, the story seems to be more of an artificial outcome derived from a zero-sum design of measurement and analysis. Moreover, the treatment of the data is debatable. For example, zooming in Figure 5.2 (p. 93) by decreasing the unit of both axes suggests that countries such as Israel may be qualified as one on a “balanced growth” trajectory, as opposed to the author’s none finding. Also, the author provides no theoretical or mathematical justification with regard to how much change along one dimension (i.e. percent change in the share of a country’s GDP in gross world product) should be commensurate with that of the other dimension (i.e. percent change of a country’s GDP/cap as percent of world mean GDP/cap) in defining the different trajectories.

Paul Ciccantell examines China’s increasingly aggressive competition with Japan and other western rivals in securing global natural resources. This adds fresh light to the Sino-Japan relationship. As far as natural resources are concerned, John Gulick points to a Sino-Russian alliance is now forming. Both chapters reaffirm the notion that the global market place for natural resources is more political than economical. Yet some may argue, from China’s point of view, Japan is not so much a rival in natural resources as an important trade partner that has benefited China. On another account, Russia’s recent deployment of resources that plays China against Japan has made Russia an untrustworthy partner in the eyes of the Chinese.

Stephanie Luce and Edna Bonacich propound an interesting scenario as they
address what Chinese workers have to do with the global labor movement. They envision that workers located at strategic nodes of the global supply chains should unite together to make disruptions. They argue that such cross-border collaboration would increase the bargaining power of global labor. Nevertheless, the authors fail to specify the mechanisms and circumstances that would unite workers from Shenzhen (China) and workers from Long Beach (California) in their fight against the global capitalists. Given the U.S. public sentiment and the U.S. trade protectionism toward China, such possibility seems fanciful at least for now. Beverly Silver and Lu Zhang’s investigation of China’s labor unrest is well grounded by comparison. These authors start off with the premise that where capital goes, labor-capital conflicts follow. They perceive China as a new center of global labor unrest. Unlike the ambitious speculation of Luce and Bonacich, Silver and Zhang define such labor movements as domestic without organizational linkage to a global labor movement.

In all, this volume is a rare and important contribution to understanding China’s rise in the context of global capitalism. Despite the questions raised, this reviewer enjoyed reading all the chapters and learned much from each author who contributed to this excellent collection. The volume is a must-read for anyone who is intrigued by China’s past and its contemporary role in the global system.

Peter Winch was a British Wittgensteinian philosopher who in 1958 published a challenging short book, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* arguing that the very idea of social science was a deep error. The charge was not only the long-familiar one that the social studies are logically distinct from the natural sciences. The Wittgensteinian twist was a double claim about the identity of human actions and the character of understanding. As Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock observe, “what they are doing, the identity of their action, is simply what the action means for the actors in the social setting” and “understanding what a person is doing is a perfectly mundane and everyday affair.” Understanding human actions and more generally practices is not a theoretical task, identifying causal relations, but rather “simply looking and seeing,” which we all can do. Thus, the authors write, “Winch believes, with the ethnomethodologists and with Wittgenstein, that ‘sociology’ as a lay activity is ubiquitous, but, for that very reason, as a professional activity is only infrequently necessary.” Moreover, “the whole idea” of social science “is wrong-headed,” even those traditions which suppose sociology’s task is “interpretation.” Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, they write: “Don’t look for the interpretation, look for an adequate description.”

Winch later published an article, “Understanding a Primitive Society” boldly challenging E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s classical account of witchcraft among the Azande, generating a lively debate about rationality and relativism among anthropologists and philosophers. Winch argued that the anthropologist was wrong to view the Zande as empirically mistaken and logically contradictory in their beliefs. His mistake was, Winch wrote, to assume that “the European is right and the Zande wrong,” for “Zande notions of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical system in terms of which the Zande try to gain a quasi-scientific understanding of the world;” and it is “the European, obsessed with pushing Zande thought where it would not naturally go—to a contradiction—who is guilty of misunderstanding, not the Zande.” Hutchinson et al. respect Evans-Pritchard’s ethnography but endorse Winch’s critique of his interpretation of it, agreeing with Winch’s view that “there are different ways of attempting to ‘understand reality,’ not all of them of the same form or comparable with those of science.” Just as Winch wrote that what “is real and what is unreal shows itself in the sense that language has” (so that it is “within the religious use of language that

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God’s reality has its place’’), so the authors write that talk about “reality” “finds life and referents in discontinuous contexts of application.” And, just as Winch wrote that “the standards of rationality in different societies do not always coincide,” so they write of the “philosophical fantasy of culture-free understanding as an appropriate conception of what ‘rationality’ is.”

Their book can be read, and judged, at different levels. Is it a convincing interpretation of Wittgenstein, whose single purpose is seen as therapy, alleviating confusions? Or of Winch, “a resolutely Wittgensteinian thinker,” defended as neither a relativist nor a linguistic idealist nor an advocate of a “quietism” that precludes social criticism? Here let us ask, are its arguments, defending their views thus interpreted, convincing?

“Understanding” is, the central argument goes, a matter of “simply looking and seeing.” It results from “explanation,” which, we learn, is “removing a puzzlement” about why people act in a particular way; and the means to such explanation lies in “the relevant practice.” So the key to understanding is identifying actions (“explanation by description”): that is, placing them within “the social settings within which the activities occur,” namely, the relevant “practices.” “Practices” are the unanalyzed bedrock of their argument. Correct description of actions is judged by what competent participants in practices say (“is this move checkmate?”). There is no place for any further “why question.”

This is indeed an odd basis for declaring social science illegitimate. It stems from a resistance shared with Winch to “a prejudice towards theory which Wittgenstein called ‘a craving for generality.’” Yet social scientists of all kinds address innumerable pressing why questions whose answers demand comparison and thus generalizations across “practices.” And they have analyzed and specified these frameworks of action in countless ways, from face-to-face groups to cyber-networks. In short, this resistance to generality is itself no more than particularist prejudice.

Nevertheless, they offer a raft of insights along the way. They demonstrate the importance of identifying “action under a description” (“hand-washing” by hospital medics, ritual worshippers and Pontius Pilate are three different actions)—but do not show why we must stop there. They give an illuminating interpretation of Goffman as engaged in successive projects that involve redescribing actions independently of actors’ intentions—but without showing where this explanatory approach misfires. And they rightly insist on the value of looking for familiar analogies to alien practices—but fail to show why we should view practices as yielding mutually unintelligible realities and rationalities. Objecting to a scientific critique of religion, they write that religion “is not primarily a set of doctrines at all, but much more importantly a set of maxims for a way of life.” But isn’t that very understanding of the practice of religion an outcome of its scientific critique? And they rightly agree with Winch that when faced with talk of what is “real” and “unreal,” we must always pay attention to the context. But why should we conclude that contexts engender mutually exclusive “realities,” so that, for instance, practitioners of magic would have no interest in causal efficacy? Evans-Pritchard, at the end of his great book, asked a why question that Winch and his defenders deem out of place: why do the Zande fail to perceive the futility of their magic? offering as an answer twenty-two compelling reasons.


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Over the past four decades, John Irwin has contributed significantly to our understanding of the nature of imprisonment and its consequences. In such books as *The Felon*, *Prisons in Turmoil*, and his co-authored book with James Austin, *It’s about Time: America’s Imprisonment Binge*, Irwin has provided sobering analyses of the prison’s internal structure, inmate culture, and associated consequences that together have revealed many critical and important insights about the inhumanity and ineffectiveness of...
prisons. Unfortunately, from a public policy standpoint, prisons have emerged largely unscathed from these sorts of critical assessments, evidenced by their unprecedented growth over the past decade and today’s approximate 1.5 million inmate population.

In his latest book, *Lifers: Seeking Redemption in Prison*, Irwin focuses upon a particular growing group of inmates, namely “lifers.” The book is comprised of seven chapters that include descriptions of lifers and their pre-prison, prison, and after-prison experiences, and changes in sentencing that have contributed to the growing number of lifers in prison today. As Irwin explains, he became interested in lifers (i.e., those inmates who have normally been convicted of first- or second-degree homicide), while completing a study of prisoner social organization at the Solano State Prison in California. He decided to initiate a study of lifers at San Quentin where he was able to complete interviews with lifers and attend some of the self-help programs they had developed. He found that the backgrounds and life experiences of the lifers were both varied and similar. Moreover, Irwin indicates that in the course of completing his study he came to realize that much of the conventional wisdom regarding “homicide, lifers, and their crimes, their prison ‘careers,’ and their threat to society if released are distorted or mistaken,” (p. ix). In his effort to address these distorted perceptions about lifers, Irwin probed their pre-prison lives, their crimes, their maturation, and their transformation in prison. He found that despite different life trajectories, most lifers “become decent persons after serving years in prison.”

Troubling is Irwin’s claim that many lifers find redemption during their long periods of incarceration. Given the scant evidence provided by Irwin, namely interviews with 17 lifers incarcerated at San Quentin, his redemption claim must be viewed as preliminary or exploratory at best. However, Irwin does provide a number of other valuable insights on the personal, family, and public policy implications associated with the long prison sentences served by lifers. In fact, the book is at its best when Irwin discusses the multiple impediments and associated dilemma of reentry that are faced annually by some 700,000 inmates and, in particular, lifers, as they reenter their communities following release from prison. Here Irwin provides gripping descriptions of how difficult it is for lifers who have served 20 or more years in prison, to return and begin law-abiding lives in a society that has changed dramatically during their long periods of incarceration. Despite their best intentions to reenter society and live crime-free lives, lifers are largely ill-equipped to deal with and function in what is now a “foreign land and way of life.” Not only is society the polar opposite to life in confinement, but it is so different from the society they knew decades before their incarceration. Housing, jobs, transportation, and other everyday basics are illusive, and helping services for these common reentry difficulties are largely inadequate or non-existent, contributing to and facilitating alcohol and drug use, as well as a return to crime.

Overall, John Irwin’s *Lifers: Seeking Redemption in Prison* is informative and raises a number of timely and important research and public policy questions related to long prison sentences and the associated challenges of reentry. The book is guided by Irwin’s unique and firsthand experiences with imprisonment and his associated ability to glean helpful insights from prisoners. A supplemental reading for undergraduate and graduate courses on corrections, parole, and reentry, it is easy to read and Irwin provides examples that will prove helpful to readers not familiar with the prior literature on prisons, inmates, inmate culture, and reentry. Researchers will find Irwin’s redemption claim to be of such importance that it leads them to follow-up with appropriate empirical tests. Clearly, it is essential for criminology and public policy to know more about what happens to lifers, their attitudes, their beliefs, their expectations for the future, and their post-release experiences and outcomes. Given the potential empirical tests and the policy-related implications for reentry, *Lifers: Seeking Redemption in Prison* could prove very useful for criminology and public policy. But before responsible conclusions are drawn, they must be informed by carefully conceived empirical studies that reflect a representative sample.

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Islam, Migration and Integration by Ayhan Kaya is a welcome contribution to the growing literature on transnational migration in the context of recent securitization. The book provides an extended discussion of the migrant integration practices and cultures of four European countries: Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative research, it focuses on the experiences of Turkish and North African Muslim immigrants.

Clearly written and well organized, the book consists of six chapters plus an extended introduction and a brief conclusion. It makes generous use of tables, maps and survey results. In the introduction, the author defines his work as an attempt to compare and contrast the contemporary regimes of migration, integration and citizenship in four countries with respect to their Muslim residents. The author analyzes the change in migration and citizenship policies of those European countries in terms of structural changes that have produced stigmatization of Islam, securitization of migration, the rise of Fortress Europe, and a transition from the welfare state to prudentialism. The literature reviewed in the introductory chapter puts some recent theoretical insights into conversation with empirical accounts of European immigration. The introduction states that one of the book’s ambitions is to be a followup to Rogers Brubaker’s classic in the field, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (1992).

The four chapters that follow present detailed pictures of Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. Here Kaya argues that culturalist Germany has made a successful transition from being a segregationist country to an integrationist one, while civilizationist/republican France has proven ineffective in integrating its migrant populations. Of the remaining two cases, Belgium is seen as divided between these two models, while multiculturalist Dutch practice is shown to have made a recent U-turn, retreating from its earlier exemplary status. The last two analytical chapters look more closely at the experiences of Muslim communities themselves and the ways in which Islam is accommodated by European states. Both chapters deal with issues of community dynamics, problems of multiculturalism and the author’s conclusions about the changing landscape of European Islam, where the religion is simultaneously individualized and institutionalized. The concluding chapter, while largely repetitive, makes the noteworthy call for “transnationalization” of integration, that is, for a multidimensional approach to integration on the part of host countries that would include closer cooperation with immigrants’ countries of origin (p.207).

This book is better appreciated as a survey of several European countries than as a work advocating one strong overarching thesis. Although the author makes a number of interesting points about local issues and offers creative observations on securitization, regimes of representation, and governmentality, his analysis is primarily descriptive and synthetic.

Kaya argues on multiple occasions throughout the book (pp.9, 141, 177, 180, 182) that the turn towards religion or religious revival among Muslim migrants is a result of pervasive racism, discrimination, Islamophobia, etc. “This work claims,” he notes, “that religious resurgence could also be interpreted as a symptom of the existing structural social and political problems such as unemployment, racism, xenophobia, exclusion, and sometimes, assimilation. My works on Euro-Turks reveal that migrant origin groups tend to get affiliated with the politics of identity, ethnicity and religiosity in order to tackle such structural constraints” (p.177). This persistent claim, a typically well-intended liberal argument, is nevertheless a weak and problematic one. Elsewhere Kaya says that “religious, ethnic and...

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traditional community structures provide migrants with the necessary equipment to struggle against the destabilizing effects of these challenges” (p.141). Given the author’s postmodern and positively critical inclinations, this argument bears unexpected traces of now-defunct modernization theory. As much as we want to criticize culturalization of the exclusionary discourses deployed against immigrants, we do not need to attribute religious revival among immigrants entirely to the failure of structural integration. Needless to say, the secularization theory, which treated religion as an epiphenomenon, has long since been proven wrong.

The book provides a useful update to Brubaker’s earlier work. Kaya presents convincing evidence that the legal and cultural environments have changed in both France and Germany, with Germany seemingly more successful in integrating its Muslim immigrants. Implicit in his argument is the following observation: today the French model effectively denies Muslim immigrants recognition, and while it provides some relief from negative discrimination, it completely blocks the possibility of positive discrimination, thereby turning immigrants into unequal equals. Germans, on the other hand, seem to treat their immigrants, culturally speaking, as equal unequals. Juxtaposition of Brubaker’s original argument and Kaya’s contemporary survey of the French and German cases shows how modalities of citizenship privilege a different model depending on whether you are looking at the claim of the host or the experience of the immigrant.

Its fresh analysis of the landscape of European migration and its interdisciplinary appeal make Kaya’s Islam, Migration and Integration a valuable resource for students of international migration and of Muslim diasporas.
Koff limits the game metaphor to the chapter titles, using it briefly only in the concluding chapter. The focus shifts from broad generalizations about civil society and the nonprofit board in the introductory chapter, to specifics from the survey of NOCA members in the remaining chapters. The introduction would be helpful to someone unfamiliar with discussions of the development of the third sector, of institutionalist perspectives on organizations, and of citizen participation, but it lacks a more detailed analysis of these issues, to which the text often simply alludes in broad, abstract terms.

In the middle three chapters, the specific survey results tend to contrast opinions of executive directors and public members of boards, though those opinions are often rather similar, in fact. As the text recognizes, the definition of “public member” is unclear in the literature on public participation, so it is not surprising that the respondents are somewhat confused about what the role of the public member is. My own reaction to this distinction, admittedly influenced by my experiences with other kinds of nonprofit organizations, was also confusion. In many nonprofit organizations, which unlike NOCA do not represent professionals and their credentialing, the distinction between different board members is not so stark: that is, many members are “public” in some sense. The public member role is, as Koff makes very clear, potentially important, perhaps of growing significance, and yet quite ambiguous. In the abstract, most of her respondents agree that the public member role should permit the organization to hear outside opinions (that is, in this association’s context, non-professional opinions). However, many of the public members she surveyed seem confused about their role and desirous of more training for it, and many of the executive directors agreed.

Focusing narrowly on the central contribution of the book, it is clear that the survey of the members of NOCA does provide some useful insights about the demographic characteristics of public members of the NOCA member organizations, and about perspectives on these public members’ role. Admittedly, these insights are often based on rather small differences in responses. Based on these responses, the penultimate chapter provides many suggestions for “maximizing” the public members’ “potential,” but the suggestions, though reasonable, are not convincingly based on the survey responses themselves and the explanations for these suggestions are undeveloped.

In the end, though the title of the book and many comments throughout refer to nonprofit organizations overall, the data derived from the survey are really limited to one kind of nonprofit, certification organization. The problem is, of course, that those certification organizations are staffed and governed by professionals, and have missions that focus on professional certification, and are thus very different from most nonprofit organizations, in which professionals play a much less central role in the board and missions are vastly different. The result is that someone expecting an analysis of citizen participation in nonprofit organizations generally will be disappointed, as I was.


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In Women’s Work and Lives in Rural Greece, Gabriella Lazaridis presents an intriguing discussion of “the limits and possibilities of economic change in transforming women’s lives in two villages” (p.1) located in Western Crete (Nohia and Platanos). The study is based on in-depth field work conducted in the late 1980s for her doctoral thesis. The author analyzes traditional norms of chastity and honor, the emphasis on family life and religion in agricultural Crete, the impact of new income opportunities for women, and the shifting importance of women’s domestic skills as core elements to rural women’s identity and to village social organization. She documents and explains both continuity and change in women’s domestic and work roles over two decades, relying heavily on personal observation, formal and informal interviews, local records, policy and program documents, and “gossip.”
Although the production of olives and olive oil is the traditional economic activity for families in both villages, Lazaridis’ core argument is that between-village differences in socio-cultural changes can be explained by the nature of women’s nontraditional work introduced through national and international support for rural development. She makes the case that women’s handicraft production in the 1980s, based on women’s traditional craft skills, reaffirmed patriarchal norms governing marriage and sexuality, male and religious authority, and an identity based on women’s domestic roles in Nohia. In Platanos, however, women’s incorporation into greenhouse gardening for the market, which required new skills acquisition, contributed to more “radical” change (author’s term) such as increased decision making for married and single women, reduced importance of religious authorities, and the increasing dependence of households on women’s labor in market production.

The questions posed by the author during field work and her conclusions regarding the relationship between the conditions of work and socio-cultural change reflect those of many analyses of women’s changing roles under conditions of “economic development” during the 1970s-1980s. Particularly interesting are Lazaridis’ insightful explanations and anecdotes throughout of how she conducted research to piece together her evidence, and her ability to draw in the reader through engaging and exceptionally clear writing. If not for the daunting price of the book, it would make an ideal text for undergraduate courses on rural women or social change and development. The author also is skilled at explaining links between macro and micro-level change processes and she positions local change within the broader geographic, political, economic, and historical context (Chapter One). For example, she considers the impact of European Union and state policies, development projects, local class structure, culture and institutions (i.e., family, religion), and social mobility.

In the brief introduction, Lazaridis not only presents the setting and major questions that guided research, she provides insightful tales of people’s responses to her as a person (Greek origin, speaks Greek fluently, understands basic cultural rules and values, and her somewhat suspect position as an unmarried woman) and how these affected “not only what I was doing, but also to whom or to which data I had access” (p.2). Students will find most interesting the dilemma of a dearth of official data on women’s work and inaccuracy of data due to ideological bias and the innovative measures she used to re-construct the history and details of tradition and change as people recalled it. The book presents an excellent example of how to do research under trying conditions and in the absence of reliable statistics and public records.

Chapter Two is another good example of the author’s engaging and clear writing. In order to give the reader a sense of rural life and a range of experiences, she chose to tell stories of both “typical and exceptional” (her terms) families in both villages and from different socio-economic positions. (Photos also are helpful.) Throughout the book, analysis of work, family, women’s associations, and local culture include the stories of real people gleaned through Lazaridis’ observations or their own words. This is the case of the analysis of handicraft production in Nohia (Chapter Three), market gardening in Platanos (Chapter Four), production of olives and olive oil in both villages (Chapter Five), marriage and family life (Chapter Six), sexuality and recreation (Chapter Seven), and the nature of women’s associations (conservative and church-directed in Nohia, more focused on women’s concerns and leadership in Platanos).

The major weakness is theoretical. For her research, the author drew from “discrete theoretical approaches” which she cites as including the literature on women and development, issues highlighted by social anthropologists who conducted research in rural Greece, contributions on the state of Greek agriculture and family labor, the role of the European Union/Community in transforming agriculture in Greece and Crete, and unspecified “recent theoretical contributions from the world of sociology and gender studies” (p.207). But no details are provided. In chapters, some connections are made between study findings and those of relevant works of other studies, primarily from the 1980s. The problem is that there is
no clear theoretical framework and very little discussion of the theoretical implications of findings beyond pointing out links between economic and socio-cultural change. In the epilogue there is an incipient effort to tie together themes from all chapters into a very brief discussion of limits and possible factors for change in women’s lives. Lazaridis’ main point in the epilogue seems to be that “results of this study do not lead to a simple conclusion about the role of economic development...in changing women’s lives and about the role of culture and ideology in curtailing the emancipator potential of economic development” (p.207). The vast assumptions implicit in such a statement are not clarified or critiqued. This was a disappointing ending for an otherwise engaging study and text.


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Zeus Leonardo’s goal is to advance a critical social theory (CST) of race in education that is multidisciplinary, integrates critical and race theories, and enhances our understanding of how race operates in education and everyday life. He sees CST as a perspective that can improve the quality of education for students by teaching the value of in-depth analysis and critical thinking and fostering emancipatory knowledge. Critical theory is, of course, not new: Leonardo traces its origins to ancient Greek society. It is inherently leftist and has become hegemonic in some disciplines. Yet the critical tradition is still rooted in Western thought, which is often constructed as a universal standard of rationality rather than as a white racialized worldview. Paul Freire is credited with bringing CST to the field of education, but Leonardo argues that it has remained underdeveloped in studying race in educational processes. Two of the 10 chapters in this book are explicitly devoted to examining race in education, and the topic emerges throughout the book. But the book is primarily about race and racism in a U.S. and global context. Leonardo takes on the issue of race in the post-civil rights era in a number of ways, such as integrating race and critical theory, examining ways to recast race in light of capitalist expansion and globalization, and interrogating whiteness studies.

Leonardo uses his impressive grasp of classical and contemporary theories to examine their usefulness in understanding race and racism and with an eye towards synthesis. Marxist and race theories, for examples, are often at odds but Leonardo believes they would benefit from an integration of ideas. He criticizes the objectivism of Marxist theory for dismissing race as epiphenomenon or even false consciousness and the subjectivism of race theories for treating race as identity, culture, and natural, fixed category. Race theories benefit from understanding race as a social-historical construct situated in political economy, and recognizing the subjective aspects of social class would be useful for Marxists. Leonardo also sees potential in applying Althusser’s theory of ideology to the study of race. He discusses how various strands of this theory are applicable to understanding race and racism, although Althusser did not apply them to race. One strand of the theory of ideology that Leonardo finds especially useful is that ideologies, as ways of making sense out of life, are integrally embedded in the unconscious. This helps explain why racism is endemic, even among the “enlightened,” and leads Leonardo to claim that “racial ideology is unconscious in the last instance” (p.43).

The reality of race as a social category with significant consequences is a major theme in this book, but Leonardo acknowledges that the racial landscape has changed in ways that have upset conventional racial reasoning. For example, globalization, racial diaspora, intraracial conflict (e.g., Hutus and Tutsis), the social class mobility of racial minorities, the limitations of the once dominant black-white paradigm of race, and the multiracialization of beauty images (e.g., Halle Berry, Jennifer Lopez) all have made theorizing race more difficult. Debates have emerged among white abolitionists who insist race (especially the concept of
whiteness) must be abolished, reconstructionists who believe whiteness can be reformed, and color blind theorists who want to avoid the issue of race. Leonardo offers a sharp analysis of each perspective, and concludes that the solution is to re-imagine and recast race, undermining it from within by disclosing what it has taken from us and no longer consenting to it.

The very core of racism is the concept of whiteness, and Leonardo argues that undoing white ideology is crucial to ending racial stratification since “[w]ithout a privileged center, there can be no denigrated margin” (p. 71). Whiteness studies have proliferated since the 1990s, most delineating how white privilege works and urging whites to dismantle whiteness by becoming racial traitors. But whiteness is not easily disavowed, even by those who seek to break its codes, since it is firmly embedded in institutional practices and policies and is an opportunity structure, even (or especially) for class-oppressed white ethnics. Whiteness is the core of school curricula and culture, a signifier of what is right, and, given the expansion and flexibility of capitalism, a global marker of superiority. The investment in whiteness, Leonardo argues, is the strongest form of racialization that exists. The concept of white privilege sees racism as an omnipresent and disembodied force, but errs by implying that whites are not responsible for it and failing to link it to white domination. Leonardo contends that white privilege can only be understood in the context of white supremacy and, paralleling McIntosh’s list of white privileges, constructs a portrait of white supremacy.

The ten chapters of this book are from the work Leonardo published between 2002 and 2008. Analyses of race, racism, and race theory dominate the book but, given its title, it should be noted that the author does analyze educational policy, specifically “No Child Left Behind” and, in a chapter co-authored with Margaret Hunter, provides a sophisticated analysis of education in racialized urban spaces. Leonardo’s major contribution, however, is his fresh analysis of race and race theory. He offers an in-depth analysis of race and critical theories and makes laudable efforts to broaden them and, when possible, to interrogate and reconcile competing ideas. Simply stated, his key argument is that race still matters, but he does an excellent job of showing us how it matters, how to recast race in light of changing societies and global forces, and what we must do to transcend it. Finally, the book is an excellent demonstration of how CST can be used in analyses of race and a valuable asset for social theorists and educators.


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Raphaël Liogier’s book is a provocative argument about French discourse and practice regarding laïcité, a term generally translated as secularism. Liogier correctly points out that scholars should interrogate how well actual practices reflect the discourse and common understandings of terms such as secularism and laïcité. Liogier makes a powerful and convincing argument that French laïcité is not what many inside and outside of France believe it to be, the separation of church and state, but rather an organized and hierarchical system of state intervention in religion.

After forcefully making this first counter-intuitive argument, Liogier then masterfully illustrates how French public discourse veils state interventions in religion with a discourse on laïcité as being neutral towards religion. By rhetorically neutralizing anyone who questions what laïcité means or who tries to criticize how laïcité is actually practiced, this public discourse creates a faux neutrality by only permitting certain voices to be heard. As the book’s title suggests, Liogier’s thesis is that laïcité creates a defacto state religion by which other religions or religious practices are judged as good or bad. To back up his provocative claims, Liogier uses evidence from laws, interviews with government officials and intellectuals, and his own ethnographic and survey work studying new religious movements in France, such as Buddhism.
One example illustrating his claim is that the Law of 1905 of separation of church and state only uses that phrase in the title. The law actually spells out various collaborations between the French state and the Catholic Church, not the least of which is public funding for Catholic education that has continued to the present. Despite this, many French believe that this law created separation between church and state. Another contemporary example of state intervention (rather than neutrality) in religious matters is the 2004 ban on conspicuous religious symbols, such as the Muslim headscarf, in public institutions. Proponents of the ban repeated that the law was not motivated by a problem with Islam nor with the Muslim headscarf, but rather the ban was framed as part of a universal concern for preserving laïcité. However, this discourse of laïcité as neutrality covered up ample evidence that the reason for the ban was indeed concern about Muslim fundamentalism symbolized in the headscarf.

Liogier makes the multitude of French associations assigned to deal with the so-called “problem of sects,” (what others might call new religious movements) and dialogue with Islam, sound about as neutral towards religion as the Spanish Inquisition (which sought to evaluate religious truth claims) or the Soviet Union (which sought to suppress nearly any kind of religion). Furthermore, Liogier highlights rather than covers up his interviewees’ inability to articulate answers about laïcité. Such strong statements and unflattering quotes might lead one to think that Liogier overstates his argument or is mocking his interviewees, but it is precisely his willingness to point out the lack of clear justification for some ideas which are accepted by the majority of French intellectuals that makes his book so worthy. Liogier is not the first to criticize French laïcité, nor to point out that French laïcité is more like an aggressive secularism than neutrality. However, Liogier’s work stands out because his evidence that laïcité is anything but state neutrality towards religion is abundant and convincing.

He argues that we need more people studying the rhetoric and practice of laïcité. By inviting more scholars into the dialogue, we will certainly get a better picture of what French laïcité is. Simply dismissing all critiques of laïcité as missing something obvious yet unidentified makes laïcité an axiom with no need of justification or explanation. But like any other element of legal culture, laïcité is a social phenomenon in need of study and explanation. Furthermore, it is a phenomenon with real social consequences, not the least of which is the restriction of individual rights to religious freedom, which the ban on conspicuous religious items clearly violates.

Liogier’s book joins a growing body of scholarship in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France and elsewhere in the West, about religion and the state. Yet much scholarly work on religion and the state shares the premises of the French laïcité—namely, the state has the right to restrict certain religious groups and practices.

Furthermore, it is often assumed that the state has the duty to intervene in internal religious matters—such as deciding what is a sect or a heresy—when necessary for social order. Yet growing social science research, such as that of Brian Grim and Jonathan Fox, has found that such state interventions in religious affairs fuel conflicts about religion rather than subdue them. In France, a good argument can be made that the ban on conspicuous religious items has fueled Islamic fundamentalism rather than quenched it.

Comparatively little scholarly attention has been given to an alternate view of religion and the state, the idea that the state has a duty to protect the free exercise of religion, a duty explicitly named in the U.S. constitution. Examining the various ways that democracies throughout the world succeed and fail in protecting religious freedom would contribute to a better understanding of how religious institutions and democratic institutions can co-exist with each side respecting the boundaries and competencies of the other.
The title of Paul Lopes’ social history of the American comic book industry, Demanding Respect, leads to a natural question: from whom are comic books demanding respect? From scholars? Twenty years after Andrew Ross traced the anxious relationship between intellectuals and popular culture in No Respect, the reconciliation is largely a fait accompli. From the public? Comics, in 2009, remain a healthy, albeit marginal, part of Western cultural industries. From the other arts? Certainly the relationship between comic books and competing media forms is increasingly co-dependent. Cinema, television and video games are increasingly reliant on comic books as a source of revenue generating commercial properties, while even more consecrated forms, including literature and the visual arts, have been engaging with comics for more than a half-century. Lopes’ title implies the perpetuation of an injustice, but because he examines comic books largely in isolation from other art forms or scholarly traditions, it is sometimes difficult to determine just what crime has been committed.

Demanding Respect is an effort to rewrite the history of the American comic book, an increasingly oft-told tale, through the lens of cultural value. Borrowing selectively from the cultural sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, Lopes argues that the history of the American comic book format has been a struggle for cultural legitimation. This is an original and defensible thesis, although the efficacy of the argument is hindered at times by the limitations of the historical methodology deployed by the author. Lopes structures his book around a reading of secondary historical sources – interviews with cartoonists, surveys of fan-published magazines, and the relatively small number of scholarly histories based on primary archives, utilizing John Fiske’s framework for the cultural economy of fandom. The result is an idiosyncratic, though clearly written, overview of the American comic book industry that will be familiar to many fans of the form, partnered with a novel analytic framework.

Demanding Respect is structured around six case studies, each of which takes up a single chapter. Lopes opens with a consideration of the low status of comic books in the 1930s, tying their origins more closely to the tradition of pulp publishing (the basis for their economic model) than to newspaper comic strips (which provided the general aesthetic). One effect of this is to situate comics firmly amongst the least-respected of literary forms, while minimizing comic books’ association with the more highly regarded strip. Lopes devotes the second chapter to the anti-comic book campaign of the 1940s and 1950s, arguing, following the work of Paul Boyer on book censorship, that comics were caught up in a postwar trend towards increased social control. The third chapter moves through the 1960s, conflating the purported new seriousness of Marvel superhero comics like Spider-Man with the anarchic youth culture sensibilities of underground comics. For Lopes, this decade represented the end of what he terms the “industrial age” of comic book production. The remaining chapters successively examine the rise of organized comic book fandom, so-called “alternative” comics (or comics that partake of genres other than superheroes, science-fiction and fantasy) and the “graphic novel” traditions both within and without the superhero tradition. This graphic novel tradition, Lopes suggests, has culminated in an “Heroic Age” in which comic books are defined by their author-driven content and status as serious works of art.

It is Lopes’ conception of “the Heroic Age” that is the main contribution of the volume to comics scholarship. Unfortunately, it is also the least convincing part of his argument. Lopes borrows the term from The Rules of Art, where Bourdieu used it, often ironically, to critique the efforts of writers and painters in the nineteenth-century to establish the criteria of aesthetic autonomy, or art for art’s sake. As even Lopes acknowledges, this is an awkward analogy for the
American comic book industry, where the heteronomous principles of production continue to rule the marketplace. In borrowing a term from Bourdieu, but stripping it from its historical and critical context, Lopes has also stripped the history of the comic book industry of its tremendous complexity. The teleology that this history constructs presumes a generalized drive within comics towards the demand for respect, when, in reality, this interest has been highly selective. For every Art Spiegelman and Will Eisner who have championed the comics form there exist dozens of men like Carl Barks and Robert Crumb who are hesitant to see their work venerated by scholars and critics, who, in other words, did little to demand respect. For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production is a site of struggle and of power disparities. Lopes minimizes these features in presenting a simplified vision of the comics industry moving uniformly in a common direction.

Ultimately, it is difficult to regard the primary concern of the comic book industry as a call for respect when the legacy of the “Industrial Age” of comic book production is so central to its current economic logic. Indeed, walk into any comic book store today and you will be struck by the fact that the vast bulk of contemporary comic book production is driven not by the auteurist impulses that Lopes celebrates, but by the demands of large media companies (Disney, owners of Marvel Comics, and Time-Warner, owners of DC Comics) seeking to maximize market share through multi-platform exploitation of popular characters. While author-centered comic book projects exist in the current marketplace more than at any time in history, they are a secondary market at best. Furthermore, the development of author-centered comics owes more to changes in related media forms—particularly cinema—than to efforts taking place within the field of comics itself. From the perspective of Bourdieu, it would be impossible to argue that the industrial logic of character maintenance is not the dominant pole of the contemporary comics field. Lopes’ suggestion that comics have entered an Heroic Age that is largely divorced from market demands is highly contestable if not completely untenable. As he himself has forsaken the aesthetic justification of individual works, leaving that task to aestheticians and critics, he is unable to demonstrate that the comics he writes about deserve the kind of cultural and educational respect he claims for them. The result is an historical analysis that has to ignore the vast bulk of comic book production and disregard key elements in its theoretical framework to make its point. A more nuanced approach would embrace the complexity and contradictions that now allow competing conceptions of the comic book to exist within a single field.


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On the strength of a continuously mounting series of publications, David Lyon has carved out a niche for himself as the leading contemporary analyst of the technologies of what Foucault famously if inelegantly called “governmentality.” These many practices involve the “humble modalities” by which modern systems of power exert their sway over human beings and cause them to participate in the production of those systems of power. Following a Weberian logic, Foucault was interested in these techniques above all for their contribution to the disciplining of populations. Lyon, by contrast, comes at these issues from a more familiarly social-democratic perspective influenced by T. H. Marshall, emphasizing the effects of surveillance on the prospects for the realization of equal citizenship. In Identifying Citizens, Lyon focuses on what might be regarded as the surveillance-society equivalent of the commodity in Marx’s analysis in Capital: namely, the ID card. The innocuous-seeming ID card emerges from his discussion as the central manifestation of a social order that “governs by identification.” Let us unpack the significance of that claim.

Lyon argues that ID cards and, more importantly, the databases to which they are connected, constitute crucial elements...
of modern life. They do so because they have become increasingly decisive in the processes of “social sorting” and exclusion from access to opportunities that have grown in tandem with the demise of more inclusive conceptions of citizenship. They achieve these outcomes in part by reversing a process that had led away from the use of the body as a direct resource for identifying the person. “Papers” came into more widespread use in part because liberalism regarded the body, which previously had been written on by the authorities or by owners to symbolize their claim on the bearers, as inviolate. More recently, however, technological changes have meant that individual bodies have increasingly come to act as their own “passwords.” That is, given the suspicion on the part of authoritative actors that people may be prepared to claim they are someone other than their official papers attest, the body is used as a way of verifying the link between person and identity.

Similarly to Marx’s description of the commodity form as dissemblingly presenting a relationship between people as a relationship between things, Lyon insists that the spread of identification demands and requirements has meant that identification by authoritative others has come to overwhelm “identity,” which is the narrative that people tell about themselves and who they “really” are. The identity prevalent in the life-world is trumped by that of the system, at least when the individual wishes to travel abroad or transact certain kinds of business. It cannot be overstated how dramatic this transformation is: whereas 150 years ago, when people were known by what they and others said they were, now people cannot move very far or do much business on the basis of unsubstantiated acknowledgement and recognition by others.

One of the most important points Lyon makes in this book is to insist that the “authoritative others” who impose and require identifications are not just state officials, but those in the private sector who determine whether individual people have the wherewithal to consume in various contexts. Where others have stressed the state’s role in the development of identification practices (disclosure: some of his theoretical argument in this area is with previous work of mine), Lyon makes the case that there are both public and private actors involved in the seemingly continuous expansion of contemporary identification practices. Indeed, he argues that the contemporary spread of “governance by identification” is a product of the joint activities of what he calls a “card cartel” that marches hand-in-hand toward ever broader uses of identification documents and data management protocols.

One difficulty in seeking to restrain the constant spread of identification cards and surveillance procedures, as Lyon notes, is that many people endorse the notion—promoted frequently by those doing the surveillance, naturally—that “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to worry about.” This sensibility has of course been much on display in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But it has generally redounded to the disadvantage of the less powerful—the poor, racial minorities, immigrants, women. Like many people, Lyon’s response to this situation is to advocate greater citizen participation in developing laws and policies concerning identification. In fact, many people do not presume the innocence of those taken into custody by the authorities; despite the frequent discovery of cases in which evidence is cooked or witnesses are coerced into saying what the police want them to say, many people assume that the accused “wouldn’t have gotten arrested if he hadn’t done something.” It is therefore reasonable to conclude that civil libertarians will have to fight a constant battle with the forces promoting intensified surveillance and scrutiny of “suspect” populations, especially when the forces of order expect the support of the general public in the expansion of surveillance. At the end of the book, Lyon recounts a number of recent examples in which people have mobilized successfully against new identification practices.

Such opposition is possible. But Lyon’s book—and his growing œuvre in this field—tend rather to demonstrate the pre- science of Weber’s comment that bureaucracies, once instituted, is one of the most difficult forms of domination to dismantle. And, like Weber, Lyon reminds us that bureaucratization is a product of forces not just in state administration, but in the private economy.
as well. Identifying Citizens is a valuable contribution to making sense of a world in which identification by others constitutes an increasingly decisive aspect of people’s opportunities as consumers and as citizens.

Malaby shows how Linden Labs is part of a corporate culture that emerged from the open-source software movement. This culture is characterized by a faith that technology will facilitate the solution of problems via the bottom-up collective generation of ideas, rather than top-down institutional decision making—“technoliberalism” is the term Malaby applies. Adherents of technoliberalism believe that via a quasi-Darwinian competition between ideas generated by unfettered, ad hoc collaborations of interest-ed individuals, the wisdom of the collectivity will provide emergent solutions to whatever challenge is at hand. While such an antibureaucratic, antiauthoritarian set of principles might seem antithetical to the corporate mindset, “[t]hese ideas about authority and technology were held by Lindens as applying both to Linden Lab’s creation, Second Life, and to themselves as an organization. In that sense, it may be better to characterize them as ideals; their status as the right way to go about doing things was, at least for many at the company, unassailable” (p.57). Malaby goes on to illustrate how holding to this ideology caused the Lindens to act in a manner atypical of many profitmaking ventures or governance bodies.

Adhering to the ideology that a good organization should do no more than provide a technological apparatus optimized to facilitate the emergent ideas of a collectivity, produced in the Lindens a desire to proclaim a hands-off attitude toward activity in Second Life. They wished to see the virtual world as evolving according to the interests and creativity of its residents. Malaby illustrates how that this self-perception belied Linden Labs’ actual power, both as a provider of governance and in deciding what tools it would make available.

Malaby finds evidence of a contradiction between technoliberal ideology and
authority-infused praxis existing within Linden Labs itself. Power and hierarchy were formally denied in the design of the headquarters, with its open-office space, sans cubicles or walls, but Malaby “saw in Linden Lab order beneath a claim to chaos” (p.63), with unacknowledged teams clustered around key Lindens who were more equal than others.

The positing of the Lindens as one big egalitarian family failed to acknowledge the high status of “devs” (developers—that is, programmers) that Malaby shows led to significant social tensions between members of Linden Labs. There was conflict between reverence for coding and technological skill, and resistance to hierarchical power wielded by devs. Moreover, Malaby shows us in Linden Labs not only a hierarchy between the devs and other employees, but a culture clash between their views of the very nature of Second Life. The devs saw the virtual world as primarily a site of technical collaboration, while others saw it as primarily a social world. The devs identified as gamers, and those who claim such an identity “think primarily in terms of individual challenge” (p.98). These core Lindens “had not expected the cultural aspects of Second Life to happen at all” (p.98), and seemed to be nonplussed by them. They imagined residents would be building virtual objects, not fashions and clubs. The explosion of sociality in Second Life was “taken as a surprising testament to the world’s robustness, but not as an illuminating critique of their own imagining of the human” (p.105).

Marketers at Linden Labs saw where the growth was and sought to cultivate what both the Lindens and Malaby term “consumer” residents, interested not in creating objects or scripting, but in creating avatars and social groups. Of course, this too is creative work, though not of a type valorized by devs (and it’s worth pointing out the gender ideologies implicit in this). Malaby himself treats the vast market for fashion in Second Life as evidence that most users’ experience in Second Life is derivative rather than truly creative, which I would challenge. I find it fascinating that social creativity was demeaned at Linden Labs, and would wish it were given more respectful attention by Malaby, as this would have strengthened his analysis. Still, the book is of great value for social scientists interested in the efflorescence of online interaction.


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This book appeared in the well-respected Berghahn series Monographs in German History, but seems curiously ill-placed there as the book’s content is closer to organizational sociology, deals with contemporary Germany more than its history, and is ultimately sociological rather than historical in approach and orientation. In fact, the theoretical background presented in Chapter Two (Environmental Organizations: Theoretical Considerations) underlines this by calling in four strands of social science (mostly sociological) theorizing to help understand the development of environmental organizations: interest group theory; social movement theory; theories of civil society; and organizational theory, the book’s conceptual bedrock. This list does not include what one would expect in a work informed by historical methods and approaches, such as path dependency theory or comparative-historical institutional analysis, let alone the various scholarly positions in the fierce debates that have come to characterize historical studies of and in Germany since the Historikerstreit of the 1980s.

Environmental Organizations in Modern Germany is well-written and presented in an organized way, and in this sense keeps what the author promises on page five by wanting to be accessible to the wider audience of the environmental movement and not only being of interest to the relatively smaller group of sociologists who would find what Markham rightly regards as an important observation worthy of explanation: why are German environmental organizations among the “most persistent,
adaptable and influential forms of environmental action in Western democracies?" (p. 2). It is surprising, therefore, that the four major environmental NGOs covered in the book have received little systematic attention as organizations, a gap which this book wants to fill (p. 5). They have, as William Markham notices, been at the center of social movement studies in Germany, a literature that he puts to good use.

The four organizations are: NABU (German Nature Protection League), the WWF (Worldwide Fund for Nature), BUND (German League for Environment and Nature Protection), and Greenpeace Germany. These four organizations have large membership bases, are relatively well-funded, and are growing in size and importance. They managed to do so, the book argues convincingly, because they were able to build on long-standing cultural currents (e.g., some reaching back to nineteenth century romanticism) and values (e.g., a deep-seated sense of place combined with respect of nature) that enabled these professionally-run organizations and their politically astute leadership to engage in, and combining the right framing of issues (nature protection with anti-nuclear protest and anti-big business sentiments), to take advantage of opportunity structures that opened up after the 1970s especially.

Along the way, as they expanded and grew in importance over the last twenty-five years, the four environmental organizations increasingly have faced dilemmas that are common to nonprofit organizations generally and membership-based groups in particular. These dilemmas relate to internal structure, resourcing, and inter-organizational relations, and are covered in Chapters 10-12: the balance between centralization and decentralization; the narrowness or inclusiveness of goal structures; the relationship between members, volunteers and paid staff; the tension between cooperation, cooptation and competition, and prominently, fund-raising.

All this is good, and fully in line with studies of nonprofit organizations, although the issues of transparency and accountability could have received greater attention. In this sense, the book makes a valuable contribution in as far as it validates in four important and influential cases what organizational theory and social movement theory would lead us to expect. The book would have been even better had its author limited himself to organizational analysis and paid more attention to current issues and applied what is promised in Figure 13.1 (key variables in the functioning of environmental organizations) more systematically across cases and time, and devoted more than two pages (pp. 341-2) to “Implication for Improving Theory.”

Instead, the book reaches these important sections far too late and suffers from a lengthy quasi-historical approach presented in Chapters Three-Seven that occupy about one third of its pages, and whose connection with the organizational analysis is not convincing. For the author, the fact that two of the organizations, NABU and BUND, had precursor movements and are linked to older organizations is reason enough to justify such lengthy treatment. The author searches for continuities where discontinuities dominate, certainly in terms of framing strategies and opportunity structures; and he introduces a level of historical detail that seems unnecessary for the main purpose of the book. One chapter on organizational culture and members’ value dispositions would have been sufficient to make the argument that environmental organizations were aided in their framing strategies by specific sociological currents that run deep in German society. Likewise, the chapter on the environmental movement and organization in the former German Democratic Republic is worthwhile but covers no new ground.

In the end, we really have two books that are weakly integrated: one solid and based on organizational theory; the other historiography but in name, and much less convincing because it seeks historical explanations without adequate institutional analysis guided by specific hypotheses.
In this lively and mordant book, the irony (or attempted irony) begins with the title. Jonathan Marks, Professor of Anthropology at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, feels bound in the first line of the preface to make sure the reader knows that his title and his persona are simultaneously satiric and serious. Marks opens with an assertion “All right, I admit it—I am a scientist.” This is pure Marks, conversational, pedagogical and self-confident. Throughout the book, Marks is explicit about where he stands and what he thinks, making certain that his readers understand when he is joking or serious, winking or stern, or, as is frequently the case, both at the same time. By so doing, the book’s tone and genre are set: personal, committed, didactic and authoritative.

His model is not Jonathan Swift but Bertrand Russell, whose book Why I Am Not a Christian, serves as the template for the title. Marks thereby places himself in a line of modern intellectuals who, having achieved credibility and authority through their scholarly or scientific achievements, feel prompted and justified to enter into a broader public domain in order to combat what they take to be rampant ignorance, evil and hubris. Marks is very clear throughout that his readers understand when he is joking or serious, winking or stern, or, as is frequently the case, both at the same time. By so doing, the book’s tone and genre are set: personal, committed, didactic and authoritative.

The first chapter turns on a discussion of C.P. Snow’s 1958 diagnosis of the split and perceived increasing divergence between the ascendant natural sciences (Cold War, and in the second edition, molecular biology) and the humanities, not necessarily merely antiquarian but themselves often engaged seriously with the dilemmas and challenges of the modern world. For Marks, the ever-present lack of communication between the more institutionally powerful life sciences and the critical humanities, at times lost in their jargon, and the loss of dialogue and meaning, is no nostalgia trip but an ever-widening chasm. Of course the mandatory spread and deepening of specializations and sub-specializations and their inverse relation to significance had been a central theme of Max Weber early in the twentieth century. And it certainly holds sway today.

Each of Marks’ chapters turns on the split between natural scientific authority and its influence on domains of human life to which its insights and hypotheses and methods do not legitimately extend. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Marks does not pick up the gauntlet that Snow threw down to both camps—to never forget the suffering and impoverishment of most of humanity and the moral obligation to change that nefarious situation. Snow’s hope that a “third culture” of a scientifically informed and humanistically focused social science devoted to humanitarian work is not pursued very far. Marks does hope that a renewed and engaged anthropology might be a vehicle for overcoming the false split of nature versus culture. This hope, however, largely resides in deflating, correcting and exposing falsities, distortions and outright errors. His main concern is the existence of scientific racism perpetually present no matter how many times it has been refuted. Although some of the critique of the false claims of the biological basis of inequality may seem dated, following Marks we can be confident that new versions are certain to be thrown into the public space.

Why I Am Not a Scientist is definitely worth reading, discussing and engaging. On the one hand, specialists in particular areas are likely to be frustrated given the nature of the genre, its strong normativity and jocular fast-pace. On the other, there is much to be learned, especially for specialists, in Marks’ demand that those who pay for their science—taxpayers and citizens—have every right to know what is claimed, defended and criticized. Thus, while Marks is
probably no more a scientist than Russell was a Christian, that is to say distantly, he is right that the ecology of truth is shaped to a significant degree by these forces and forms. In sum, Marks like Russell, is a true believer with a message to transmit; a message in both instances well worth hearing.

In the past twenty-five years, transnational adoptions around the world have more than doubled, and often such adoptions have been the object of considerable political controversy. This volume grew out of the first International Forum on Childhood and the Family, held in 2006 at the University of Barcelona, and the editors state that their work is an effort to “initiate a common conversation about adoption” among scholars and adoption activists (p. 20). Most of the contributors to this collection’s seventeen chapters are academic anthropologists who come from many parts of the globe (e.g., France, Canada, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom). Much of their work goes beyond previous research on adoption, both because it examines the adoption process in a number of countries that send children abroad to be adopted (e.g., Russia, Peru, Brazil); and because it focuses on adoption in receiving countries besides the United States. The editors argue that international adoption today is a product of “a transnational system of power relations that enables privileged women to bear and nurture children while disempowering those who are subordinated by reason of class, race, and national origin” (p. 17). Moreover, they contend that we need to understand the opposing forces that currently buffet transnational adoption, especially the fact that demand for children to adopt continues to grow in the West, while “major ‘sending’ countries such as China and Guatemala are scaling back or halting their international adoption programs” (p. 20).

Most of the chapters are based on extensive fieldwork, and add substantially to our knowledge of adoption. Moreover, although the authors are certainly aware of the many abuses that occur in transnational adoptions, most of them avoid ideological and inflammatory language; seldom is international adoption portrayed simply as an act of humanitarian rescue or an act of piracy. (One of a few grating exceptions is Jessaca B. Leinaweaver’s declaration that Peru’s heavy reliance on biomedical criteria as “objective” standards for deciding when the state should remove children from their birth parents’ homes and make them available for adoption “dresses in sheep’s clothing the predatory wolves of racism and class inequality that are embedded in the Peruvian state” [p. 197].) The topics that are covered are so diffuse and so specialized, however, that at times the collection has a rather disjointed feel about it, and it can be difficult for the reader to discern what broader issues are being addressed in the volume as a whole. For example, there are individual chapters on adoption by gay and lesbian partners in France, on the merits of open adoptions and of attempted reunions between birth parents and adopted children in Norway, and on attitudes toward assisted reproductive technologies and adoption in Lithuania.

A few points receive particularly prominent emphasis in at least several of the chapters, however. The first of these is that transnational adoption should be regarded as “a last option for abandoned children, following efforts to reunite them with their birth family, or place them with an adoptive family in their birth nation” (p. 109), a position that is consistent with the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption. The second is that transnational adoption too often involves “removing children from their homes in lieu of [governments’] assisting their families” (p. 194). In her essay on the “Medicalization of Adoption in and from Peru,” Leinaweaver calls this the “pathologization of poverty”: “Rather than addressing the conditions under which so many Peruvian children come to be malnourished, or the reasons why their parents
cannot afford or obtain medical care, the state posits poor parenting as the cause of malnutrition and illness” and often takes such children away, thereby making them available for adoption (p. 195). Such a strategy, she concludes, “deflects attention from Peru’s inability to provide basic social services for its citizens” (p. 197). And the third conclusion is that closed or “plenary” adoptions, in which adopted children’s kinship ties with their birth families are severed, should be replaced by more open adoptions, in which adopted children are informed of the identity of their birth parents and can contact them if they so choose.

But this volume still leaves many important questions unanswered. First, the authors assume that their readers are familiar with previous anthropological research on kinship and adoption. For example, Chantal Collard asserts that “The circulation of children among kin-group members through fosterage or adoption is well-documented by anthropological studies of non-Western societies” (p. 120), but Collard gives the reader little description or explanation of such studies; the same might be said of Martine Gross’ assertion that “Anthropologists have shown that the circulation of children that is customary in most societies is not antithetical to the open recognition of their birth families” (p. 70). At least a brief “primer” of this kind of literature would have been very helpful to readers who are not anthropologists. For example, why do blood ties appear to be so much more central in Western, developed nations like Sweden than in developing nations like Ethiopia, where adoption, whether or not it is by biological kin, is “no big thing” (p. 111)?

Second, what are some of the political and social factors that prompt governments to allow more or fewer of their children to be available for international adoption? Given the enormous numbers of desperately needy children in the world today, why is there so little transnational adoption (fewer than 50,000 children in 2004)? (For example, there is no discussion in this volume of the number of children left orphaned by AIDS, and whether they can be legally adopted.) When “sending” nations cut back on the number of children made available for adoption, do domestic adoptions increase in response? Third, is altruism a factor that influences persons to become adoptive parents? (These chapters stress infertility as the dominant reason by far.) And finally, what recent trends in transnational adoption might supersede some of these authors’ conclusions, which are based on 2004 data? (The number of international adoptions to the United States has dropped by nearly 50 percent since its historic high in 2004. Why has that occurred?)

Despite these limitations and gaps, this is an admirably ambitious collection of papers, which significantly advances our understanding of transnational adoption.


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Who’s Watching, a collection of fourteen chapters, surveys practices of surveillance, counter-surveillance, sanctioning and response in American families. The various contributions focus on practices ranging from public responses to parents of children from different racial backgrounds, to the marketing of home drug testing equipment to suspicious parents of adolescents, to the dilemmas and decision-making processes of prospective parents confronting disturbing results of amniocentesis. In short, a laundry list of very different forms of information-gathering and human interactions in response to resulting revelations.

An essay by Holly Blackford presents results of participant observation of young children and their parents in public play spaces. She notes significant differences between mothers and fathers in their surveillance over their own and others’ children’s play: mothers “reveal a sense of competition in mothering”(p. 101), whereas fathers “regress and become kids again on the playground”(p.102). The chapter by Rosanna Hertz explores the efforts by
parents of children born from artificial insemination to locate and establish contact with half-siblings otherwise unknown to them—and the dilemmas of setting boundaries of intimacy with these new “relatives” and their families. A chapter by Kevin Roy and Linda M. Burton presents results of a survey of efforts by low-income women to “recruit” father figures for their children—some of whom are the biological fathers. “Some men cannot live up to conventional expectations as fathers and are risks as partners as well,”(p. 209) they observe.

“Combining surveillance studies and family sociology,” the editors Margaret Nelson and Anita Garey write in their introductory chapter, “enables us to see issues and problems that are otherwise invisible or obscured”(p. 2). This manifesto is only ambiguously fulfilled by the chapters collected here. As so often in our fields, much energy in these writings appears devoted to applying novel theoretical terminology to subjects and processes that are quite adequately recognized under more familiar names. For example, “Just as gender is known to be something people perform . . . mothering is a produce of social negotiation between adults as well as between adults and children,”(p. 106) Holly Blackford writes. The accuracy of these assertions is hardly in doubt, but the reader has to wonder what difference the conceptual re-packaging actually makes.

More broadly, informative generalizations either about surveillance processes or present-day family life in America are few and far between in these essays. Each chapter serves up a credible slice of life, usually including some well-observed detail on one or another form of watching drawn from direct observation or face-to-face questioning. But the forms and purposes of surveillance, and their significance in the lives of those under study, are so different as to defy efforts at identification of more inclusive patterns. Nor does the work lend itself to any thematic normative stance—e.g., given forms of surveillance should be curtailed, encouraged, regulated or censored.

Certainly the findings reported here are rarely likely to evoke gasps of surprise from the reader. The chapter by Donna Kurz on parental monitoring of teenagers concludes, inter alia, that “parents develop inventive ways—some direct, some indirect and unobtrusive—of monitoring”(p. 274) and that their children respond in kind with a mix of compliance and resistance. Similar observations are reported in the final chapter by Barbara K. Hofer et al on parental monitoring of young adult children away at college. All these conclusions have the ring of truth, but not of theoretical news.

The strongest departures from this pattern come in several chapters reporting new uses of information technology that actually appear capable of ushering in enduring, qualitative changes in social relationships. One of these is William K. Staples’ discussion of the family repercussions of house arrest. These are situations where, in lieu of doing jail time, convicts are required to be available for electronic monitoring by telephone. Offenders must respond to calls from parole officers at all hours of the day and night, transmitting images of themselves and samples of their breath, while verifying their whereabouts. “Flunking” these sophisticated surveillance tests is likely to lead to actual incarceration. Staples reports that these massively intrusive surveillance measures make major demands on the family members and close associates, as well as on the direct targets.

Similarly striking is Margaret K. Nelson’s report on the rise of websites reporting sightings of apparent misdeeds by nannies in moments when they are beyond the reach of normal parental surveillance. Isawyournanny.blogspot.com offers a medium for observers to disclose—often anonymously, for the presumed benefit of parents—sightings of nannies neglecting children in their care, feeding them junk food or otherwise straying off the reservation of their supposed responsibilities. Of course, these postings inevitably involve much supposition and interpretation—e.g., is the person observed indeed a nanny? But the potential implications of a world where virtually any “public” behavior is subject to such populist surveillance are far-reaching.

There are other such intriguing findings—e.g., Nelson’s report on the aggressive and successful marketing of baby monitors to anxious parents of small children,
reminding us that potential demand for extended surveillance is all but limitless. One wishes for more such insights in a work where dramatic sociological news is scarce.


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In recent years, scholars, activists and pundits have described the growing rate of intermarriage among racial groups as an indication of the decline of racism and an increase of intergroup tolerance in U.S. society. Because a considerable fraction of the Asian American population is well educated, upwardly mobile and less subject to racial segregation from whites than are blacks and Latinos, dating and marriage between Asian Americans and whites (who often share middle class status) are seen as a particularly powerful harbinger of the colorblind society of the future.

Kumiko Nemoto rejects this premise. Taking a psychoanalytic approach informed by critical scholarship on race and feminism, in *Racing Romance: Love, Power, and Desire among Asian American/White Couples*, she interrogates the basis of interpersonal attraction to find that people’s desires for one another are often rooted in decidedly unromantic motives associated with control and power-seeking. Through inter-racial relationships, members of the majority are able to dominate racial others. At the same time, members of racialized minority groups who bond with whites seek to distance themselves from oppressed minority status.

Nemoto collected data for this study through interviews with 16 Asian American-white heterosexual couples and ten individuals, speaking with couples together and then separately. She contacted respondents in a university community and through referrals from a variety of Asian-American organizations. In addition to focusing on race, she also examined the impact of age, class, income, ethnicity, and generation in the United States and respondents’ views of the larger society on these relationships.

Of the persons involved in these relationships, Nemoto finds those most subject to racist and gendered stereotypes to be foreign-born women who lack economic resources, English language skills and knowledge about U.S. racism and sexism. In contrast, U.S.-born Asian American women may be more likely to participate in egalitarian relationships with white men. (A more definitive conclusion with regard to this is precluded by the small number of respondents in this category in her sample.)

As a consequence of her analysis, the author contends that the growing prevalence of Asian American-white affairs appears to reinforce rather than eliminate the relevance of racial categories. For example, she finds that Asian American women often recognize that white men have little interest in them personally, but instead, pursue their company because they are driven by an objectifying “Asian fetish.” For their part, second generation Asian American men with good jobs find that by dating white women rather than coethnics, they can access a measure of white masculinity. Enjoying this benefit and accepting the racialized standards of the larger society, they come to regard white women as the paragon of attractiveness and consequently develop their own “blonde fetish.” Because of the inequality inherent in these relationships, in many cases, the racialized partner experiences feelings of disenchantment, while the white one (especially if male) minimizes the reality of his partner’s encounters with racism.

While the topic of Nemoto’s research involves the particular nature of inequalities associated with Asian American-white relationships, she does not find such relationships to be uniquely oppressive. In fact, she points out that the larger structure of gender is a greater source of inequity among romantic couples than are racial differences. Further, she asserts that romantic relations between members of the same racial groups are also subject to inequalities of power and oppression: “Asian American-white intimacy shares more commonalities than differences with same-race relationships” (p. 155).
Remaining unconvinced that the growing number of Asian American-white romances is an indication of a more racially harmonious society, she points out that many such couples are themselves racist. For example, the author notes that such couples suggest that their relationships are more prestigious than those involving blacks. In this way, Asian American-white couples assert that both the non-white partner and the couple’s mixed-race children can claim whiteness in such a way as to attain the “American Dream” of freedom from both the negative stereotypes that label Asian Americans as second-class citizens, as well as forms of ethnic patriarchy associated with the immigrant culture.

Admitting that her study “aims only to offer plausible interpretations of interracial relationships,” the author agrees that “there are certainly alternative explanations for my findings.” (p. 13). As a consequence, the book’s analysis, while creative and thought-provoking, sometimes appears free floating. For example, how and why the author chooses to accept one respondent’s comments at face value while considering the ulterior motives behind another’s are not specified.

Given that inter-racial marriages are a growing social phenomenon, it might have been helpful to present some quantitative data to help readers get a broader understanding of the nature of such relationships. What are the demographic and SES characteristics of people involved in these relationships? How many involve first-generation migrants with limited English and economic resources and how many include Asian Americans who have greater financial and educational standing?

That being said, *Racing Romance* offers a compelling and innovative challenge to assertions that inter-racial relationships are the bellwethers of a post-racial society. Well-written, it will appeal to both scholars and general readers. Given that the book concerns dating, gender and race, it will interest college students, and as such, would be excellent for use in courses on gender, sexuality, international migration and related topics.


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In 1995, Nancy Fraser made a paradigm-shifting contribution to critical theory by arguing that injustices of recognition are distinct from and irreducible to distributive injustices. This volume gathers responses to that argument from 1995 to the present, many previously published, and organizes them into four “rounds” of discussion. This format presents the redistribution-recognition debate at one useful go. It also charts, perhaps unintentionally, a shift in New Left critical theory from internecine battles to a concerted engagement with questions of social justice.

The first set of responses, written by Judith Butler, Richard Rorty, Iris Marion Young and Anne Phillips, and mostly published in 1997, are a reminder of the discursive constraints of writing within what Fraser herself called “a ‘Postsocialist’ Age.” In this context of liberal triumphalism (exemplified by Fukuyama’s 1989 essay, “The End of History?”) and with a conservative Democrat in the White House, the academic left was on the defensive. Under the lingering shadow of “post-marxism” and the fresh insult of Sokal’s 1996 send-up of post-structuralism, Fraser’s interlocutors read her argument polemically. They interpreted her as distinguishing recognition from redistribution in order to privilege political economy over “cultural” politics. Subsequent readers find Fraser’s argument compelling precisely because they see her resisting such dichotomies, in particular, by conceiving misrecognition as a result of status subordination, rather than as an affront to identity. Far from privileging the one over the other, Fraser emphasizes how they work together and, later adding political injustice to the mix, underscores that they reach “beyond their immediate impact in their own domains” (p. 248).

The remaining sections build critically on Fraser’s work, at once elaborating...
underspecified concepts, putting her work in dialogue with that of Axel Honneth, and refining her framework by applying it to practical contexts. Elizabeth Anderson enlists the redistribution/recognition distinction to disclose the inadequacies of contemporary arguments for race-conscious affirmative action that posit diversity as its goal, thereby setting aside “compensatory” rationales that acknowledge a history of racial injustice. Anderson contends that the diversity rationale, which treats affirmative action as a response to a recognition injustice, glosses over an important distinction between two kinds of recognition that Fraser, too, blurs together. There is “recognition of a group as legitimately culturally distinct,” which remedies injustice in the case where a “pre-existing cultural difference” has been unjustly ordered, and “recognition of a group as unjustly constituted by subordination to counterpart groups” (p. 152). This second case acknowledges what Leonard Feldman (also in the volume) identifies as a specifically political form of injustice.

Feldman elaborates by drawing from Patchen Markell, who has elucidated the “performative” dimension of recognition (p. 230). This dimension is evident in cases where the state criminalizes behaviors associated with homelessness or homosexual conduct, or in laws prescribing different codes of conduct for blacks and whites. The state is “actively constructing the terms and terrain of status differentiation” while purporting merely to register relevant differences “between persons ‘out there’ in society” (p. 230). Here the injustice inheres in the act of recognition itself, not in the fact that a difference has been mis-recognized or unjustly ordered. To incorporate that difference in a regime of diversity is not to correct but to obscure and exacerbate the injustice. Critical theory needs a precise distinction between the performative and constitutive aspects of recognition in order to lay bare what Feldman terms “the specific dynamic of the state’s self-concealing production of status” (p. 231).

Chapters by Ingrid Robeyns and Kevin Olson make an equally fruitful engagement with Fraser’s core concept, “participatory parity.” Robeyns recruits Amartya Sen’s “capabilities” approach to contend that Fraser’s concept is limited by virtue of its political focus. In cases of “pervasive, structural and widespread poverty,” the moral case for redistributing resources rests not on that democratic political ideal but, rather, on assuring people’s “basic capabilities to function” (p. 193). For Olson, Fraser’s theorization of participatory parity is insufficiently attentive to the “paradox of enablement”: the contradiction in the fact that deliberation—the means whereby those “suffering from maldistribution, misrecognition, or marginalization” are to call for redress of their situation—“presupposes” the parity that it is supposed to bring about (pp. 260–61). Olson, too, shifts to a “capabilities” logic (although without citing Sen), arguing that the terms of participation cannot be set by participation itself but must be guaranteed by “a policy creating equal capabilities for political participation” (p. 271).

This well-designed volume provides an entrée into a significant debate in contemporary critical theory and an elaboration of its central concepts. A scholarly and pedagogical resource, it could feature in either a graduate seminar or an upper-level undergraduate class.


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The many volumes that Robert Perrucci and Carolyn Perrucci have written over the past decades on plant closings, class inequality, work, women, and the family have culminated in this impressive book emphasizing the social consequences of the deindustrializing economy of the United States. This book is an advance over the classic works by Robert Kuttner and Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison about the decline of the American economy and the middle class. The Perruccis use their critical sociological perspective to extend an analysis, of not just the economic crisis itself, but how that
crisis has led to a cultural and institutional crossroads. The Perruccis consider the possibility that deindustrialization may have so eroded the humane values and practices of hope, trust, and caring that the United States may lack the capacities to respond effectively to its own manifest social problems.

The Perruccis’ analysis of economic decline and the crisis of caring is a sterling example of how private troubles need to be seen in the context of economic conditions, and should be conceptualized as a problem of the entire society. Their book details how the participation of women in the work force, the wage gap, and the time demands of employers have led to issues at the personal level about scheduling and the sharing of housework. The Perruccis relate these personal dilemmas to policies of corporations and governments, and cite examples in Western Europe that point to the possibilities of social-democratic policies here.

In addition to a crisis of caring, a crisis of hope underlies the social problems of deindustrialization. From their in-depth interviews with laid-off employees (pp. 29–31), the Perruccis reveal a “severe deficiency of hope” (p. 51)—the hopelessness of workers about a good job and about educational opportunities for their children. Hopelessness stems from the harsh inequalities of plant closings, outsourcing, high school dropouts, and unaffordable four-year colleges. The authors in their last chapter propose ameliorative polices: equalizing per-pupil school expenditures, extending affirmative action programs to those from working-class backgrounds, and expanding low-income housing. President Obama has offered a rhetoric of hope, and more updrating research is needed to examine the range of workers’ multiple reactions, consciousness, and hope or lack thereof in the recession that began in 2008.

The declining economy, then, has profoundly affected our capacity to hope, care for one another, and in addition, trust our leaders. The Perruccis show that popular distrust of government elites, big business, the media, and labor unions currently accompanies the economic decline. The authors claim that workers’ distrust is rooted in elites who do not act in the interests of workers, the Federal government that bails out banks not homeowners, politicians who are beholden to contributors and lobby- ists, and the corporate media that does not speak to the concerns of workers. The Perruccis advance a very plausible argument that the distrust of Americans stems from discontent about jobs and work (p. 63), but they do not demonstrate that their hypothesis explains more than an alternative hypothesis, that government distrust stems from frustrations about high taxes, and a failure to win wars and affirm certain moral stands. Although the two authors do point out that the “new spirit of populism” (p. 61) could turn to the political right as well as the left, and in-depth examination of how distrust is currently being perceived and expressed might yield clues about the potential for the progressive platform that the Perruccis advocate, and what can be done to cultivate support for it.

Distrust that blocks progressive policies stems not only from unresponsive elites, but also from identity politics and the conflicting claims of rival racial/ethnic groups. America at Risk argues for the recognition of the most compelling racial grievances and a program focused on the “class politics” (p. 76) of unifying and economically advancing workers from across different groups. The Perruccis consider different groups separately and assess the magnitude of the harm experienced by each (pp. 84-90), concluding that Native Americans and blacks have greater group grievances compared to white ethnics and women.

The Perruccis’ goal of building a coalition of minorities is certainly laudable, but in order to formulate a coalitional program, it is necessary to analyze and understand claims as the product of intersecting racial, ethnic, gender, and class inequalities, rather than considering these dimensions of inequality separately as rival bases for claims making. Building trust and coalitions between groups is not only a matter of relatively ranking their grievances to decide whose grievances will lead the coalition; it also depends upon the specific history of how groups (blacks and Koreans, for example) have related to each other in a geographic place. In addition, downplaying certain claims of groups as “micro insults” (p. 80) should be tempered with the awareness

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that what counts as a significant symbolic struggle for recognition is often in the eye of the claimant.

*America at Risk* will find an audience within the academy as a framework for sociologists and public policy experts researching which features of the current economic crisis will significantly shape popular perceptions around hope, trust, and caring. The character of the cultures of hope, trust, and caring that emerge will help set discourses and political agendas. Although not written as a textbook, the book can be used as supplementary reading in upper-division undergraduate courses.

This book should also reach the desks of Congressional staffers, Washington DC journalists, and progressive K Street think tanks. The ASA and the SSSP should establish a fund to subsidize the purchase and distribution of books such as this one to opinion-makers and leaders. *America at Risk* is clear and concise, providing essential information without overloading. While not tackling health-care reform and the climate bill, the book provides a rationale for the other social-democratic legislation that the Obama administration should advance in its remaining years.


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“Marriage” and “family” are flammable topics. Americans discuss the meaning of marriage and who should be able to marry. Politicians worry about the future of marriage and family while sociologists provide data to fuel debates.

*Marriage and Family: Perspectives and Complexities* is an edited volume that thoughtfully addresses contemporary trends and issues of American families. Editors H. Elizabeth Peters and Claire M. Kamp Dush build this volume around themes of *diversity* and *change* in family—over historical time and, particularly, across class, race, and ethnic groups. I commend the editors for their organization of this volume. The book moves from broad demographic trends and theoretical perspectives in Part One to focused attention on contemporary families in Part Two, to policy initiatives in Part Three, ending with a very strong section on the “future of marriage” in Part Four.

Part One provides four perspectives on family. Arland Thornton provides an historical perspective and links historical context to structural change with careful attention to the promise and limits of historical data. Next, an evolutionary perspective provides an overview of family patterns across time and cultures. Paula England provides a theoretically sophisticated multi-level perspective on gender to analyze recent demographic trends in families with a compelling thesis: “women have more autonomy in a society in which many individuals spend a good share of their adult lives unmarried, but that, in such a low-marriage regime, women also bear more of the costs of childrearing, especially among the poor” (p. 57). Paul Amato lends a strong finish to this section with a summary of marriage, divorce, and childbearing trends and a nuanced social psychological perspective to explain why and how economic and historical conditions led to changes in meanings and beliefs about marriage that, in turn, influenced demographic trends. He also synthesizes theory and data to inform cultural debates about marriage.

Part Two reveals the complexity and diversity in contemporary American families with five chapters that address the implications of various contemporary family structures for individual and family well-being. Each chapter also speaks to contemporary debates and policy issues. An outstanding chapter by Rachel Dunifon reviews trends in single parenthood and variation across race/class/ethnicity. Other chapters consider how cohabiters view parenthood, focus on child well-being in stable single parent and married families, and analyze stepfather families with their implications for adolescent children’s well-being. The final piece in this section, by Gary Gates and Adam Romero, is a must-read chapter for scholars and policy makers interested in...
Part Three addresses policies and approaches to strengthen marriage. The first chapter focuses on the Healthy Marriage Initiative and the second focuses on distinctions among types of domestic violence. While these chapters provide topical overviews and directly address important policy issues, neither details issues of diversity that we see throughout the other chapters in this volume.

Marriage and Family ends on a strong note with Part Four on the “future of marriage.” The chapters by Steven Nock and Tamara Metz counter one another in thought-provoking ways. Nock argues that marriage signals maturity and responsibility and, given the decline in marriage rates, we might expect that marriage will become an even more important symbolic signal (e.g., to employers) in the future. The Metz chapter follows with a recommendation that “we disestablish marriage as a legal institution” (p. 325). Her critique of marriage focuses on the unequal distribution of benefits conferred by marriage. The interesting juxtaposition of these chapters centers around their shared focus on the importance of symbolic meanings of marriage. Shirley Hill’s chapter provides a thoughtful overview of family trends by race, an historical perspective on marriage among African Americans, and how social science has framed African American families over time. Finally, Daniel Lichter and Warren Brown present demographic trends and projections for marriage and family, taking into account race and immigration patterns. The authors continue the emphasis on diversity and change that we see throughout this book and emphasize the importance of symbolic meanings of marriage and family that change over time and vary across race, ethnicity, and class. They conclude: “The idea that we can conveniently summarize the typical family experiences of average Americans, both now and in the future, by calculating aggregate rates of marriage and fertility, seems increasingly arcane. In the case of marriage and family life, statistical averages may obfuscate as much as illuminate” (p. 379).

Of course, statistical averages offer us the opportunity to illuminate a moving target and Marriage and Family embraces that opportunity. This volume offers up-to-date statistical profiles and trends on wide-ranging aspects of marriage and family, an emphasis on diversity and change in family structures, dynamics, and meanings, and attention to policy concerns. This book will be a valuable resource for family scholars and policy makers and an ideal compendium of facts and issues for advanced students.


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The development of Durkheim’s concepts, epistemological and ontological commitments and assumptions, his (theory-laden) empirical descriptions and his optimistic judgements about his society and its historical possibilities constitutes such a complex body of work that much can be gained from re-examining it to address problems that at first sight seem peripheral to his main concerns. While it might seem counter-intuitive to produce an edited collection that explores the contribution of Durkheimism to suffering and evil and their interrelation, this stimulating and exciting edited collection demonstrates that, on the contrary, it is a very valuable project. The book consists of eleven essays by scholars from the United States, Canada, Britain, France, and Italy. The editors claim that sociologists of all stripes have addressed suffering poorly. While acknowledging the contributions of Max Weber, Gaston Richard, Zygmunt Bauman and Ian Wilkinson, they argue that a sociological analysis of suffering and evil is enriched by a distinctively Durkheimian examination. By evil they mean the suffering produced, often inadvertently, by routine social activities and arrangements, and also that produced by calamitous events. As
William Pickering argues in the book’s concluding essay, the questions raised and dealt with in the articles are those of a sociodicy and not a theodicy.

In the first substantive paper, “Le Suicide and Psychological Suffering,” Sophie Yankelevitch points to an equivocation in Durkheim’s understanding of the malaise of modern societies – is it due to excessive, and remediable, anomie and egoism or is it a particular expression of the tragic dualism of human nature, the sacred social aspect of our being requiring painful sacrifices from our profane embodied egoistic self. Further, she suggests that the concept of anomie is itself unpersuasive, drawing on Canguilhem and Bergson, she asserts that “order and disorder only designate two different kinds of order.” But this an odd claim conflating regularities in general with the particular kind of regularities associated with self-sustaining orders, including nomic ones.

More fitting, is Giovanni Paoletti’s “Some Concepts of ‘Evil’ in Durkheim’s Thought” which locates suffering and evil through a complex discussion of Durkheim’s theorization of societies and their pathologies. Durkheim saw as evil whatever negatively affected the social tie, conceptualized as consisting of two dimensions, integration (how individuals are attached to society) and regulation (how it regulates them). As Durkheim’s work developed there was a change in the content of both of these dimensions and of their interrelation. In Division of Labour in Society (1893) and in Rules of Sociological Method (1895) he deployed a developmental and self-equilibrating biological model; while identifying abnormal forms of the division of labor, he ultimately thought they would disappear with further evolution. In Suicide (1897) he first refocuses the biological model by attending to “good measure” – because “in the order of life, no good is measureless” (Durkheim cited by Paoletti, p.70). While both integration and regulation are required there must not be too much nor too little of either. Over a long period from 1899 and culminating in Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) Durkheim again modified his position, arguing that the lack of shared rituals and understandings of the complexities of social life limited the ability of the society and its members to respond self-consciously and creatively to the unforeseen contingencies of societal development.

In “Suffering to Become Human: A Durkheimian Perspective,” Mark Cladis somewhat displaces Paoletti’s analysis by showing how Durkheim recognizes that from our earliest moments as human beings each of us receive and require not only food and shelter but “sociolinguistic substance and sustenance” and this involves a mutually enriching interactive process between baby/child and adult. The process of human growth is better thought of as involving a gift relationship than a sacrificial one. Both egoism and altruism are “natural” and socially produced, hence the lack of opportunities for involvement in collective and altruistic actions also involves a sacrifice of human needs and desires.

In “Robert Hertz on Suffering and Evil: The Negative Processes of Social Life and Their Resolution,” Robert Parkin continues his exploration of Hertz’s work on the topics of death, sin and right and left-handedness. While death causes suffering for the bereaved, it is also a “rent in the fabric of society.” It creates anxiety because death may have been an effect of witchcraft and both the body and the soul of the deceased are often felt to be dangerous. Mortuary rites are used to limit and contain both suffering and evil. Hertz also takes up Durkheim’s insight that there are both benevolent and malevolent (impure) variants of the sacred, to develop the categories of the left and right sacred.

A concern with the ambiguous nature of the sacred was central to the work of Georges Bataille, whose somewhat surprising relationship to Durkheimism is analyzed in William Ramp’s “Le Malin genie: Durkheim, Bataille and the Prospect of a Sociology of Evil.” The importance of Durkheimism for Bataille’s thought was particularly evident in the 1930s, during his involvement with surrealism, radical politics, the Collège de sociologie, and the journal and secret sacrificial society, Acéphale. Bataille shared Durkheim’s view that the totality of human activity, including “individuality, passion, desire, transgression and limit have significance only in a sociocultural matrix” (p.124), and also his ontological commitment.
to the sui-generis reality of society. Bataille elaborated these in his own way and believed that human and societal conscious-
nesses were contingent and composite, determined not only by positive desires for knowledge, but also a certain compulsion to embrace excess, violence and obliteration particularly in the light of the inherent limits of knowledge. He valorized “sovereignty”—the willingness to make choices based on grounds that were “beyond good and evil,” that opened one up to “the gamble, the risk, the danger” of hazarding words and self in potentially wounding and fatal encounters” (p.129). The implication for Ramp seems to be that social scientists must accept that there is little that they can claim to confidently know about how social progress might be determined, and how suffering might be measured and ameliorated. So posed this seems a reasonable conclusion, but hardly exclusive of other possibilities.

The need for analyses that can empower democratic collectives to make judgements of what constitutes for them the best possible social arrangements is evident in John Allcock’s “The Hague Tribunal: Critical Reflections Prompted by Durkheim’s Remarks on Suffering.” His article shows the limits of legalistic accounts of, and responses to, war-related atrocities by showing the impossibility of sustaining individualistic accounts of the criminal violence unleashed through the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Allcock demonstrates that those individuals put on trial are necessarily conceived of as representatives of particular “communities” and those who have suffered are often seen as having suffered on behalf of their communities. Using different time scales, three of the major ethnic groups constitute themselves as sacred communities of victims, unwilling or unable to work with other “sacrilegous” groups.

Contra the argument of the editors, many sociologists have paid explicit attention to suffering; since the 1960s, much sociology has been committed to analyzing class, gender, racial and ethnic exploitation and domination with a great deal of attention paid to the suffering of the victims of such processes. There is no doubt that this book makes a contribution to sociological analysis, but in doing so it builds upon rather than displaces the sociological corpus.

This splendid little book provides a clear, readable and remarkably comprehensive overview of social theory in less than 150 pages of main text. After a short introductory chapter stressing “The Practical Nature of Social Theorizing” and its direction to its audiences, the following three chapters neatly divide the field into “Arguments” from natural science and the aspiration to imitate it, from “Language/Understanding” (Wittgenstein, hermeneutics etc.) and from “Political Community”, where the main emphasis is on critical theory from Lukács to Habermas and some of his postmodernist or postmodernist critics such as Bauman and Rorty. The three perspectives complement one another: “... the appeal to natural science cannot inform a definitive mode of social theoretic engagement ... there is no single definitive way of doing social science” (p.43).

At this point in my reading of the book I began to worry that although I had seen enough to write an enthusiastic endorsement there would not be enough to say in a review. Fortunately, Preston also has a distinguished career as a sociologist of development who has worked substantially on and in Japan, China and Singapore, and this wide experience comes to the fore in the final chapter of the book. First, he recalls the engaged and critical character of classical social theory in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then, following Ernest Gellner’s argument in Thought and Change, he suggests that development theory offers “something akin to a restatement of the core concern of the classical European tradition of social theorizing ...” (p. 124). And whereas modernization theory cut too many corners in its assumptions of necessary convergence on a Western model, more recent accounts of globalisation or, more properly, regionalism (since globalization theory has often also been insensitive to
regional differences) open up new perspectives on global diversity. The European tradition of social theory was and remains itself diverse:

There are national strands of social theorizing: in France a republican statist polity, affirming citizenship, reason and celebrating intellectual life; in Britain an oligarchic liberal polity, affirming subject-hood, accumulative pragmatics and relegating intellectual life to closed circles of the elite; and in Germany a democratic polity, affirming law, the public sphere and the possibility of rational political/social life. (p.129)

Preston then identifies three types of engaged thinkers: “political writers” such as George Orwell or Günter Grass, “colonial administrator-scholars” such as T.S. Raffles in Singapore and J.S. Furnivall, who was active in Malaya and wrote a definitive book on the Dutch East Indies, and “critical engaged scholars” such as Gellner, Rorty, Habermas or Bourdieu. “Social theorizing is embedded in deep context; theorists work with reference to traditions, these are carried in polities, themselves lodged in societies, in turn located in unfolding historical trajectories” (p.142). National and regional traditions are shaped by

the systematic difference in understandings of relations between persons-in-the-world and the ways such understandings inform the particular sphere of social scientific reflection; thus, illustratively: persons as responsible individuals (Britain); persons as members of families/communities oriented towards a collective national project (Singapore); persons as members of family, kin and clan (China); and persons as rational/moral members of the public sphere (Germany). Each associates with a domestic style of social theorizing: in Britain, liberal economics conjoined with ameliorative welfarism; in Singapore, policy work, oriented towards unpacking elite specified national directions; or, in Germany, a strong commitment to the scientific value of social science within the public policy sphere. (pp.142-3)

There is much material here for critical discussion, as there is in Preston’s lapidary but apt characterization of the British Labour Party as “a subaltern conservative party, whose animating ethos has long been obedience to the status quo, respectability and decency . . . ”(p.133). Overall, the book would function admirably as an extremely readable introduction to social theory, with a more prominent focus on the stakes of theory and on global diversity than one usually finds in such works.

The obstacle is of course that indicated in the heading to this review: ninety dollars is a stiff price for a book of this length, especially one marred by such poor copy-editing. The absence of full stops in the endnotes and bibliography is strangely disturbing, and comparing this book to another recent Palgrave book reveals that this was not a new house style, designed presumably to reduce their carbon footprint. I would unhesitatingly recommend this book to students (via, at this price, the university library), but with a health warning that the comma can be overused and is better not randomly interchangeable with the colon and semicolon.


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As Róisín Ryan-Flood astutely observes, nearly all existing research on lesbian family issues has been arrayed around the U.S.-U.K. axis. What makes this new contribution to ongoing debates over lesbian motherhood particularly valuable is where she conducted her research: in Ireland and in Sweden. She interviewed lesbian mothers at length in each country, and substantial quotes from her interviewees are at the heart of her comparative analysis. By moving her gaze into two different national contexts, Ryan-Flood facilitates an invigorating discussion of the ways in which state policy inflects the desire for and experience of parenthood for
lesbians. Through her gaze, questions of sexual citizenship assume new breadth and complexity, and the reader is encouraged to rethink the vexed issues of assimilation vs. subversion as they have shaped discussions of LGBT family and parenthood.

Although the road to parenthood presents American lesbians with many challenges, the laissez-faire, market-driven system that exists in the United States looks like a freewheeling land of plenty compared to the difficulties faced by lesbians in both Ireland and Sweden. In Ireland, same-sex partnerships have not achieved legal recognition, so lesbian mothers’ legal status is equivalent to women whose children are born out of wedlock. Marriage is the assumed context for reproduction in Ireland, so biological mothers are treated as sole guardians and even known donors face daunting obstacles if they wish to be recognized as fathers. Custody arrangements fall under the purview of the (usually) homophobic courts, and adoption is not available except to heterosexual married couples. At the same time, however, lesbians can sometimes access donor insemination (DI) and new reproductive technologies (NRTs), which are managed with little official regulation. The use of these resources is tempered by Irish lesbians’ belief that the identity of the donor must be known; this means that donors drawn from among women’s own networks are preferred to men whose identities were not accessible.

In Sweden, despite its established recognition of same-sex couples, access to the means of reproduction is severely constrained. Only recently, same-sex couples in Sweden gained the right to adopt, and the route to both DI and NRTs is littered with restrictions. Sweden has a long history of encouraging gender equality and involved fatherhood, and this means that DI in that country only rarely can be anonymous. Even more influential than these regulations, however, is the prevailing Swedish ethos of family, which dictates that the “father” be an active parent even when his role in reproduction was limited to the provision of sperm. Swedish lesbians, we learn from Ryan-Flood, firmly believe in the importance of the known father/donor, and seem to willingly manage their families in a context that often awards more visibility to the donor than to the lesbian co-parent.

The importance placed on the donor as a real person, and often a force in the life of the family, takes on different inflections in each country, but stands in dramatic contrast to lesbian reproductive practices in the United States. While many U.S. lesbians (and others using DI) have come to see the eventual release of the donor’s identity to be desirable, realistic legal fears have made the fully-known donor a less attractive option. As Ryan-Flood shows, these preferences, along with other decisions made by lesbian mothers as they seek and experience parenthood, need to be understood as shaped by the political and cultural specificities that prevail in each nation, and not as an essential attribute of all lesbian families.

Besides contrasting the approaches to achieving motherhood that are characteristic of each country, Ryan-Flood focuses on the ways that the two settings affect other key dimensions of lesbian motherhood. She devotes considerable attention to the ways that lesbian mothers and their partners use and “queer” public space, the intensity of their commitment to biological understandings of relatedness, and the question of whether their actions are best viewed as heteronormative (assimilation) or transformative (resistant), an issue that not surprisingly ends in equivocal conclusions. While each country presents lesbian mothers with specific challenges, some issues are familiar to scholars of LGBT family life. The endlessly debated question of whether lesbian parenthood facilitates new kinds of kinship systems makes its appearance here, with support for Kath Weston’s view that families of choice and blood families are both constructed systems built on similar foundations.

Raising another long-debated issue, Ryan-Flood in part approaches the question of whether lesbian-mother families are “transformative” through an examination of the domestic division of labor reported by lesbian couples who have children. Not surprisingly, these couples consistently claim to organize domestic and caretaking work along egalitarian lines. At this point the reviewer’s skepticism takes hold: deviations to this lesbian “just-so” story might be revealed by the kind of participant observation Christopher Carrington undertook in
No Place Like Home (2002), his innovative study of the domestic division of labor among lesbian and gay couples. Carrington found that the social desirability of egalitarianism saturated the narratives offered by couples in ways directly contradicted by his observations of their actual domestic practices. Perhaps a similar dynamic shaped Ryan-Flood’s data. More fully fleshed out narrators, rather than the disembodied voices that speak to us in “talking-head” fashion, would have helped to make these narratives more convincing.

But these are small complaints. There is no question that adding countries outside the United States and the United Kingdom to the literature on lesbian motherhood and framing a comparative study is a significant contribution that highlights the direct impact of public policy on the lives of lesbian citizens. In so doing, Ryan-Flood has opened up a line of inquiry that should receive much more attention in the future.


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It was with considerable trepidation that I agreed to review this book. I have been researching and teaching futures studies within a department of political science for almost forty years and over that time have read thousands of books, articles, and plans; discussed ideas about the futures with people in every region of the world; and viewed many movies, videos, and games that purport to be about the future whether from the perspectives of fiction, science, or conjecture. Lawrence R. Samuel was not a person I recognized as being an active member of the futures community, nor has he published in the recognized peer-reviewed futures journals in English, such as *Futures, Journal of Futures Studies, Foresight, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, World Future Review* (formerly *Futures Research Quarterly*), or *World Futures*, none of which he references. *Future* is the result of an enormous amount of research over what seems to be a long period of time. There is no doubt that any one person who is completely unfamiliar with America’s obsession with “the future” will be stunned by what they read from so many sources and even more stunned by the equal weight Samuel gives to his sources: *Cosmopolitan, The New York Times, Popular Science*, or—even rarely—some early scholarly source. Samuel relies heavily on Joseph Corn and Brian Horrigan, *Yesterday’s Tomorrows: Past Visions of the American Future* (1984), which is indeed an excellent source. He also cites five other “histories of the future” published between 2000 and 2007. Samuel does not contribute anything to our understanding beyond what these have already provided—except for his attention to high school and college yearbooks of the pre- and immediate post-WWII periods. Even though every sentence he writes is rich with modifying phrases that both exalt and ridicule the ideas expressed, there is no attempt to contextualize or evaluate by any criteria the statements quoted. What he praises one author for writing, he often ridicules another for writing.

The book is basically a series of quotations flowing with no apparent logic from one to another in a book roughly—very roughly—organized in chronological chapters as follows: “The Shape of Things to Come, 1920-1939”; “Great Day Coming, 1940-45”; “The Best is Yet to Come, 1946-1964”; “Future Shock”, 1965-1979”; “The Empire Strikes Back, 1980-1994”; and “The Matrix, 1995—”. Samuel states there are certain enduring themes moving through or demarking each of these periods with each chapter considering “the idea of the future as it relates to (1) the public or civic arena; (2) popular and consumer culture; (3) the economic arena; (4) travel and transportation; (5) architecture and cities; and (6) science and technology . . . .” (p. 14). Would this were so! Instead, one breathless quotation follows another, page after page, in no consistent order and very often in complete contradiction to one another. There are numerous annoying errors. One example: Bertrand de Jouvenel’s name is routinely misspelled, and the name of his futures organization is not *Les Futuribles, which*
Samuel follows with the phrase, “of course”, as though futuribles were a common French word for the future rather than one adopted specifically to show the plurality and openness of the future—a perspective that Samuel steadfastly refuses to acknowledge, so intent is he on insisting that “futurism” pretends to “predict” the future, even though most academic futurists, such as de Jouvenel, do not.

This brings us to a fatal flaw in the book: fundamental terms and concepts are defined only briefly and incompletely, when at all. Then they are redefined as though for the first time later, and in any event are used inconsistently throughout so that it is impossible to be sure what Samuel really means about anything he writes. For example, Samuel states on page two: “futurism (the practice dedicated to anticipating the future)—and that’s it as a definition until much later (p. 116) when he writes, “futurism (also called futuristics and futurology, the latter term coined in the 1940s)” with no further mention of those two terms and their relation to each other, to futurism, or to other terms. Towards the end (p. 201) Samuel writes, “Futurism—the study of the future.” This is at odds with every implication of the term as used on every other page of the book. But a few sentences later (p. 202) he refers to “the academic and applied field of Future Studies, . . . the dry-as-a-bone school of futurism born between the wars.” However most futurists within or without the academic field never refer to the field as “futurism.” It is instead “futures studies,” with the insistent “s” indicating the openness and plurality of the futures. Futures studies is the study of ideas about and actions towards the future from various theoretical and methodological perspectives, and is neither the study of “the future” (which does not exist to be studied) nor the assertion of some specific ideology about the future, as “futurism” clearly implies—and futures studies per se certainly does not try to “predict” the future as Samuel routinely insists.

However, Samuel more often applies the term “futurism” not to designate the academic field but mainly to describe any statement made by anyone about the futures. Even so, most frequently Samuel uses “futurism” only for optimistic views about the futures, dismissing gloomy views as somehow not “futurism”—and indeed somehow not even about “the future.” He makes other strange distinctions between “futurism” and “the future” such as: “the future and futurism can of course be going separate directions, the two concepts in fact often sharing an inverse relationship,” (p. 2), as well as the completely bewildering assertion that “much of the future had been transformed into marketing research” (p. 154). What in the world does he mean by “the future” in these and so many other instances, and how is “the future” different from “futurism”?

_Future_ is basically a shoddy whirlwind look at pop futures in America—and only in America (“Another reason why this book is so American-centric is that the idea of the future is so American-centric.” p. 6). As such, it is severely flawed, but harmless. However, entirely out of the blue Samuel occasionally makes totally unsubstantiated pronouncements about futures studies as an academic and applied field, completely ignoring the reality and global compass of the field. These utterly undocumented pronouncements are found sprinkled throughout the book—as with everything else, unrelated to what comes before or follows. Especially annoying is his last chapter where he makes a considerable number of firm judgments about what futures studies is, and should and should not be, that have absolutely no basis in facts about the actual field whatsoever.

Reference


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Social sciences have produced numerous accounts of the postcommunist transition
that analyze it from a macro-level institutional, historical or policy perspective. But how are the effects of institutional reforms perceived by households? And how do policy changes shape people’s day-to-day practices? To answer these questions, Olga Shevchenko conducted 103 interviews with 33 Muscovites over the course of two years, from 1998 to 2000. The result is an insightful and compelling account that pursues two main lines of inquiry. The first one focuses on the perception of the deterioration of living conditions as a “total crisis”, a reflection on both its magnitude and permanence (Chapters Two-Four). The second deals with the organization of daily life by households with the crisis serving as a backdrop (Chapters Five-Seven).

It is particularly fascinating to see the central role that consumption played in helping the Muscovites to overcome the crisis and claim competence in chaotic reality. In fact, consumption became a lens through which one got a close look at the political, economic and social changes of the postcommunist transitional period. When questioned about the experience of political and economic reforms, Shevchenko’s interviewees invariably turned the conversation towards their consumer practices. On the other hand, consumption offered a way to claim the new identity of a savvy and competent consumer, replacing old socialist selves that were either lost entirely (e.g., the category of “Soviet citizens” ceased to exist) or significantly diminished following the loss of income and status by many professional groups such as doctors and teachers. There was a widespread belief among people that the market was “out there to get them”: that the quality of goods was suspect, the buying process was perilous (for instance, the scales used to weight groceries at open air markets were wrong), and that the legal enforcement was incapable of protecting consumers. (To reflect the hidden dangers lurking everywhere consumers turn, one of the sections in Chapter Five is aptly named “Consumption Safari.”) Consumers prided themselves in their ability to exhibit “practical competence” and achieve autonomy from inefficient or even malevolent state institutions.

Postcommunist consumption also signified the return of hoarding, which had been perfected as a consumer strategy in the midst of socialism-induced shortages. In the 1990s, shortages were no longer a problem as markets delivered an abundance of consumer products. Yet consumers felt deeply uncertain about the future – about preserving their savings which could evaporate due to market crashes or inflation and about maintaining their ability to earn a livelihood. Neither could they predict well their future needs. As a result, as long as they had any money left after buying necessities, Muscovites spent it on new consumer durables (even though their old ones were working perfectly), reinforced doors or apartment renovations. This was consumption that was running ahead of consumer needs. While American consumers routinely replace their still functioning but outdated durables with new ones (driven by wants rather than needs), Muscovites did not throw away their old appliances. New refrigerators stood alongside the old ones, sometimes simply for decoration, while older ones actually held food; or the old ones stood un plugged, in bedrooms or hallways, used either as additional cabinets or TV stands, ready to be plugged in when needed (their owners reasoning that having two working appliances was better than one). These purchases blur the distinction between consumption and investment, and between consumption and insurance. In fact, Shevchenko refers to such defensive consumption as “a surge protector” against possible misfortunes— inflation, loss of earning capacity, appliance malfunction, etc.

In the last chapter, Shevchenko warns that the drive of Muscovites towards autonomy to protect themselves from what they perceived to be a disorderly and disintegrated reality, inhibits active civic engagement capable of reforming inefficient and corrupt institutions. The only reason for optimism is the fact that the shared experience of living in a total crisis allows Muscovites to forge collective identities.

While the argument is persuasive and the writing clear and cogent, one is left with several questions. To what extent are postcommunist consumer practices a unique response to the chaotic postcommunist reality, or could they instead be traced back to daily experiences in the late socialist period,

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when “beating the state” and “outsmarting the authorities” were virtues to be proud of just like “outsmarting the market” strategy became in the 1990s? Furthermore, to what extent are Muscovites’ consumer practices particular to a transitional society? For example, how different is their fascination with alternative healing from American overconsumption of vitamins, food supplements and self-help literature? How do gender, age or economic and symbolic resources make some consumers more vulnerable in the face of the crisis and others more skillful when dealing with it. Data from 33 interviewees would not support any causal arguments, but such a discussion would add multidimensionality to the analysis.

These minor points aside, the book is a must-read for anyone with an interest in postcommunist transition and its effect on day-to-day living. It will also be a great resource in undergraduate classes on market transitions, contemporary Russia and consumption.


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Patricio Silva’s In the Name of Reason is a book of essays about technocrats in Chilean history. He argues that middle-class technocrats have enabled the Chilean state to become relatively autonomous from the struggle between social classes. This book is both insightful and overly ambitious: while it makes some compelling points, its inability to document many of its key claims undercuts the persuasiveness of its core conclusions.

In the Name of Reason is in the tradition of Alberto Edwards’ essays on the Chilean upper class (La fronda aristocrática, first published in 1928) or Mario Góngora’s more recent book on the role of the state in Chilean history (Ensayo histórico sobre la noción de Estado en Chile en los siglos XIX y XX, first published in 1981). Such books, which appear to have a special appeal to Chilean intellectuals, sociologists, and historians, eschew the systematic evaluation of key claims. Like Silva’s last book, they assume that readers have an intimate grasp of Chilean history to judge whether they have united a huge number of facts in a convincing and novel manner.

Silva ranges widely over a century-and-a-half of history. Chapter One examines a pair of public intellectuals from the nineteenth century (José Victorino Lastarria and Valentín Letelier) who wrote about developing a more rational approach to public administration. Chapter Two covers the tumultuous decade of the 1920s when a group of technocrats led by Pablo Ramírez joined Colonel Carlos Ibáñez’s dictatorship (1927-31) to reform the party-centered bureaucracy. Chapter Three discusses the foundation of the Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO) in 1939 and the heyday of Import Substitution Industrialization between 1938 and 1964. Chapter Four analyzes how middle-class technocrats were displaced from their bureaucratic posts in President Jorge Alessandri’s government (1958-64), partially returned with the Christian Democratic government of President Eduardo Frei (1964-70), and marginalized during President Salvador Allende’s aborted socialist experiment (1970-3). The remaining chapters explore the role of University of Chicago-trained economists in the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973-89) and the return of pragmatic, equity-oriented technocrats during the center-left governments between 1990 and 2010.

It is hard to quibble with the central thrust of Silva’s book. In comparative perspective, the Chilean state has been one of the most sophisticated in the developing world—and technocrats, whatever their class background, have something to do with outcome. Systematic efforts to rank governance capabilities (e.g., by the Bertelsmann Stiftung or the World Bank) or the quality of public policies (by the Inter-American Development Bank) regularly rank its public sector on par with the states of much wealthier societies like New Zealand’s. Though he does not discuss such evidence, Silva is surely right that a state staffed by highly trained engineers, economists, and
other professionals is going to behave differently than one filled principally by party hacks.

At his boldest, Silva argues that technocrats are representatives of the middle class and have acted as “the moderating force” in a “polarized political environment” (p. 18). The first of these claims is marred by the absence of a definition of this (or any other) class and by the lack of data on the class composition of technocrats. The second is suggestive, but underdeveloped. There is enough evidence scattered in Chapters Two and Three to lend credence to the claim that technocrats wanted social reform, unlike the revolution sought by many workers and miners or the dogged allegiance to the status quo championed by the upper class. And Silva presents some evidence that the militant left accepted the modernizing plans of the technocrats, even if it preferred revolution to reform—at least until Allende. But, there is neither argument nor evidence about how technocrats convinced workers and capitalists that they were uniquely qualified to be a moderating force in politics.

Making a persuasive case for his bolder claims would have required Silva to analyze the political system and its dynamics. This is a curious omission because it was far from inevitable that technocrats would join governments to rid the body politic of factionalism. The unstable governments and nepotism that the technocrats decried persisted for decades before President Jorge Alessandri’s inability to overcome legislative inaction led to the 1925 coup. Explaining why these conflicts laid the groundwork for technocratic reform would have only strengthened Silva’s ambitious interpretation of Chilean political history.

The manuscript should have been more carefully edited. There are more than a few places where Silva makes questionable claims. For example, Chile did not have a parliamentary system, even if its presidential system evolved in a parliamentary fashion between 1891 and 1925 because legislative majorities picked the cabinets of independently elected presidents. There are all too many claims about what the “people” wanted, despite the lack of testimonial and other accounts for the period before the use of surveys and the absence of polling data for more recent decades (see pp. 38, 66, 157 for three examples).

In the Name of Reason will be largely of interest to students of Chilean politics and history. It synthesizes a large body of secondary work on technocrats in Chilean development and relates these findings to central concerns of Chilean historiography.


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As there is less written about men in occupations where the majority of workers are women than the reverse, I was looking forward to reading Men in Caring Occupations, especially regarding the four occupations covered—airplane cabin crew, nurses, primary school teachers, and librarians. The focus of the book is how men “negotiate the potential mismatch between the (feminine) nature of the job and a gendered (masculine) identity” (p. 4-5). As the minority group in these occupations, men need to practice their caring skills, but need not feminize as workers. By maintaining their masculine identity, they would do gender differently. But do they? Not much—“what emerges is a patchy and uneven transformation” (p. 164).

The data come from in-depth interviews with 49 men working in the United Kingdom between 2002 and 2006—7 librarians, 10 teachers, 15 nurses, and 17 cabin crew. A smaller group of 16 nurses and 9 teachers was interviewed in Australia in 2006. The interviewees were contacted through advertisements in professional journals and websites, and through personal contacts.

Ruth Simpson presents little information about the gender divisions in the occupations in the two countries (comparison with the United States would have extended readership), and whether they have become more welcoming of male workers in the last ten years or so. It would have been helpful to know, when quoting a particular worker,
whether he was the lone token man, or whether he had compatriots at the same level.

Another problem with the research is that although about a third of the men interviewed were estimated to be homosexual, sexuality was not raised in the interviews unless it was by the subject. It is a major gap, for much of the discussion of maintaining masculinity was around confronting the assumption of others that they were all homosexual, otherwise, why were they working in a woman’s occupation? The subtleties of this double confrontation had to be different for straight and gay men, but there are few comparisons. The issue of homosexuality is raised for all the occupations, but the interviewees’ comments on the subject are presented anecdotally rather than systematically.

The first half of the book is an overview of the key issues in gender performance and gender construction in non-traditional work. These issues are identity, maintaining masculinity, visibility as a token, and gender and emotions. Physical bodies are conflated with emotions as sites of expression. For those familiar with the theories and previous research, there will be little that is new. The second half of the book is on the specific occupations. Here, too, the data from this particular research project are buried in overly detailed literature reviews.

Each of the occupation chapters centers on a particular aspect of gender construction – space for the cabin crew, bodies for the nurses, professionalism for the primary school teachers, and social identity for the librarians. The findings are pretty much as expected – the performance of conventional masculinity within the negotiation of feminized practice demands. Thus, male cabin crew tried to create an “authoritative” masculine space by playing up the safety and security aspects of flying, but that performance of masculinity was disrupted and subverted by the feminine activities of serving and care-taking passengers’ needs.

In nursing, male bodies are the outsiders and can be disruptive, unless the men work in mental health arenas, where strength and aggression are seen as their advantage, and in anesthesiology and other more technical specialties, where men are seen as belonging. Homosexuality is the norm, according to one respondent. I would have liked more data on whether gay men are more accepted for working on women patients as general nurses, in ob-gyn, and as midwives, and if they are, is it because they are seen as more emotional (a “fact” a heterosexual nurse insisted was true) or less threatening sexually?

For male primary school teachers, the recent emphasis on standardization and curriculum control in the United Kingdom and Australia, as in the United States, is an advantage. The “professionalization project” fits into stereotypical masculinity as rational and objective, contrasted with female teachers’ supposedly emotional and creative feminine style of relating to children. However, the men also want to be relational – but without the stigmatization of femininity and the accompanying devaluation of primary school teaching. Another way that the male teachers expressed their masculinity was to present themselves as a father figure to boys (disciplinary, authoritative, sports-oriented) and as a paternalistic caretaker to girls. The potential danger area were accusations of pedophilia, so touching, hugging, and displays of affection had to be strictly avoided. The retreat into professional objectivity was thus seen as the safest course for the male primary school teachers.

Male librarians seemed to have the toughest identity management, fighting the stereotype of librarian as an older, dowdy, conservative woman, and men librarians as socially inept, powerless, unambitious, and effeminate. Many of them were unusual in age as well as gender. The research subjects had an advantage in identity re-construction in that they were all academic librarians, and some claimed they worked for the university as information specialists. Others turned to sports, work as DJs or actors, and graduate studies as more positive alternate identities. With new technologies in knowledge management, some saw a new social identity in the making.

In sum, for the most part, this book is not about “doing gender differently” but about “déjà gender all over again.” In this study, gender was invoked by men who contrasted themselves with the women in their fields.
and by their constructions of masculinity to belie their doing women’s work.


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The 2008 presidential election suggested a resurgence in political participation. Obama spoke to crowds of 75,000 in Portland. Palin drew 60,000 supporters to a rally in Florida. More than one in ten adults made a donation to a candidate. And on Election Day, 64 percent of the electorate turned out to vote. By all accounts, Americans seemed to be actively involved in public life.

However, a year later, as health care reform lingered in Congress, the public appeared noticeably less involved and pundits began to voice doubts about the robustness of civic life. Yet, as Carmen Sirianni illustrates in Investing in Democracy: Engaging Citizens in Collaborative Governance, evaluating the health of American democracy based on levels of electoral activism ignores the important and varied roles that citizens can (and do) play in local and federal policymaking. Indeed, in this meticulously detailed account of citizen involvement in three separate case studies, Sirianni shows how, when, and under what circumstances citizens can be active partners in governance, not simply voters in elections.

Sirianni’s main argument is that when governments invest the time, money, and effort into building civic capacities of citizens and providing them significant roles in the policymaking process, everyone benefits. Citizens learn key skills, develop networks of like-minded individuals, and influence the final product. Government agencies produce policies that have citizen buy-in and support, but also take advantage of the key resources and knowledge in the public (the community’s assets). However, he argues that while citizen input is increasingly important, “civic capacities do not simply bubble up from the well-springs of community life, supplied by the bountiful aquifers of grand republican traditions” (p. 24).

Instead, government must create civic capacities. But they cannot do so by simply opening up the policymaking process and allowing citizen input. Enabling citizens to participate in governance means providing programs that train the public in both the substance of the topic and the skills of participation. It means granting them access to data. It means allowing them to affect both the way in which the issue is framed and the final outcome. It means earning their trust.

Lest it seem like government is doing all the work, Sirianni does not let citizens off the hook easily. He expects the public to respond to this empowerment with a renewed sense of civic responsibility. Citizens should not act like customers who need to have their wants and needs met, or even activists who make demands for their particular policies, but active participants who have a responsibility to work hard, consider trade-offs, and be true partners in the process.

To illustrate his eight core principles that constitute collaborative governance, Sirianni investigates three very different policymaking processes in Seattle, Washington (where the focus is on urban planning initiatives), Hampton, Virginia (where leaders were concerned with youth civic engagement), and, on the federal level, the Environmental Protection Agency. In each case, he conducts a series of interviews (many repeated over several years), direct field observation and participation observation. He supplements this with significant documentary evidence and secondary studies, and then submits each case for member checks.

In all three cases, Sirianni details the policy making and implementation process. These accounts are chockablock full of information, from the key players to the percent of people below the poverty level who were involved in a particular program, to the ways in which various elements were more or less successful. Students of public policy and urban policy will find these chapters especially illuminating in the ways in which they capture the intricacies of
policymaking and the possibilities of productive citizen involvement. Scholars of youth civic engagement may look to the experience of Hampton to illustrate how to nurture the active and productive involvement of young adults. Sirianni is careful to describe both the successes and the challenges of these three enterprises.

Although the topic of civic engagement is one that draws widely across disciplines, as evidenced by the breadth of studies that Sirianni references, there are times when the book appears to be directed at a narrower audience. This is due, in part, to the fact that the author never really defines his key terms. There is substantial debate about what constitutes civic engagement, but Sirianni does not enter into this fray, or bother to establish his own definition. Similarly, the way in which “collaborative civic action” is realized through the core principles is described, but not exactly defined. Sometimes, as with his examples of community policing in Chicago, Sirianni shows how an abstract idea is translated into a specific policy. The ways in which these lofty goals actually become particular practices do not become clear until the reader has reviewed the case studies.

What should recommend the book to a broader audience, however, is Sirianni’s fundamental orientation toward problem solving that endorses the notion that we live in an interconnected world. We see this orientation both in the substantive way that policies are framed and the procedural way in which they are addressed. So, substantively, issues must be addressed holistically, rather than piecemeal, taking into account the wide variety of interconnections. Procedurally, this means that in public policy making, citizens have to be at the table, not as token participants to provide a reaction to a government initiative, but as partners who have been provided the resources to be full contributors. This truly is a vision for the twenty-first century, and as Sirianni makes clear, the time is ripe for such action.

One of the main criticisms of social capital theory is its failure to explain why some people tend to benefit more from their social ties than others. Mario Luis Small has made a considerable advance toward addressing this criticism in Unexpected Gains. While different from his work on race and networks in urban communities, Villa Victoria (2004), this latest book is a natural extension of Small’s research agenda which attempts to explain the extent to which macro social structure shapes the context of individual interactions. Small’s hypothesis is that network inequality stems from variability in the organizations that individuals patronize.

The three major findings from this book are: (1) organizations contextualize individual-level social interaction for their members; (2) organizations are an important source of variability in network inequality; (3) in terms of forming positive relationships, individuals benefit more from organizations that they regularly patronize than from their own agency. These findings imply that the social structure dominates individual choices when it comes to obtaining resources through ties to others — a result that, while not unfamiliar to social network researchers, highlights the importance of formal group settings in shaping individual social outcomes, such as having more supportive ties, larger friendship networks, and greater access to resources.

The book is at once an ethnography of day care centers in New York City and a social network analysis of the parents who use centers in the Princeton Fragile Families Study. Readers of Small’s past work will recognize his mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. The centers and parents were selected from across the class, organizational type, and neighborhood spectra. Some readers may be skeptical of the choice of research site because of its specialized niche. Small adequately dissuades such concerns by


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pointing out that day care centers vary in many different ways: their size, extent of dependence on parental volunteers, neighborhood setting, wealth, and so on. Indeed, it is this variability that makes the choice of site ideal. He also highlights consistent findings from other sites (e.g., church groups, schools, beauty salons).

Small’s particular approach to studying social networks is best characterized as an “organizational embeddedness perspective,” to use his own term (p. 178). This perspective emphasizes social contexts rather than formal network structure which is the norm. The context, which stems from an organization’s characteristics, influences social behavior and individuals’ propensities to form stronger or weaker ties. Day care centers provided both formal and ad hoc opportunities for parents to interact: formal opportunities included parent-teacher meetings, field trips, and clean-up days; informal opportunities included child pick-up, drop-off, and postings on information boards. While individuals varied in their level of participation, Small’s evidence suggests that parents whose kids were enrolled in centers that provided more frequent social opportunities had better well-being and were more likely to form friendships at the center. Being embedded in an organization only improves one’s social outcomes to the extent that the organization provides adequate resources that facilitate social interaction.

The book has some limitations and challenges. First, while Small should be commended for combining qualitative interviews with quantitative surveys, the methods are more supplementary than complimentary. The survey questions employ very broad measures of social network properties, whose interpretations have to be stretched to fit the research question. For example, the log-number of friends is used as a proxy for the extent of a subject’s prior sociability; past work suggests who counts as friends varies across individuals. Also, the interviewers asked questions about how often parents interacted with ties formed in centers but there were no corresponding survey questions. We do not have an adequate way to evaluate whether the relationship to a friend formed in a center is the same as one formed outside the center. As noted in the appendix, collecting the actual support network data on these subjects would have been too costly.

Second, by framing his research within the spectre of social capital theory, Small may have overlooked sources of potential conflict or “unanticipated losses” for his subjects. For example, Small notes that parents often use their own networks to find centers despite the competitive nature of placing children in centers; we would expect some relationships between parents to suffer because of this competition. Small’s brief discussion of “negative social capital” raises the issue of potential conflict between the organization and the parents, but no comment is made about the potential for negative relationships to form between parents vis-à-vis the organization. Finally, while Small dedicates the first chapter to social capital theory, it is unclear how that theory motivates expectations for individual social networks in this specific study nor how he would falsify those expectations. A detailed discussion of how to rectify his findings with social capital theory would have greatly improved the concluding chapter.

Despite the limitations, Small’s contribution is worth the read. Small is a good writer and his style is easily read by both general and academic audiences. I recommend this book to both organizational sociologists and sociologists of the family (despite Small’s protest that the work is not a study of family issues) who require more depth into how the macro shapes the micro in terms of human relationships. For the social capital literature, his primary finding that organizational embeddedness shapes individual level social network properties is a great clue toward understanding latent sources of network inequality.
at Wellesley College in 2007 entitled “Environmental Justice Cross-Culturally: Theory and Praxis in the African Diaspora and in Africa.” Filomina Steady organizes twelve chapters into three parts, with the first part including three chapters under the heading “Linking History, Theory and Praxis.” Glenda Johnson’s brief history of the environmental justice movement, Steady’s cross-cultural examination of environmental justice (EJ) theories and praxis in the African Diaspora and in Africa, and Celene Krauss’s discussion of African American women’s activism at the front line of the movement are solid contributions to expanding our understanding of how environmental justice became synonymous with environmental racism and human victimization. Indeed, Steady’s criticism of neoliberalism and economic globalization within the context of critical race theory (CRT) are important elements for recognizing universal and institutionalized forms of “structured expendability (SE)”. SE is the systematic and recurrent exploitation against black and other people of color by powerful actors who benefit by the creation and perpetuation of economic, political, and social class inequities within and across societies. Krauss demonstrates the marginalization of African American women who challenged the multiple layers of racism within their communities and interpreted the dumping of toxic wastes as a metaphor for powerlessness and political exclusion. As she states, “…the meaning of the environment itself became a contested terrain, reflecting, in part, the ways in which experiences of race, class, and gender mediated their different environmental interpretations” (p. 83). Women’s narratives reflect both their questioning of the mainstream environmental movement’s power to decide which issues should have priority, and their resenting these organizations’ assumption that “Blacks weren’t interested in the environment” (p. 83).

The concepts of SE, domination, and exploitation are reified in the second and largest part of the book. Ten case studies are presented on a global and historical stage to define the African Diaspora, to demonstrate the universality of environmental racism and the structural expendability of blacks, and to validate empirically the environmental injustice paradigm. Christen Smith examines the “epistemology of blackness” and its consequences for police violence in the city of Salvador, Brazil. The racial paradox she notes that exists between Brazil’s alleged racial harmony and the complex realities of racism prevailing throughout Brazilian society mirrors the disparities, noted by Steady and others, between neoliberal/democratic dialogue and the realities of environmental injustice. Leith Dunn directs attention to the Caribbean Diaspora and Jamaica. She addresses a spectrum of impacts caused by natural disasters, climate change, bauxite mining, and tourism in the region on gender inequalities. She advises that the needs and resources of men and women of different age groups and socioeconomic backgrounds should be reflected in management strategies and policies, if they are to be effective.

In addition to Steady’s chapter about the African Diaspora, Francis Adeola and David Tabachnick’s chapters regarding oil development in the Niger Delta of Nigeria and common-property institutional alternatives in Guinea are the most interesting selections in this text and should have a place in any environmental justice curriculum. Adeola skillfully conducts a holistic analysis to explain the axis of crude oil-induced violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria with its enduring legacies of neo- and internal colonialism and ethno-regional politics. Tabachnick’s chapter is a lucid thesis about the English and French historical property systems and their relevance for pro-market versus pro-communal property policies in Guinea. The intriguing application of this chapter is its potential as a counter-argument to Garrett Hardin’s over-worked “Tragedy of the Commons” in which he makes the assumption that the human tendency to fulfill self interests in a resource commons will result in ecological abuse of the commons. Mashile Phalane and Filomina Steady collaborate to argue that international dumping of toxic waste and the expansion of the nuclear energy industry are underlain by remnants of de facto apartheid (apartheid was constitutionally banned in 1994) and are environmental justice issues in South Africa. Black Africans constitute eighty percent of the population, yet own only thirteen percent of the land. This chapter is a gripping exposé of apartheid
policies having residentially segregated Black South Africans and targeting these areas for the dumping of 190 tons of mercury laden waste products by Thor Chemicals in the late 1980s.

Pashington Obeng’s chapter examines four cases from Uttara (northern) Kannada in southwestern India. A majority of Siddis, or present-day African Indians, live in the states of Gujarat, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra as dispossessed peasants in a de facto caste system that was outlawed in 1948. The Siddis use roadblocks (rasta rokos) and fasting (upavasa satya-graha) to protest biopiracy and other environmental injustices enacted upon them. According to Obeng, the expropriation of Siddis and other peasants’ land is a form of ecological terrorism committed “... for greed, power, profit, and ruthless depersonalization of minorities and the powerless” (p. 206). Judy Wang contributes the last chapter in this section. She overviews the efforts of non-governmental organizations such as the Black Environmental Network (BEN) to strengthen the participation of ethnic minorities in environmental activism.

The final part of Steady’s text includes only two chapters. Hope Lewis critically assesses Hurricane Katrina’s devastation both as a natural disaster and as a debacle of governmental and organizational dysfunction, inaction, and abusive neglect in response to the hurricane’s victims. Lewis is correct to encourage, as others do in this text, that blacks and others at the grassroots level should be vigilant, informed participants in correcting the failure of democratic neoliberalism. In the concluding chapter, Clemora Hudson-Weems places eight examples on a continuum representing the severity of environmental racism in America. Her chapter is a potpourri of information and arguments that occurred in prior chapters and makes a limited substantive contribution to the text. The extremes of her continuum are at one end the 1955 murder of Emmett Till for whistling at a twenty-one year old woman in Money, Mississippi. At the other end, the gentrification of post-Katrina New Orleans parallels the development of Hilton Head, South Carolina, where lower- and working-class blacks were replaced by affluent whites as a result of strategic taxation, and assessment and predatory lending practices.

Overall, Steady has selected and presented several interesting chapters that are conceptually linked by a simple but tragic fact: powerful people, organizations, and governments have viewed historically and currently blacks in the African Diaspora and in Africa as expendable and targeted them for environmental, social, economic, and political exploitation. In a 1970 speech to the Organization of Afro-American Unity, Malcolm X pleaded that, “We have to make the world see that the problem that we’re confronted with is a problem for humanity [my emphasis]. It is not a Negro problem; it is not an American problem...” Perhaps the question that should be asked is, “If the protection of these rights cannot be assured in the United States for all peoples, how can Americans demand the enforcement of these rights by other societies?”


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Alexis de Tocqueville never wrote a treatise on political economy. Nor, it seems, was he greatly influenced by the political economists of his day. Nor, for that matter, did he ever write much about purely economic questions. From this has followed the conclusion that Tocqueville was not interested in economic matters. Richard Swedberg disagrees with this conclusion. In his view, Tocqueville’s analysis of economic phenomena is “as interesting and evocative” (p.1) as anything he wrote about politics. Whilst many commentators on Tocqueville would find this view to be both exaggerated and implausible, Swedberg is firmly of the opinion that, if understood properly, Tocqueville can be seen to have made a major contribution to our understanding of modern industrial capitalism and, moreover, that his views on this subject are still of relevance today.
Central to this challenging thesis are the arguments that Tocqueville saw the economy as being indissolubly connected to the rest of society—there was no separate sphere of the economy—and that what especially marked out Tocqueville’s approach was his “way of thinking” (p.5) about the economy. Herein, according to Swedberg, lies “the greatness of Tocqueville” (p.281).

Given the above, it is not surprising that Swedberg devotes considerable time and attention to a discussion of Tocqueville’s methodology of economic investigation. This he does throughout the volume, revealing the intricacies of what he broadly characterises as Tocqueville’s inductive and comparative method. Seen thus, Tocqueville’s distinctiveness and originality is found in his capacity for synthetic thinking in economic matters. This had many dimensions (each summarized in Swedberg’s conclusion) but, in terms of Swedberg’s overall argument, the most important of these is that the economy is as integral part of a human community as is its religion or politics.

In truth, there are times when this argument seems stretched too far and even Swedberg himself admits that the result of Tocqueville’s labor was “not very rich” (p.171) but, taken as a whole, Swedberg’s approach allows him to provide an alternative and novel re-reading of both Tocqueville’s political career and his writings. Here the greatest obstacle arises from the well-known assertion that in Democracy in America Tocqueville showed himself to be completely disinterested in the economic life and development of the United States. Swedberg forcibly argues the contrary case, suggesting that Tocqueville provided “long and carefully constructed analyses” (p.69) of American economic phenomena, that he did so in an original and pioneering way, and that, as such, he should be recognized as the first social scientist of any stature to have analyzed “the emerging entrepreneurial economy in the United States, including the new phenomenon of mass consumption and the importance of a dynamic organizational culture” (p.69). Excluded from America’s democratic economy were women, African and Native Americans, the poor and those unfortunate enough to find themselves in U.S. penitentiaries.

It is with similar intent that Swedberg journeys through Tocqueville’s writings from the 1830s until his death in 1859, providing insightful explorations of Tocqueville’s visits to (industrial) England and (impoverished) Ireland, his response to the then-pressing question of pauperism, his actions and views as a local and national politician and journalist in the 1840s, his writings on French colonial expansion (in Algeria in particular), his interventions in the heated debates of the Second Republic after 1848 and, finally, “the return to thinking” (p.219) exhibited most clearly in Tocqueville’s second masterpiece, The Old Regime and the Revolution. This, it should be said, makes for fascinating reading and Swedberg shows a comprehensive knowledge of his sources throughout. There is little, if any, of Tocqueville’s output that seems to have escaped his attention. Nor does Swedberg skate over the difficulties posed by Tocqueville’s writings. Tocqueville remained distinctly hostile to all efforts on the part of government to relieve the poverty of the poor. After the Revolution of 1848 he was an articulate opponent of the right to work, showing a decided lack of sentimentality towards the plight of the urban working class. Above all, Tocqueville’s attachment to personal liberty appeared not to extend to the indigenous population of a colonized Algeria.

For all that, Swedberg is of the opinion that there is much to be admired in Tocqueville’s thoughts on what, following Max Weber, he terms “social economics” (p.274). In Tocqueville, he writes, can be found “the beginnings of a political economy of freedom.” Although never fully formulated, “his basic suggestion is that if liberty is given first priority, by an individual or a country, the economy will flourish in the long run” (p.263). Economic liberty, however, could not be separated from social mores and what Tocqueville referred to as habits of the heart. Nor should they be, for, if they were, we would be left with nothing but the selfish pursuit of individual prosperity.

In summary, Richard Swedberg has written an original and erudite interpretation of a largely-ignored dimension of Tocqueville’s work and, in so doing, has extended our understanding of the ideas of one of the
major thinkers of the nineteenth century. The book is also finely produced and contains an excellent selection of well-chosen and humorous illustrations.


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Young People Making a Life is an interesting book that speaks directly to three powerful currents in contemporary life course studies. The first is a desire to tackle the “inner side” of the life course, specifically to unpack the subjective dimensions of life course stages, transitions, and pathways, and Ani Wierenga does an admirable job detailing the thoughts, feelings, aims, and interpretations of a particular group of adolescents transitioning into adulthood. The second current is the effort to understand life course stages and transitions, particularly adolescence and the transition to adulthood, within a global context and to detail both how life courses unfold in relation to the globalizing world and how life courses are profoundly (and differentially) shaped by their unique socio-cultural context. Studying the young people of Myrtle Vale on the southern tip of Tasmania, Young People Making a Life clearly tests the scope of conditions of contemporary thinking and does so in useful ways. Third, the book makes serious efforts to link to contemporary social theory, including questions of structure and agency, reflexivity and temporality, and subjectivity and trust. Here, Young People Making a Life aims high and seeks to extend the conceptual boundaries of current life course theory in important and powerful ways.

This book is an analytic story of the lives of 32 teens that are transitioning into adulthood in the context of a small, rural village undergoing significant economic change. The teens were initially interviewed around age 12 and were followed up over a period of 12 years. The orienting theme of the book is a typology of practices of “storying,” of how young people are differently orienting themselves to the project of making a life. At the start, practices of storying are broken down into four types that are organized around two dimensions: focus that is either global or local and stories of identity that are either clear or unclear. The four types that result are “exploring” as global and clear, “wandering” as global and unclear, “settling” as local and clear, and “retreating” as local and unclear. These typologies subsequently guide the organization of the transition to adulthood by linking class and gender (e.g., explorers are predominantly middle class and female working class), by delineating ideas about social life and the trust that individuals have in those sources (e.g., retreaters have low trust in more homogenous networks such as peers or isolated family members), by describing cultural orientations in life course transitions (i.e., global versus local and specific versus vague [stories of what they’re doing]), and by shaping means, goals, sources, and resource flows (e.g., “wandering” involves global goals and few means of attainment).

This book is really about practice, about the ways in which young people articulate stories about their lives and how these stories are connected to broader social contexts of geography, community, mass media, schools, peers, and family. As such it does a fine job detailing the different types of “storying” that characterize the lives and life course transitions of those being studied. Moreover, given the broader pattern of de-institutionalization that is characterizing nations in general, at least Western ones, and the resulting claims about the “individualization” of the life course, there is value in the typology offered and how it can help make sense of varied pathways through life in contexts far removed from Myrtle Vale.

At the same time, many American social scientists may be less impressed with the final product. First, the preponderance of theoretical terms and ties to varied strands of thinking is at times dizzying. Page after page, term after term accumulate and one is often left wondering what the take-away message is. Second, the methods and analytic strategy are opaque, maybe to the point of worrisome. Reading through 10 chapters to figure out exactly how and when the
interviews were conducted. I learned, in the final chapter, that the research involved “formal interviews over six years, and then continued conversations with most respondents for over ten years, well into adulthood” (p. 200). This is far below my comfort level for methodological rigor (and a final chapter on “Research and Theory as Grounded Social Practice” [Chapter 11], while interesting, did little to clarify things). Third, many of the arguments seem old news and not particularly innovative. Two decades of research by Arnett, Elder, Furstenberg, Mortimer, Settersten, and Shanahan (to name but a few) have suggested similar processes at work and similar mechanisms in play. (Two chapters are devoted to the topics of “resources” and “resource flows” and conclude that such things matter!) While we should perhaps all read White and Wyn in the spirit of increasing the scope and diversity of our intellectual influences, all the claims to detailed assessment of subjectivity and serious attention to joint issues of structure and agency did not seem to produce any particular insight. Finally, the policy prescriptions (Chapter 10) seem vague and unconnected to the nuances of the research: they seemed to disregard the different ways of “storying” that are the fundamental bridge between structure and agency and hence should provide a strong base from which to tailor social supports/interventions. An opportunity was missed here.

Still, Young People Making a Life does have value. In detailing the problems and difficulties of making a life in Myrtle Vale, it echoes the problems of making a life in fishing villages in Scotland, forestry towns in Canada, farm communities in the American Midwest, and any other setting grappling with devolution of local economy in the context of a globalizing world. Given that this is increasingly the way of things, accounting the stories of 32 teens transitioning to adulthood in the southern tip of Tasmania does pay off.

Women’s Migration Networks in Mexico and Beyond, by Tamar Diana Wilson. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2009. 214pp. $26.95 paper. ISBN: 9780826347206. JOANNA DREBY Kent State University jdreby@kent.edu

Mexican migration patterns to the United States have changed significantly from times past. Women’s Migration Networks in Mexico and Beyond takes us into the complexity of the social networks that underlie these new migration patterns. Drawing on life history interviews and long-term participant-observation with members of one Mexican family, Tamar Wilson illustrates how internal migration may be related to international migration, how women can be important nodal points in the social networks that facilitate migration, and the ways that social networks can both expand and contract in transnational spaces.

During the mid-twentieth century most Mexican migrants were men, often temporary labor migrants, from agricultural communities in the states just north of Mexico City. Today these migrants are joined by others including women, urban residents, members of the middle classes, and those from the southern states of Puebla, Oaxaca, Chiapas, among others. Since the 1990s, Mexican populations have also been growing in “new destinations” throughout the United States, and strong transnational ties between sending and receiving communities and between family members on both sides of the border are common. Simultaneously, U.S. immigration policy has become increasingly restrictive and Mexicans are settling in the United States more than they did in the past.

In some ways, Wilson’s characters—Doña Consuelo in Mexico and two of her daughters, Irma and Anamaria in the United States—are representative of “new” Mexican migration patterns. Wilson is, after all, following the migration stories of women, not men. The U.S. migrants she interviewed are settled and are not involved in circular migration.

Yet in other ways, the women’s migratory experiences diverge from new trends in
Mexican migration. For one, Doña Consuelo was not raised in urban settings nor was she a member of the middle class that sought work in “el norte” after the Mexican debt crises. Quite to the contrary, Doña Consuelo grew up as a member of the landless poor. She had her 12 children (with four men) while traveling between ranchos and towns in Jalisco, Zacatecas, Mexicali and also in Mexico City. Unlike migrants from the states of Puebla and Oaxaca, Doña Consuelo did not have strong ties to the town of her birth and in fact, she was only able to gain property by participating in land invasions in the border town of Mexicali—the “Colonia Popular.” Nonetheless, Doña Consuela’s migration to the border helps explain how two of her daughters ended up following their husbands to the United States. A question worth asking is how frequently female migration to the United States is preceded by internal migrations within Mexico.

Doña Consuelo and her kin are not members of the type of transnational community researchers typically describe. They do not, for example, participate in trans-border organizations. In fact, the ties Irma and Anamaría have with other migrants from Mexicali are reinforced more through the rituals of compadrazgo than through a shared identity of members of a transnational or migrant community. Transnational network ties are not to be taken as a given, Wilson suggests, but rather expand or contract given particular needs.

Moreover, Irma and Anamaría’s social networks point to what may be a new feature of contemporary Mexican migration: the centrality of women to the migration of men. One of the most interesting implications of this book is the role sisters play in facilitating the expansion of migration networks in the United States. Wilson suggests that “network extension is facilitated through sisters’ marrying men who migrate to different places in the United States. Their brothers can then pick or choose where they want to try out...people who once had few if any network ties to the United States now have such ties” (p. 164). That siblings’ marital patterns help explain the proliferation of Mexican migration to new destinations in the United States is fascinating. Of course, Wilson cannot provide us with enough data from the experiences of one family to support this claim, but it is an interesting area for further research.

Women’s Migration Networks in Mexico and Beyond is a short book, but not a simple one. Taking us through the maze of the women’s network ties, the overall storyline is not always clear. Wilson presents an overview of the literature early on, leaving the reader to make conclusions about how the peculiarities of Doña Consuelo and her kin’s experiences fit. The topics are interesting, but the overarching thesis is ultimately unclear.

More guidance would have been helpful in interpreting the lengthy excerpts Wilson offers from her field notes and interview transcripts. The stories of each of the family members are at times not always easy to follow, but her candidness has value in making it easy to imagine, for example, the hard bed Wilson shared with Doña Consuelo on a sleepless night in the Colonia Popular. However, the effect of presenting the stories with little to no interpretation distances the reader from Doña Consuelo and her kin. Wilson spent two decades with this particular family (from 1988 to 2009) and in fact, writes that she married a man from the Colonia Popular and helped pay for the schooling of Anamaría and her cousin. Wilson would have done well to share more of the commonalities she experienced with the family to make the book a more effective tribute to Doña Consuelo’s experiences.

Women’s Migration Networks in Mexico and Beyond takes up important themes in Mexican migration overlooked by other researchers. Wilson’s in-depth work highlights the complexities surrounding women’s involvement to migratory networks both within a country and beyond its borders. This is certainly a worthy topic of inquiry and one that needs to be explored in other contexts.


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In this well-researched and well-organized book, Guobin Yang offers an engaging
account of a new type of citizen activism in China. Sandwiched between the introduction and conclusion are eight empirical chapters, organized by Yang’s analytical frame of “multi-interactionism” (pp. 6–10). Chapter One provides an overview of how China has entered an age of contention since the 1990s, which differs profoundly from the 1989 student movement in form (more mundane), content (more diverse), and style (more playful and irreverent). Chapter Two details the tug-of-war between state control and citizen resistance over the freedom to inhabit cyberspace, with the outcomes largely being shaped by “issue resonance” and “issue-specific opportunity structure.” The following two chapters shift the discussion from state-society relationship to cultures of online activism. The current rituals, genres, and styles, Yang argues, constitute a sharp contrast to those of traditional social movements in China: a contrast between the prosaic/pragmatic/profane and the sublime/spiritual/sacred. In this new age, an online group might turn its “inaugural statement into a technical manual [about how to evade government censorship]” (p. 92), expressing not only an orientation towards practicality but, more broadly, a spirit of defiance against any claims to sacredness, even that of their own activism. Chapter Five describes a symbiotic relationship between e-commerce and e-contention. Chapters Six and Seven discuss civic associations and civic ideals among online communities, revealing an emergent, grassroots civic identity that embraces the values of liberty, justice, and solidarity. The final empirical chapter documents the different approaches to online transnational activism, such as those taken by various INGOs, diasporic activists, and domestic protestors engaging in cross-border contention.

Arguably the first of its kind, Yang’s book makes several important contributions. With his impressive empirical data—collected through ethnographic research, content analysis, participant observation (by running his own blog), and survey research—Yang provides a long-awaited, extensive account of a new type of political activity that we all sense is noteworthy yet cannot fully grasp. While Yang never loses his empirical focus throughout the book, his sociological vision is broad and multifaceted. As he guides the reader through the landscape of Chinese online activism, Yang shows how this new space is embedded in, and shaped by, both the histories of social movements in China and the nation’s contemporary social and political transformations. As such, Yang’s book joins an important and timely debate about the potential for democratization in today’s China. Some readers will question whether some of Yang’s cases (e.g., a college girl’s online plea—later found to be not entirely truthful—for financial help for her ailing mother and the online community’s enthusiastic response) are not better described as civic engagement than activism per se. But the bottom line is that Yang's analysis is a convincing illustration of a significant recent development—the growth of a Montesquieuian vision of civil society—that departs decisively from the earlier model of corporatist civil society in China. Even as civic groups and online activists find it difficult or undesirable to challenge the state directly, their very existence serves to diversify and decentralize the articulation of power and becomes the first line of defense against political authoritarianism. Yang concludes that “as civic engagements in unofficial democracy expands, the distance to an officially institutionalized democracy shortens” (p. 226).

Yang’s bold and optimistic prediction is inspiring, even as it raises questions that warrant further debate and research. First, it can be difficult to fully appreciate the political potential of China’s “unofficial democracy” without concretely discussing its limits. Yang makes it clear that, although certain political boundaries are not to be crossed, there is a sizable gray area where “netizens” vividly and artfully display their political and cultural imaginations. Yet given that there exist serious institutional barriers that have not been—and probably cannot be—overcome by political and cultural imaginations alone, one desires a fuller theorization of the limits of the capacity of online activism to “shorten the distance to officially institutionalized democracy.” And at the risk of subscribing to the irreverent online culture that Yang describes (I am submitting this review over email, after all), I also wonder: is not there some online activism that is
nonchalant or cynical about democracy? How should we conceptualize the role of such activism in the broader picture of China’s current political culture?

Second, as the world of online activism that Yang conveys is explicitly diverse, how do we evaluate the political potential of different online activities? A blogger publishing her sexual diary online and a group of “cybernationalists” hacking into foreign websites are both protestors in some sense, but the political meanings of their actions are different, ranging far beyond their shared status of being “non-state.” How are we to conceptualize such differences?

On a related note, Yang’s account portrays a commoners’ activism that challenges social injustice and pursues a sense of recognition and belonging, but as feminist and Gramscian scholars often remind us, even in doing so commoners themselves may perpetuate forms of social injustice and misrecognition. Whereas Yang’s online world is populated by people with various gender, class, and ethnic backgrounds, it is less clear how their online cultures might be gendered, classed, or racialized. Asking questions about potential biases in online activism does not contradict the political energy that Yang so skillfully documents; rather, as Jeffrey Alexander argues, through inquiring about how civic groups overcome (or not) their ubiquitous exclusionary tendencies, we can more concretely describe the reflexive and self-expanding capacities of civil society.

Overall, The Power of the Internet in China offers us not only a rich study of Chinese online activism but also raises significant questions about China’s civil society. It will no doubt be an important book for students of political sociology and contemporary Chinese society alike.